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1.1 baCKgroUnD
Health policymakers around the world are confronted with the challenging task of 
increasing efficiency, quality, and consumer responsiveness in healthcare. Policymak-
ers in the Netherlands (and in several other European countries; e.g. Germany and 
Switzerland) approached this task by taking steps towards regulated (or managed) 
competition in healthcare, as defined by Enthoven (1978, 1988a, 1988b). The introduc-
tion of the Health Insurance Act (HIA, Zorgverzekeringswet) in 2006 was an important 
step towards regulated competition in the Dutch basic health insurance (BI) market. For 
many years, the government planned the capacity and regulated the tariffs in the Dutch 
healthcare system. However, because this top-down strategy did not contain sufficient 
incentives to enhance efficiency, quality, and consumer responsiveness in healthcare, 
it has been replaced with regulated competition. The introduction of regulated competi-
tion has changed the role of insurers fundamentally: instead of being only the third-party 
‘payers of care’, insurers have become also the third-party ‘purchasers of care’. In this 
new role, insurers have to negotiate with healthcare providers on the price, quality, and 
quantity of care. As critical purchasers of care on behalf of their consumers, insurers 
are allowed to selectively contract with healthcare providers; e.g. with only the best 
and most efficient healthcare providers. Thus, insurers can limit consumer choice of 
healthcare provider to that of the selected providers.
In the regulated competition setting, the government sets, as regulator of the mar-
ket, the rules of the ‘regulated competition game’. These rules should contribute to the 
fulfillment of the following essential preconditions for achieving efficiency1 in healthcare: 
1) consumer choice of insurer, 2) consumer information and market transparency, 3) 
risk-bearing buyers and sellers, 4) contestable markets, 5) freedom to contract and 
integrate, 6) effective competition regulation, and 7) effective quality supervision, and 
to the following crucial preconditions for achieving affordability2 in healthcare: 1) cross-
subsidies without incentives for risk selection, 2) cross-subsidies without opportunities 
for free riding, 3) effective quality supervision, and 4) guaranteed access to basic care 
(Van de Ven et al., 2013).
The first part of this dissertation focuses on one of the crucial preconditions for 
achieving the intended results of regulated competition: consumer choice of insurer. We 
empirically examine whether consumers are free to easily switch insurer and introduce 
potential strategies to improve consumer choice of insurer. Most analysts (Miller and 
Luft, 1994; Folland et al., 2010) consider selective contracting with healthcare providers 
1 We use the same definition of efficiency as Van de Ven et al. (2009): ‘’as low as possible unit 
costs for a given quality of care’’.
2 Van de Ven et al. (2013) have defined affordability as follows: ‘’everyone has access to afford-
able health insurance covering a basic care package of services of acceptable quality within 
reasonable travel time and without undue waiting time’’.
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as the main tool that insurers have to stimulate efficiency in healthcare. The credible 
threat for healthcare providers of having no contract with an insurer – which may result 
in less patients and less income for them – stimulates price- and quality competition 
in the healthcare provision market. However, if consumers are unwilling to give up (to 
some extent) their unlimited free choice of healthcare provider in return for a lower 
premium, they will not take out the insurance products with a limited healthcare provider 
choice. Because the threat of selective contracting will then be substantially reduced 
for healthcare providers, regulated competition will be less able to enhance efficiency 
in healthcare. The United States were about 20 years ago confronted with a substantial 
backlash against selective contracting (i.e. the ‘’managed care backlash’’). The second 
part of this dissertation evaluates the causes of this backlash and seeks lessons for the 
Netherlands.
This dissertation integrates evidence from different disciplines; such as health 
policy, health economics, behavioral economics, and health law. Although it focuses on 
the Dutch context, the conclusions and policy recommendations can also be relevant 
for other European countries that have taken steps towards regulated competition or 
countries that intend to do so (e.g. Australia, Ireland, and Russia).
1.2 ConsUMer CHoICe of HealtH InsUrer
The threat of consumers switching to a competitor must continuously stimulate insurers 
to be responsive to consumer preferences.3 The government facilitates this consumer 
choice of insurer by enforcing open enrollment, a standardized basic benefit pack-
age, community-rated premiums, and a risk equalization system that should eliminate 
predictable losses and profits in healthcare expenditures among different consumer 
groups. In markets with homogeneous preferences, all consumers will benefit from 
the critical choice of a minority, because a few critical consumers can be sufficient 
to spur insurers to be responsive to consumer preferences. However, in healthcare, 
consumer preferences are highly heterogeneous. For example, low-risks (i.e. young 
or healthy consumers) are mainly interested in price (Buchmueller, 2000), while high-
risks (i.e. elderly or unhealthy consumers) value also (the quality of) the composition 
of the provider network (Beaulieu, 2002). This implies that if groups of consumers with 
specific preferences are not free or feel not free to easily switch insurer, insurers have 
lower incentives to accommodate the specific preferences of these consumers than 
the preferences of other consumers. This would be particularly problematic if these 
consumers are those with the most healthcare needs, because insurers have then most 
3 The assumption is that the risk equalization model does sufficiently eliminate predictable dif-
ferences in healthcare expenditures among different risk groups of consumers. 
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likely reduced incentives to act as quality-conscious purchasers of care for them. This 
led to the following central question of the first part of this dissertation:
Are all consumer groups with specific preferences free and do they feel free to easily 
switch insurer in the Dutch basic health insurance market? If not, what are potential 
strategies to improve consumer choice of insurer?
In order to answer this central question, we formulated 5 research questions. These 
research questions will be answered by both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods.
research questions
The media pay a lot of attention to the total percentage of consumers switching insurer 
(e.g. Financieele Dagblad, 2015), while the switching rates of different groups of con-
sumers receive less attention. However, in the context of regulated competition, what 
matters is that all consumer groups with specific preferences feel free to vote with their 
feet. Previous studies (e.g. Alterly et al., 2005; Shmueli et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 
2008; Mosca and Schut-Welkzijn, 2008; Dormont et al., 2009; Reitsma-van Rooijen 
et al., 2011; Boonen et al., 2015) showed that young consumers are more inclined to 
switch insurer than elderly consumers. These studies used subjective health informa-
tion (e.g. self-reported health, diseases, and healthcare utilization) to compare the 
switching behavior of healthy and unhealthy consumers. Our study contributes to these 
previous studies by using administrative data on nearly the entire Dutch population 
(n=15.3 million individuals) with objective health information (i.e. medically diagnosed 
diseases, pharmaceutical use, and healthcare expenditures) to answer the following 
research question:
Q1: To what extent do switching rates differ between low-risks and high-risks?
This first research question has a descriptive character. Because it remains unclear 
whether the differences in the switching behavior of groups of consumers are problem-
atic, the following research questions aim at explaining these differences. Consumers 
will switch insurer if their perceived switching benefits outweigh their perceived switching 
costs (Scanlon et al., 1997; Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004). In the literature, a conceptual 
framework providing insight into the potential switching benefits and switching costs 
in a competitive health insurance market is lacking. This led to the following research 
question:
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Q2: What are potential switching benefits and costs in the competitive health insurance 
market?
Low switching rates among specific groups of consumers may be explained by low 
perceived switching benefits due to satisfaction with the current insurer. However, sub-
stantial perceived switching costs that outweigh the perceived switching benefits may 
also hinder consumers from switching, even when they are dissatisfied (Schlesinger et 
al., 1999). Insurers will then have lower incentives to accommodate the specific prefer-
ences of the consumer groups who perceive high switching costs compared to their 
switching benefits than to accommodate the preferences of the other consumer groups. 
Therefore, it is important to have insight into the switching benefits and switching costs 
that influence the decision of (groups of) consumers to (not) switch insurer:
Q3: What are the main perceived switching benefits and costs in consumers’ decision 
to (not) switch insurer?
About 85-90 percent of the Dutch population voluntarily take out supplementary in-
surance (SI) for benefits not covered by BI, such as alternative care, glasses, and 
paramedic care (Vektis 2012; Vektis, 2013; Vektis, 2014). More than 99 of them take out 
BI and SI from the same insurer (NZa, 2014a), because one-stop shopping has several 
advantages (e.g. a good coordination of basic and supplemental benefits). In addition, 
most insurers make it unattractive or impossible to take out separate SI (Roos and 
Schut, 2012). Consequently, consumers’ decision to switch insurer for BI is also influ-
enced by their perceived switching benefits and perceived switching costs regarding SI.
Because of EU regulation, the Dutch government is not allowed to regulate the 
SI market. This implies that insurers are permitted to refuse applicants or to charge 
risk-rated premiums for SI. However, in the first two years after the introduction of the 
HIA, insurers collectively agreed to accept all consumers for the majority of their SI 
products and to charge mostly community-rated premiums for these products. Thus, 
all consumers had the possibility to take out their preferred SI product with an (almost) 
community-rated premium. Although since 2008 the collective agreement did no longer 
exist, all insurers have incorporated a guaranteed renewability (GR) in each SI (Roos 
and Schut, 2012). This GR consists of a guaranteed renewal of the annual SI contract 
with an equal adjustment of the premium and the insurance conditions for all current 
consumers with that specific SI (Van de Ven and Schut, 2011). SI is therefore a switch-
ing cost for the consumers who fear that other insurers apply selective underwriting in 
their acceptance procedures for new enrollees. These consumers may fear that another 
insurer will not accept them for SI, while the renewal of their current SI is guaranteed. In 
other words, because switching to another insurer may result in the loss of the favorable 
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conditions of SI, SI is a potential switching cost for BI. This led to the following research 
questions:
Q4: To what extent is supplementary insurance a switching cost for basic health insur-
ance?
Q5: What are potential solutions to reduce supplementary insurance as a switching cost 
for basic health insurance?
1.3 ConsUMer CHoICe of HealtHCare ProvIDer
Selective contracting in healthcare results in a limited choice of healthcare provider 
for consumers. The degree to which consumers are free to choose their healthcare 
provider depends upon: 1) the size of the contracted provider network and 2) the 
reimbursement level for non-contracted providers. Selective contracting will enhance 
efficiency in healthcare if consumers – and in particular those with the most healthcare 
needs – are willing to give up (to some extent) their unlimited free choice of healthcare 
provider in return for a lower premium.
The HIA and jurisprudence state that the insurer’s reimbursement level for non-
contracted providers may not hinder consumers from visiting these providers. Because 
this can be considered as a legal restriction on selective contracting in healthcare, 
the Dutch minister of Health, Welfare and Sport proposed an amendment to the HIA 
allowing insurers to provide consumers no reimbursement if they visit non-contracted 
healthcare providers. Healthcare provider organizations, together with consumer or-
ganizations and patient organizations, signed a manifest against this proposal (VvAA, 
2014), because they were hostile towards restrictions on healthcare provider choice. 
Eventually, the proposal was rejected by the Senate. This indicates a backlash against 
selective contracting in the Netherlands even before insurers do actually selectively 
contract with healthcare providers.
While the Netherlands has its first experiences with selective contracting only 
recently, selective contracting has a long history in the United States. The American 
experiences show that selective contracting is a powerful instrument for controlling 
healthcare expenditures (Harris et al., 2000; Simonet, 2007), while it does not have 
a negative effect on the quality of care (Miller and Luft, 1997; Miller and Luft, 2002; 
Dowd, 2005; Rich and Erb, 2005). Despite the positive effects, American insurers and 
policymakers were during the late 1990s confronted with a substantial backlash against 
it (i.e. ‘’the managed care backlash’’). The Netherlands – and the other European coun-
tries that have taken steps towards regulated competition (e.g. Germany, and Switzer-
land) – may learn from the backlash against selective contracting in the United States. 
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Therefore, we evaluate the main causes of the American managed care backlash and 
seek lessons for the Netherlands. This led to the following central question of the 
second part of this dissertation:
What can the Netherlands learn from the managed care backlash in the United States?
1.4 strUCtUre of tHIs DIssertatIon
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 addresses the first research 
question. By doing so, it uses individual-level information on risk characteristics and 
healthcare expenses to determine which groups of consumers switched insurer in 2009. 
In addition, it uses 3-year sample data to compare the switching behavior of low-risks 
and high-risks in the period 2010-2012. Chapter 3 focuses on the second and third re-
search question. It integrates evidence from health economics, behavioral economics, 
and health policy to develop the conceptual framework with potential switching benefits 
and switching costs. It does further use an online questionnaire to assess to what extent 
the different switching benefits and switching costs were consumers’ main reasons for 
(not) switching insurer. The fourth and fifth research question are answered in chapter 
4 and chapter 5. Chapter 4 investigates to what extent SI is a perceived switching cost 
by consumers for BI. Chapter 5 analyzes whether SI is a real switching cost for BI. By 
doing so, it reviews insurers’ practices in the SI market between 2006-2009 and 2014-
2015. This review provides valuable information regarding the suitability of the proposed 
solutions to counteract SI as a switching cost for BI. Chapter 6 answers the question 
‘What can the Netherlands learn from the managed care backlash in the United States?’ 
by a literature review on the main causes of the American managed care backlash. 
Chapter 7 concludes, discusses the findings, and presents policy recommendations. 
Because chapter 2-6 are written as separate articles, they could be read independently.
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abstraCt
All consumer groups with specific preferences must feel free to easily switch insurer in 
order to discipline insurers to be responsive to consumers’ heterogeneous preferences. 
This chapter provides insight into the switching behavior of low-risks (i.e. young or 
healthy consumers) and high-risks (i.e. elderly or unhealthy consumers) in the Neth-
erlands in the period 2009-2012. We analyzed: 1) administrative data with objective 
health status information (i.e. medically diagnosed diseases and pharmaceutical use) 
and information on healthcare expenses of nearly the entire Dutch population (n=15.3 
million individuals) and 2) 3-year sample data (n=1,152 individuals). Our findings indi-
cate that switching rates strongly decrease with age. For example, in 2009, consumers 
aged 25-44 switched 10 times more than consumers aged 75 or older. Another finding is 
that switching rates decrease as the predicted healthcare expenses increase. Although 
healthy consumers switch twice as much as unhealthy consumers, this difference 
becomes much smaller after adjusting for age. We conclude that our findings can be 
explained by higher perceived switching costs by elderly consumers than by young 
consumers. Consequently, insurers have low incentives to act as quality-conscious pur-
chasers of care for the elderly consumers. Therefore, strategies should be developed 
to increase the choice of insurer of elderly consumers.
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2.1 IntroDUCtIon
In competitive health insurance markets, health insurers have the major task of pur-
chasing (or delivering) efficient and high-quality care on behalf of their consumers. They 
must also have the tools to do so, e.g. some freedom to define enrollees’ entitlements. 
In such multiple choice settings, consumers must have the freedom to choose on a 
regular basis the insurer that best satisfies their (healthcare) needs and preferences. 
The possibility of consumers switching to a competitor must continuously stimulate 
insurers to succeed in their roles of purchasers of care. This is assumed to enhance 
efficiency, consumer responsiveness, and quality in healthcare.
In markets with homogeneous consumer preferences, all consumers will benefit 
from the critical choice of a minority, because a few critical consumers can be sufficient 
to spur insurers to be responsive to consumer preferences. However, in healthcare, 
consumer preferences are highly heterogeneous. For example, young and healthy 
consumers have other preferences than old and unhealthy consumers. Consequently, 
if specific groups of consumers do not feel free to easily switch insurer, insurers have 
low incentives to accommodate the specific preferences of these groups of individuals. 
This would be in particular problematic if these consumers are those with the most 
healthcare needs (i.e. the elderly and unhealthy consumers), because insurers are then 
no longer spurred to act as quality-conscious purchasers of care for them.4
In this chapter we focus on the question to what extent switching rates differ between 
low-risks (i.e. young or healthy consumers) and high-risks (i.e. elderly or unhealthy con-
sumers) in the Netherlands in the period 2009-2012. Although we focus on switching 
rates in the Dutch context, the policy implications of our findings can also be relevant 
for other countries in which insurers are purchasers or suppliers of care and have some 
freedom to define enrollees’ entitlements (e.g. Israel, the HMO market in Switzerland, 
and the United States).
Previous studies in different Western countries showed that young consumers are 
more inclined to switch insurer than elderly consumers (Atherly et al., 2005; Shmueli 
et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 2008; Mosca and Schut-Welkzijn, 2008; Dormont et al., 
2009; Reitsma-van Rooijen et al., 2011; Boonen et al., 2015). Moreover, most of these 
previous studies concluded that healthy consumers do not switch more frequently than 
unhealthy consumers, after adjusting for the age differences between the two groups 
(Shmueli et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 2008; Dormont et al., 2009; Hoffmann and Icks, 
2011; Reitsma-van Rooijen et al., 2011).
4 We assume that the risk equalization model and the premium rate regulation provide insurers 
with incentives to provide good quality care to all enrollees, including the chronically ill (see 
e.g. Van de Ven, 2011).
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Our study is in different ways a valuable contribution to the current evidence regard-
ing consumers’ switching behavior in the health insurance market. Previous studies 
mainly used consumers’ self-reported health, (chronic) diseases, and prior healthcare 
utilization as health indicators (Mosca and Schut-Welkzijn, 2008; Dormont et al., 2009; 
Hoffmann and Icks, 2011; Lako et al., 2011; Boonen et al., 2015). However, Hoffmann 
and Icks (2011) and Dormont et al. (2009) considered the use of these subjective health 
measures and the lack of information regarding switchers’ and non-switchers’ health-
care expenses as serious limitations. In addition, most previous studies on consumers’ 
switching behavior used sample data instead of population data. Two major strengths 
of our study are therefore the use of: 1) information on objective health indicators (i.e. 
medically diagnosed diseases and pharmaceutical use) and healthcare expenses and 
2) population data of about 15.3 million individuals to compare low-risks’ and high-risks’ 
switching behavior in 2009.5 Atherly et al. (2005) and Shmueli et al. (2007) used also 
population data instead of sample data in their studies on consumers’ switching behav-
ior, but these studies lacked detailed information on consumers’ health status. There-
fore, our use of data with objective health information and information on healthcare 
expenses of nearly the entire population is a new approach for comparing high-risks’ 
and low-risks’ switching behavior.
Another major strength of our study is the comparison of low-risks’ and high-risks’ 
3-year switching rate. Only a small number of consumers is willing to decide on their 
health insurance each switching period (Tamm et al., 2007). Therefore, we also focus 
on low-risks’ and high-risks’ switching rates over multiple years by using sample data. 
Dormont et al. (2009) and Hoffmann and Icks (2011) have also focused on consumers’ 
switching behavior over multiple years. They asked consumers whether they switched 
insurer in the previous years. Because consumers may not remember whether they 
switched insurer several years ago, the use of a single question to evaluate consum-
ers’ switching behavior over multiple years may result in response bias. We asked 
the same individuals (n=1,152) recently after the switching period in 2010, 2011, and 
2012 whether they switched insurer in that period and evaluated whether they switched 
insurer (yes/no) in the period 2010-2012. This research method reduces the potential 
response bias.
5 De Jong et al. (2008), Hendriks et al. (2010), and Reitsma-van Rooijen et al. (2011) compared 
the switching behavior of a sample of ‘non-institutionalized consumers with a medically di-
agnosed chronic illness or disability’ with the switching behavior of a sample of the ‘general 
population’. It was unclear whether consumers belonging to the ‘general population’ suffered 
from a medically diagnosed chronic illness or disability (Hendriks et al., 2010). Advantages 
of our study are the inclusion of: (1) information about both institutionalized consumers and 
non-institutionalized consumers and (2) objective health information about almost the entire 
Dutch population.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, we describe the Dutch health insurance 
market. Secondly, we pay attention to the data and methods. Thirdly, we present our 
main results. Fourthly, we discuss potential interpretations of our results. Finally, we pay 
attention to some policy considerations and conclude.
2.2 tHe DUtCH HealtH InsUranCe MarKet
We focus on the switching behavior of Dutch consumers. These consumers are allowed 
to switch insurer on 1 January each year.6 In the Netherlands, the introduction of the 
Health Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet) in 2006 was an important step towards a 
nationwide competitive health insurance market. All inhabitants are legally obliged to 
take out basic health insurance (BI) from a private health insurer.7 Insurers are free 
to offer several BI products, which may differ, for example, in the panel of contracted 
healthcare providers and the deductible level. Insurers must accept each applicant for 
BI and must charge the same premium for the same BI product to each consumer, 
regardless of the consumer’s risk (i.e. community-rated premiums). Each insurer is free 
to set its own community-rated premium8 and to specify consumers’ precise entitle-
ments (e.g. the contracted healthcare providers and pharmaceuticals) in the BI product.
Consumers can voluntarily take out supplementary insurance (SI) for benefits not 
covered by BI. Insurers are allowed to refuse applicants or to charge risk-rated premi-
ums for SI. About 90 percent of all consumers take out SI. More than 99 percent of them 
take out BI and SI from the same insurer (Vektis, 2012), because almost all insurers 
make it unattractive or impossible for consumers to take out separate SI (Roos and 
Schut, 2012).9 Due to this joint purchase of BI and SI, the decision to switch insurer for 
BI is also influenced by consumers’ expectations regarding SI.
6 Consumers who turn 18 and consumers whom insurer increases the premium or changes the 
policy conditions have the right to switch immediately. We left this type of switching behavior 
out of consideration.
7 Total number of insurers operating nationwide: 30 in 2009, 28 in 2010, 27 in 2011, and 26 in 
2012 (NZa, 2009a; NZa, 2010; NZa, 2011; NZa, 2012).
8 The community-rated BI premiums equal 50 percent of the total insurers’ revenues for BI. The 
other 50 percent consists of income-related contributions that are allocated to the insurers via 
a risk equalization fund (Van Kleef et al., 2013).
9 For example, insurers offer SI only in combination with BI or require premium surcharges if a 
consumer only applies for SI.
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2.3 Data anD MetHoDs
We used both administrative data and questionnaires among an Internet panel to 
determine to what extent low-risks’ and high-risks’ switching behavior differed in the 
Netherlands in the period 2009-2012.
2.3.1 switching behavior in 2009
We used individual-level information on risk characteristics, healthcare expenses, and 
subscriptions of 95 percent of the Dutch population (n=15.3 million individuals) to deter-
mine which groups of consumers switched insurer on 1 January 2009.
Our analyses involved three steps. Firstly, we determined the switching behavior 
of different age groups. Secondly, we evaluated the switching behavior of healthy 
and unhealthy consumers by using objective health status indicators. In this respect, 
pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs), diagnoses-based cost groups (DCGs), and mul-
tiple-year high costs (MHC) are used as indicators (see Van Kleef et al., 2013 for more 
details about these indicators). Consumers are classified into one or more PCGs if they 
received in 2008 at least 180 daily dosages of a specific pharmaceutical. If consumers 
had a specific (hospital) diagnosis in 2008, they are classified into a DCG. Consumers 
are classified into a MHC if their healthcare expenses were in 2006, 2007, and 2008 at 
least in the top 15 percent of total healthcare expenses.10 Because the health indicators 
PCG, DCG, and MHC overlap with each other, we distinguished ‘healthy consumers’ 
(i.e. not classified into a PCG, DCG, and MHC) and ‘non-healthy consumers’ (i.e. clas-
sified into a PCG, DCG, and/or MHC). Thirdly, we determined consumers’ switching 
behavior by their predicted healthcare expenses for 2009. These predicted expenses 
are based upon the risk equalization formula of 2012, which uses the following risk 
adjusters: age/gender, region, source of income, PCGs, DCGs, socioeconomic status, 
and MHC (see Van Kleef et al., 2013).
2.3.2 switching behavior in the period 2010-2012
Because only a small number of consumers is willing to decide on their health insurance 
each switching period (Tamm et al., 2007), we also investigated consumers’ switching 
behavior over a three-year period (2010-2012). An online questionnaire was distributed 
in February 2010, February 2011, and February 2012 among members of the CentER-
panel aged 18 or older. Members of this panel complete questionnaires at home every 
week. An invitation to fill in the questionnaire was sent to 2,227 members in 2010, 2,665 
members in 2011, and 2,419 members in 2012. In 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively, 
1,963 respondents, 1,852 respondents, and 1,939 respondents fulfilled the complete 
questionnaire. We merged the samples of 2010, 2011, and 2012, and evaluated which 
10 For a detailed description of MHC see Van Kleef et al. (2013).
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respondents completed the questionnaire in all three years. We performed our analyses 
solely on the 1,152 respondents who completed the questionnaire in 2010, 2011, and 
2012. This sample of respondents was older than the general Dutch population. For 
example, the percentage of respondents aged 20-39 was in our research 15 compared 
to 33 in the population. Because we focus on switching rates within different consumer 
groups, the non-representative character of the sample may not seriously threaten 
the external validity of our results. Respondents have revealed whether they switched 
insurer in 2010, 2011, and 2012. The switching rates in these three years were, respec-
tively, 3.6 percent, 4.5 percent, and 3.8 percent. Although switchers may be more eager 
to respond to a consumer questionnaire about health insurance than non-switchers 
(Kerssens and Groenewegen, 2005), these switching rates are lower than the switching 
table 2.1 Background characteristics consumer questionnaires 2010-2012
available information operationalization data analyses sample (n=1,152)
Gender (n=1,152) -  Male 56.1%
-  Female 43.9%
Age in 2010, 2011, and 2012 (n=1,152) Age in 2011 56.33 years 
(average)
Self-reported health in 2010, 2011, and 
2012 (n=1,142)
Self-reported health in the period 2010-2012:
-  Bad -  At least in one year bad or moderate (i.e. 
bad or moderate)
22.5%
-  Moderate
-  Good -  All years good, very good, or excellent (i.e. 
good, very good, or excellent)
77.5%
-  Very good
-  Excellent
Self-reported disease (e.g. asthma, cancer, 
rheumatism, diabetes, and cardiovascular 
disease) in 2010, 2011, and 2012 
(n=1,152)
Self-reported disease in the period 2010-
2012:
-  None 32.2%
-  At most one self-reported disease in 2010, 
2011, and/or 2012 (i.e. at most one)
32.6%
-  At most two self-reported diseases in 
2010, 2011, and/or 2012 (i.e. at most two)
18.2%
-  At least three self-reported diseases in 
2010, 2011, and/or 2012 (i.e. at least 
three)
17.0%
Education in 2010, 2011, and 2012 
(n=1,143)
Education in 2011:
-  Low 32.4%
-  Middle 29.6%
-  High 38.0%
Supplementary insurance in 2010, 2011, 
and 2012 (n=1,024)
Supplementary insurance in the period 
2010-2012:
-  In all years (i.e. yes) 84.3%
-  At least in one year no supplementary 
insurance (i.e. no)
15.7%
26 Chapter 2
rates in the Dutch population (3.9 percent in 2010 (Vektis, 2010), 5.5 percent in 2011 
(Vektis, 2011), and 6.0 percent in 2012 (Vektis, 2012)). Because the switching rates in 
the separate years were low, we were not able to perform reliable analyses by using the 
panel data approach. Therefore, we focused only on the switching rate over these three 
years; i.e. did consumers switch at least once in the 3-year period 2010-2012 (yes/no)?
We obtained demographic information, health information, and insurance-related 
information about each respondent (Table 2.1). In contrast to the objective health mea-
sures used concerning consumers’ switching behavior in 2009 (see Section 2.3.1), we 
used self-reported health and self-reported disease(s) as health indicators for compar-
ing the switching behavior of healthy and unhealthy consumers in the period 2010-2012.
Different previous studies concluded that high-educated consumers were more in-
clined to switch than low-educated consumers (De Jong et al., 2008; Mosca and Schut-
Welkzijn, 2008; Lako et al., 2011; Reitsma-van Rooijen et al., 2011; Boonen et al., 
2015). In addition, Dormont et al. (2009) and Boonen et al. (2015) showed that having 
a SI is associated with a low switching propensity. Therefore, in the data analyses, we 
also focused on the switching behavior of low-, middle-, and high-educated consumers, 
and on the switching rates of consumers with SI and of consumers without SI.
Our analyses involved two steps. Firstly, we performed Pearson’s Chi square tests 
to determine whether the variables gender, age, self-reported health, self-reported 
disease(s), education, and holding a SI are correlated with switching insurer (yes/no) in 
the period 2010-2012. Secondly, we performed a binary logistic regression model with 
yi =1 if a consumer switched insurer at least once in the 3-year period 2010-2012 and 
yi =0 if a consumer stayed with his or her current insurer in that period. The switching 
model is derived from an underlying latent variable: y*i = X’iβ+εi, where yi =1 if y*i >0 
and yi =0 otherwise. X’iβ is a vector of the explanatory variables (i.e. gender, age, self-
reported health, self-reported disease(s), education, and holding a SI). In this respect, 
the latent variable represents the net benefit of switching health insurer. We present 
the odds ratios to illustrate the differences in the switching behavior of different con-
sumer groups. Odds ratios range between 0 and positive infinity. An odds ratio greater 
(smaller) than one indicates that a characteristic increases (decreases) the odds of 
switching compared to the reference group, ceteris paribus.
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2.4 resUlts
2.4.1 switching rates in 2009
Our results indicate that 2.81 percent of all consumers switched insurer on 1 January 
2009.11 Bivariate analyses (Table 2.2) show that females switched slightly more fre-
quently than males. Switching rates differ by a factor of 10 between young and elderly 
11 Vektis (2009) found that 3.5 percent of the Dutch population switched insurer in 2009. The dif-
ference can be explained by a different definition of ‘switcher’ and differences in the research 
population.
table 2.2 Percentage of consumers that switched insurer on 1 January 2009
size of the group as percentage of 
the total (n=15,279,552)
switching rate of 
the group
total 100.0 2.81
gender
Males 49.1 2.78
Females 50.9 2.85
age
Aged 0-17 21.2 3.26
Aged 18-24 8.4 4.97
Aged 25-44 27.0 3.81
Aged 45-64 27.7 2.07
Aged 65-74 8.6 0.87
Aged 75 or older 7.1 0.37
Pharmacy-based cost groups (PCgs)
Not classified in 2009 83.5 3.08
Classified into at least one PCG in 20091 16.5 1.46
Diagnoses-based cost groups (DCgs)
Not classified in 2009 97.5 2.86
Classified into a DCG in 20092 2.5 0.98
Multiple-year high costs (MHC)
Not classified in 2009 92.7 2.93
Classified into a MHC in 20093 7.3 1.30
Combination PCg, DCg, and MHC
Not classified into a PCG, DCG, and MHC in 
2009 (i.e. healthy consumers)
80.6 3.12
Classified into at least one PCG, DCG, or MHC 
in 2009 (i.e. unhealthy consumers)
19.4 1.54
1 These consumers received in 2008 at least 180 daily dosages of a specific pharmaceutical.
2 These consumers had a specific (hospital) diagnosis in 2008.
3 These consumers’ healthcare expenses were in 2006, 2007, and 2008 at least in the top 15 percent of 
total healthcare expenses.
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consumers: the annual switching rate was 3.81 percent at age 25-44 and decreased to 
0.37 percent at age 75 or older. About 5 percent of the consumers aged 18-24 switched 
insurer. The switching rates of children under the age of 18 follow the same pattern as 
the switching rates of their parents who are most likely aged 25-40 (Figure 2.1). The 
percentage of males switching to another insurer is highest at age 18 and 19, while 
the percentage of females switching to another insurer is highest at age 24 and 25. 
Females aged 18-30 were about 20 percent more inclined to switch insurer than males 
aged 18-30 (not presented in Tables and Figures).
Although healthy consumers switch twice as much as unhealthy consumers (Table 2.2), 
this difference becomes much smaller after adjusting for age (Figure 2.1). This finding 
is consistent with previous studies (see Section 2.1). At each age, healthy consumers 
are 10 to 20 percent more likely to switch than unhealthy consumers. Figure 2.2 shows 
that switching rates strongly decrease as the predicted healthcare expenses increase. 
For example, 5 percent of the consumers with very low predicted healthcare expenses 
switched insurer in 2009, while this percentage decreased to about 0.5 for consumers 
with very high predicted healthcare expenses.
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figure 2.1  Switching rates on 1 January 2009 of healthy consumers (i.e. in 2009 not classified into a PCG, 
DCG, and MHC) and unhealthy consumers (i.e. in 2009 classified into at least one PCG, DCG, 
or MHC) by age
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2.4.2 switching rates in the period 2010-2012
In the period 2010-2012, 10.3 percent of all consumers switched insurer at least once: 
8.85 percent switched once, 1.39 percent switched two times, and 0.09 percent switched 
three times. Bivariate analyses show that switching rates differ significantly among age 
groups (Table 2.3). For example, about 3 percent of the consumers aged 76 or older 
switched insurer at least once in the period 2010-2012 compared to about 15 percent 
of the consumers aged 31-50. Consumers without a self-reported disease were about 
40 percent more likely to switch insurer than consumers with a self-reported disease. In 
contrast, based on consumers’ 3-year switching rate and subjective health indicators, 
we can conclude that consumers with a good, very good, or excellent self-reported 
health are not more inclined to switch insurer than consumers with a bad or moderate 
self-reported health. This may partly be affected by the fact that respondents revealing 
their perceived health status take their age into account. High-educated people switched 
insurer about 85 percent more than low-educated people. Furthermore, consumers 
without a SI switched twice as much as consumers with a SI.
Multivariate analyses do also show that elderly consumers are, ceteris paribus, less 
inclined to switch insurer than young consumers (Table 2.4). For example, the odds of 
having switched in the period 2010-2012 for those aged 41-50 are 565 percent of those 
aged 76 or older, ceteris paribus. The difference in switching behavior of consumers with 
and consumer without a self-reported disease disappears after adjusting for age. The 
results regarding education and SI are consistent with previous studies: low-educated 
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figure 2.2  Switching rates on 1 January 2009 by predicted healthcare expenses (in euros) for 20091,2
 1 Predicted expenses are based upon the risk equalization formula of 2012.
 2 About 80 percent of individuals had predicted healthcare expenses lower than 2,000 euro.
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consumers and consumers with SI were less likely to switch insurer than, respectively, 
high-educated consumers and consumers without SI, ceteris paribus. For example, 
keeping all other explanatory variables constant, having a SI decreases the odds by 56 
percent compared to having no SI.
table 2.3 Percentage of consumers that switched insurer (yes/no)1,2 in the period 2010-2012
size of the group as 
percentage of the total
3-year switching 
rate of the group
total (n=1,152) 100.0 10.3
gender (n=1,142)
Males 56.1 8.5
**
Females 43.9 12.6
age (n=1,152)
Aged 18-30 3.6 23.8
***
Aged 31-40 13.0 14.7
Aged 41-50 16.2 15.5
Aged 51-60 24.2 11.8
Aged 61-70 26.5 6.2
Aged 71-75 7.9 3.3
Aged 76 or older 8.5 3.1
self-reported health (n=1,142)
Bad or moderate 22.5 9.7
Good, very good, or excellent 77.5 10.4
self-reported disease (n=1,152)
None 32.2 12.9
*
At most one 32.6 10.9
At most two 18.2 6.7
At least three 17.0 8.2
education (n=1,143)
Low 32.4 7.0
**Middle 29.6 10.7
High 38.0 12.9
supplementary insurance (sI) (n=1,024)
No 15.7 18.6
***
Yes 84.3 9.0
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
1 We asked consumers whether they switched insurer. Dutch insurers are allowed to offer BI under different 
names. Consequently, consumers who switched to a BI that is offered under another name by their current 
insurer may have stated that they switched insurer while they did actually not.
2 ‘’Yes’’ indicates a switch on 1 January 2010, and/or 1 January 2011, and/or 1 January 2012 (i.e. ‘’3-year 
switching rate’’).
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2.5 InterPretatIon of oUr resUlts
Consumers will switch insurer if their perceived switching benefits outweigh their per-
ceived switching costs (Scanlon et al., 1997; Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004). Therefore, 
switching rates indicate for which proportion of consumers the switching benefits did 
outweigh the switching costs.12 Our main finding is that switching rates decrease sharply 
12 Next to consumers’ decisions to switch insurer, switching can be influenced by exogenous 
changes (e.g. job changes, moves outside an insurer’s area, bankruptcies, and mergers) 
table 2.4  Logit model of consumer’s decision to switch insurer (yes/no)1,2 in the period 2010-2012 
(n=1,009)
odds ratio P-value
gender
Female Reference
Male 0.617 0.026 (**)
age
Aged 18-30 10.465 0.002 (***)
Aged 31-40 3.554 0.055 (*)
Aged 41-50 5.646 0.007 (***)
Aged 51-60 3.609 0.041 (**)
Aged 61-70 2.016 0.274
Aged 71-75 0.674 0.672
Aged 76 or older Reference
self-reported health
Bad or moderate Reference
Good, very good, or excellent 0.634 0.145
self-reported disease
None Reference
At most one 0.922 0.755
At most two 0.731 0.400
At least three 0.935 0.865
education
Low 0.559 0.039 (**)
Middle 0.840 0.485
High Reference
supplementary insurance
Yes 0.441 0.001 (***)
No Reference
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
1 ‘’Yes’’ indicates a switch on 1 January 2010, and/or 1 January 2011, and/or 1 January 2012 (i.e. ‘’3-year 
switching rate’’).
2 McFadden R²= 0.086.
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with age. This raises the question: did elderly consumers switch less frequently than 
young consumers because they: 1) face higher switching costs; 2) face lower switching 
benefits; or 3) face higher switching costs and lower switching benefits?
2.5.1 switching costs
Previous studies mentioned that the differences in the switching behavior of young and 
elderly consumers can be attributed to differences in their switching costs (Atherly et al., 
2005; Hendriks et al., 2010; Lako et al., 2011; Reitsma-van Rooijen et al., 2011; Shmueli 
et al., 200713). The finding is supported by Nosal (2012) and Handel (2013) who found 
higher switching costs in the US Medicare market with relatively old consumers (65+) 
than in the US employer-sponsored insurance market with relatively young consumers 
(under the age of 65). Nosal (2012) found a switching cost of $4,163 for the median 
Medicare consumer and Handel (2013) showed that, due to switching costs, an average 
employee forgoes $2,032 each year in expected savings from an alternative option. In 
addition, Buchmueller (2000) and Strombom et al. (2002) found that young consumers 
were more price sensitive than elderly consumers and attributed this finding to lower 
switching costs for young consumers than for elderly consumers.
Given this background, it seems likely that differences in the perceived switching 
costs by young and elderly consumers are also an explanation for our results. Elderly 
consumers may face higher transaction costs than young consumers, because they 
may consider price and quality information, while young consumers may be interested 
in price information only (Hendriks et al., 2010). Different studies did further conclude 
that elderly consumers have more difficulties with processing health insurance informa-
tion than young consumers (Hibbard et al., 2001; Hanoch and Rice, 2006). Moreover, 
the psychological switching costs for elderly consumers – which may result from habit, 
tradition, and sunk costs (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Frank and Lamiraud, 
2009) – may be greater than the psychological switching costs for young consumers. 
For example, elderly consumers may face higher sunk costs – i.e. the non-recoverable 
investments in terms of time, money, and effort in establishing and maintaining a rela-
tionship with the current insurer – than young consumers, because elderly consumers 
may be quite familiar with the rules and procedures of their current insurer (Samuelson 
(Schlesinger et al., 1999; Shmueli et al., 2007; Lako et al., 2011).
13 Shmueli et al. (2007) mentioned insurers’ risk selection practices as another potential 
explanation. Due to the Israeli incomplete age-based risk-adjustment scheme, children are 
profitable clients and insurers’ risk selection practices to attract them may also encourage 
their young parents to switch insurer. Risk selection is not an explanation for our findings 
because in the Netherlands no age group is systematically under- or overcompensated by the 
risk equalization model. In addition, the Dutch risk equalization model contains much more 
relevant risk adjusters than only age (see Section 2.3.1).
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and Zeckhauser, 1988; Zhang et al., 2012). This is consistent with the results of Beau-
lieu (2002) and Frank and Lamiraud (2009) who found that longer tenures of enrollment 
continuously reduce the likelihood of switching. In addition, previous studies showed 
that elderly consumers mentioned the loss of the favorable conditions of their current 
SI – in terms of premium and acceptance – more frequently as a switching barrier than 
young consumers (Duijmelinck and Van de Ven, 2014; see Chapter 4).
Consumers choosing an insurer for the first time – who are most likely the consum-
ers aged 18-24 – may be the consumer group with the lowest switching costs (Pomp et 
al., 2005). For example, sunk costs and the loss of the favorable conditions of SI may 
be irrelevant switching costs for these consumers entering the health insurance market. 
Therefore, low switching costs may explain their high switching propensity.
2.5.2 Switching benefits
Potential switching benefits for consumers are: price, (financial) welcome gifts, the ben-
efits of SI, insurers’ service level, and the contracted provider network (i.e. the quality 
of the provider network and the freedom to choose a provider or drug) (Duijmelinck et 
al., 2015; see Chapter 3). During the research period, these switching benefits were 
quite comparable for low-risks and high-risks in the Netherlands. Firstly, insurers did 
mainly compete on price (Brabers et al., 2012), which is a relevant switching benefit 
for both elderly and young consumers. Secondly, welcome gifts were a relevant switch-
ing benefit for both consumer groups, because there were no indications that insurers 
provided welcome gifts to attract specific consumer groups. Thirdly, given the consider-
able amount of differentiated SI products in the Dutch health insurance market (e.g. in 
2009, consumers had the choice among about 370 SI products (NZa, 2009a)), SI was 
a switching benefit for both young and elderly consumers. Because the SI coverage re-
garding maternity care is a relevant switching benefit for young females, young females 
were probably more inclined to switch insurer than young males. Fourthly, insurers’ 
service level and their contracted provider network are in particular important switch-
ing benefits for high-risks because of their high healthcare use. However, these were 
quite irrelevant switching benefits during the research period (Brabers et al., 2012). For 
example, in the period 2009-2012, insurers contracted all hospitals (NZa, 2009a; NZa, 
2010; NZa, 2011; NZa, 2012).
So far, the above mentioned arguments indicate that during our research period 
switching benefits were roughly similar for young consumers and elderly consumers. 
However, consumers’ switching benefits are also influenced by their switching behavior 
in previous years. The switching benefits for consumers who did not switch in previous 
years will be relatively higher than the switching benefits for consumers who did so. 
For example, the latter group may have switched to lower-priced insurance products, 
while the former group may still have to pay a high price. In the period 2006-2008, 
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elderly consumers were – such as in later years – less likely to switch insurer than 
young consumers (Vektis, 2006; Vektis, 2007; Vektis, 2008). This implies that elderly 
consumers faced on average higher switching benefits in the period 2009-2012 than 
young consumers.14
The above arguments lead to the conclusion that during the research period the 
switching benefits for the elderly consumers were not lower than those of the young 
consumers. This implies that the substantial lower switching rate of the elderly consum-
ers compared to the young consumers cannot be explained by a difference in their 
switching benefits. Therefore, we conclude that elderly consumers face higher switch-
ing costs than young consumers.
2.6 DIsCUssIon
In general, low switching rates in the health insurance market may have some positive 
side-effects, such as low administrative expenditures and increased insurers’ incentives 
to invest in preventive care (Pomp et al., 2005; Brandon et al., 2009; Lako et al., 2011). 
However, in the Netherlands the low switching rates are concentrated among the elderly 
consumers who perceive high switching costs compared to their switching benefits. 
Therefore, the positive effects do most likely not outweigh the potential negative effects.
Firstly, lower switching rates for elderly consumers than for young consumers may 
reduce insurers’ incentives to act as quality-conscious purchasers of care for the elderly 
consumers (Pomp et al., 2005; Shmueli et al., 2007). The developments in the Dutch 
long-term care sector may exacerbate this problem. In 2015, insurers became respon-
sible for the purchase of long-term outpatient care (i.e. nursing and personal care). 
In particular elderly consumers need this type of care (Sietsma and Groot Koerkamp, 
2014). Due to the high perceived switching costs by elderly consumers compared to 
their switching benefits, it is questionable whether insurers are sufficiently motivated to 
become prudent buyers of long-term outpatient care.
Secondly, in case of an imperfect risk equalization model, cross-subsidies among 
risk groups may be threatened, because young consumers with low switching costs can 
switch to lower-priced alternatives (Atherly et al., 2005). For example, Nuscheler and 
Knaus (2005) found that heterogeneous switching costs resulted in the separation of 
low-risks from high-risks in the German public health insurance system.
Thirdly, large differences in switching rates among groups of consumers reduce 
effective price competition (Pomp et al., 2005; Nosal, 2012). Insurers may initially 
14 It is an open question whether these potential switching benefits are similar to consumers’ 
perceived switching benefits.
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charge premiums below costs to attract consumers and subsequently increase their 
premiums to exploit consumers with high switching costs (Pomp et al., 2005; Farrell 
and Klemperer, 2007; Han et al., 2014). Simultaneously, they could introduce cheaper 
products to attract the consumers with low switching costs. Marzilli Ericson (2012) pro-
vided evidence for such insurers’ behavior in the US Medicare Part D insurance market. 
Insurers who charge very low premiums to attract the consumers with low switching 
costs may enter the market. However, incumbent insurers can keep their premiums 
above the premiums of entrants, because the profits made on those consumers who do 
not switch may outweigh the losses associated with the consumers who switch to new 
entrants (Pomp et al., 2005).
To avoid the above effects, the Dutch government should develop strategies to improve 
the choice of insurer of elderly consumers. For example, the integration of BI and SI into 
one basic-plus-insurance (BPI) would be an effective solution to decrease the switching 
costs for the elderly consumers and the chronically ill (Duijmelinck and Van de Ven, 
2014; see Chapter 4). This solution takes into account that almost all insurers currently 
offer BI and SI as a joint product and that one-stop shopping has several advantages for 
consumers (e.g. a good coordination of basic benefits and supplemental benefits). After 
the introduction of the BPI, open enrollment also holds for the supplemental benefits. 
Insurers are still allowed to apply risk rating for the supplemental benefits within the BPI. 
However, they must charge groups of enrollees with equal risk characteristics and the 
same supplemental benefits, the same premium. Consequently, consumers opting for 
a basic-plus-insurance would no longer face the risk that a new insurer imposes less 
favorable conditions for SI in the next contract period than their current insurer does. 
A BPI will not threaten the affordability of the basic benefits, because insurers are still 
bound to community-rated premiums for the basic benefits.
In addition, special attention should be paid to potential strategies to decrease the 
transaction costs of elderly consumers, for example by focusing on the development of 
standardized health insurance information that is easily to understand (Hibbard et al., 
2001; Hanoch and Rice, 2006). Moreover, the regulator could launch an information 
campaign – for example via television and newspapers – that emphasizes the potential 
switching benefits for elderly consumers in the health insurance market. This campaign 
could encourage elderly consumers to compare the insurance products of different 
insurers with each other.
Furthermore, next to the exit option, consumers could express dissatisfaction with 
their current insurer by using the ‘voice option’ (Hirschman, 1970). As long as elderly 
consumers do not have equal opportunities as young consumers to act as well-informed 
and empowered buyers in the health insurance market, the voice option should be 
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effectively facilitated for the elderly consumers; e.g. by establishing consumer councils 
and consumer questionnaires.
Due to the lack of selective contracting in the Netherlands, the costs of (not) switching to 
another healthcare provider were irrelevant during the research period. These switching 
costs may be more relevant in later years, because since 2013 Dutch insurers started 
to selectively contract with healthcare providers more frequently. Consumers’ switching 
benefits may have also increased, because insurers’ contracted provider network may 
have become a relevant switching benefit in the health insurance market. For consumer 
choice of insurer it is crucial that the switching costs do not increase more rapidly than 
the switching benefits. Future research can pay attention to this subject. Moreover, 
future research could attempt to quantify the size of the switching benefits and the 
switching costs for different consumer groups.
2.7 ConClUsIons
In competitive health insurance markets, consumer choice of insurer disciplines the 
insurers to be responsive to consumer preferences. Because these preferences differ 
among consumer groups, all groups of consumers with specific preferences must be 
free (and must feel free) to easily switch insurer. We analyzed administrative data with 
objective health status information (i.e. medically diagnosed diseases and pharmaceu-
tical use) and information on healthcare expenses of nearly the entire population to 
evaluate switching rates in the Netherlands in 2009. Our findings indicate that switching 
rates decrease strongly with age. For example, consumers aged 25-44 switched 10 
times more than consumers aged 75 or older. The same conclusion holds when evaluat-
ing whether consumers switched in the period 2010-2012 (i.e. a 3-year switching rate). 
In addition, we found that switching rates strongly decrease as the predicted healthcare 
expenses increase. For example, 5 percent of the consumers with very low predicted 
healthcare expenses switched insurer in 2009, while this percentage decreased to 
about 0.5 for consumers with very high predicted healthcare expenses. Another finding 
is that although healthy consumers switch twice as much as unhealthy consumers, this 
difference becomes much smaller after adjusting for age.
We conclude that our findings can be explained by higher perceived switching costs 
by elderly consumers than by young consumers. Because an essential precondition 
of a competitive health insurance market – the disciplining effect of ‘’voting with one’s 
feet’’ – is not fulfilled for elderly consumers, insurers have low incentives to act as 
quality-conscious purchasers of care for them. Policymakers should develop strategies 
to increase the choice of insurer of elderly consumers, because a competitive health 
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insurance market can only succeed if all groups of consumers with specific preferences 
feel free to easily switch insurer.

3
Switching benefi ts and costs in 
competitive health insurance markets:
a conceptual framework and empirical evidence 
from the Netherlands 
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abstraCt
Competitive health insurance markets will only enhance efficiency, quality, and con-
sumer responsiveness if all consumers feel free to easily switch insurer. Consumers will 
switch insurer if their perceived switching benefits outweigh their perceived switching 
costs. We developed a conceptual framework with potential switching benefits and 
costs in competitive health insurance markets. Moreover, we used a questionnaire 
among Dutch consumers (1,091 respondents) to empirically examine the relevance 
of the different switching benefits and costs in consumers’ decision to (not) switch 
insurer. Price, insurers’ service quality, insurers’ contracted provider network, the ben-
efits of supplementary insurance, and welcome gifts are potential switching benefits. 
Transaction costs, learning costs, ‘benefit loss’ costs, uncertainty costs, the costs of 
(not) switching healthcare provider, and sunk costs are potential switching costs. In 
2013 most Dutch consumers switched insurer because of (1) price and (2) benefits of 
supplementary insurance. Nearly half of the non-switchers – and particularly unhealthy 
consumers – mentioned one of the switching costs as their main reason for not switch-
ing. Because unhealthy consumers feel not free to easily switch insurer, insurers have 
low incentives to invest in high-quality care for them. Therefore, policymakers should 
develop strategies to improve consumer choice.
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3.1 IntroDUCtIon
In several Western countries (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Israel, Switzerland, the Neth-
erlands, and the United States) steps have been taken towards a competitive health 
insurance market. In these countries, the government sets the rules of the game (e.g. 
an open enrollment period, community-rated premiums, a risk equalization system, and 
a standardized benefit package), while health insurers have the major task of purchas-
ing (or delivering) efficient and high-quality care on behalf of their consumers. The 
threat of consumers switching to a competitor must continuously stimulate insurers to 
successfully fulfill this task. All groups of consumers must be free (and must feel free) 
to easily switch insurer to spur insurers to be responsive to the heterogeneous needs 
and preferences of consumers. This must enhance efficiency, quality, and consumer 
responsiveness in healthcare.
One could be inclined to consider switching rates as an indicator of the competi-
tiveness of a health insurance market. This may result in wrong conclusions because 
low switching rates can be observed in both perfectly and poorly competitive markets 
(Schut and Varkevisser, 2009). Instead of switching rates, consumers’ reasons to (not) 
switch insurer provide more meaningful information regarding the functioning of the 
competitive health insurance market. Consumers will switch insurer if their perceived 
switching benefits outweigh their perceived switching costs (Scanlon et al., 1997; 
Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004). Low switching rates among consumers may be explained 
by low perceived switching benefits due to satisfaction with the current insurer (Schut 
and Varkevisser, 2009). However, substantial switching costs that outweigh the switch-
ing benefits may also hinder consumers from switching, even when they are dissatisfied 
(Schlesinger et al., 1999). This seriously threatens effective competition. New insurers 
may, for example, experience barriers to enter the health insurance market as it is 
difficult to attract consumers with high switching costs (Enthoven, 1988a; Karakaya 
and Stahl, 1989). In healthcare, the (healthcare) needs and preferences of consum-
ers are highly heterogeneous. If specific groups of consumers perceive high switching 
costs compared to their switching benefits, insurers have low incentives to satisfy their 
specific preferences. This may be particularly problematic if these groups are those with 
the most healthcare needs (i.e. unhealthy consumers), because insurers are then no 
longer spurred to invest in high-quality care for them.
Previous studies solely focused on the relevance of one specific switching benefit (e.g. 
Beaulieu, 2002) or switching cost (e.g. Frank and Lamiraud, 2009). However, a con-
ceptual framework with potential switching benefits and costs in a competitive health 
insurance market is lacking. Therefore, our first aim is to provide such a framework by 
integrating evidence from different disciplines; health economics, behavioral econom-
ics, and health policy. Previous studies (e.g. Mosca and Schut-Welkzijn, 2008; Hendriks 
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et al., 2010; see Chapter 2) showed that high-risks are less inclined to switch insurer 
than low-risks. However, the reasons of (groups of) consumers to (not) switch insurer 
are unclear. Therefore, our second aim is to empirically examine the main switching 
benefits and costs in consumers’ decision to (not) switch insurer in the Netherlands in 
2013. Other countries that have taken or intend to take steps towards a market-oriented 
healthcare system can learn from the Dutch experiences.
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, we introduce the conceptual framework 
with potential switching benefits and costs. Secondly, we describe the data and methods 
and summarize the main switching benefits and costs in the Dutch context. Finally, we 
pay attention to some policy considerations and present our main conclusions.
3.2 ConCePtUal fraMeWorK
This section describes potential switching benefits, which are derived from the theoreti-
cal model of regulated competition as defined by Enthoven (e.g. 1978, 2012). Klem-
perer (1995), Jones et al. (2002), and Burnham et al. (2003) have described different 
switching costs. This is the first study applying these costs to health insurance markets. 
The switching benefits and costs are context specific and may differ across consumer 
groups, across countries, and over time.
3.2.1 Switching benefits
Switching benefits are consumers’ perceived benefits from switching insurer. A first 
potential benefit is price, which plays a prominent role in the decision to switch insurer 
in Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Thomson et al., 2013). Consumers 
are – on average – sensitive to price. However, high-risks are less sensitive to price 
changes than low-risks (Royalty and Solomon, 1999; Buchmueller, 2000; Strombom et 
al., 2002; Schut et al., 2003; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Buchmueller et al., 2013).
Secondly, insurers’ service quality is an important reason for switching insurer in 
Belgium and Germany (Thomson et al., 2013). This switching benefit encompasses 
the speed of payment of claims, coverage decisions, and the help from the call center 
(Abraham et al., 2006). Insurers’ service quality may be especially an important switch-
ing benefit for high-risks. These consumers may have regular contact with their insurer 
because of their large healthcare use.
A third potential switching benefit is the insurers’ contracted provider network. This 
benefit consists of the quality of the contracted providers, the freedom to choose a 
provider or drug, and the way an insurer organizes healthcare. The composition of 
the provider network, the reimbursement level for non-contracted providers, and the 
prescription drug reimbursement affect consumers’ freedom to choose a provider or 
drug. Consumers can consider the quality of the contracted providers as a switching 
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benefit based upon negative prior experiences. Moreover, other information sources 
(e.g. word-of-mouth information, consumer satisfaction rates, and health outcome 
measures) can make consumers aware of the performance of their current insurer 
compared to the performance of others (Kolstad and Chernew, 2009). In Belgium, 
the insurers’ contracted provider network is an irrelevant switching benefit, because 
insurers are not allowed to selectively contract with healthcare providers. In contrast, 
in the United States, the insurers’ contracted provider network may be a considerable 
switching benefit due to the widespread use of preferred provider networks (Boonen et 
al., 2011a). Other international examples show that, for example in Germany, the design 
of the range of disease management programs may be a switching benefit (Greβ et 
al., 2006). Because of their healthcare use, insurers’ contracted provider network is in 
particular a switching benefit for high-risks. Moreover, it may be an interesting switching 
benefit for consumers whom provider is no longer contracted by their current insurer.
The benefits of supplementary insurance (SI) are a fourth potential switching ben-
efit. These benefits can provide supplemental coverage (e.g. a superior hospital stay) or 
complementary coverage of excluded or partially covered basic benefits. The benefits 
of SI are only a potential switching benefit if consumers are legally obliged to take out 
basic health insurance (BI) and SI from the same insurer (e.g. in Belgium), or if the 
separated markets for BI and SI are closely tied by a joint purchase of BI and SI (e.g. in 
the Netherlands and Switzerland). In the Netherlands, high-risks switched more often 
because of the benefits of SI than the general population (De Jong et al., 2008).
Welcome gifts are a fifth potential switching benefit. In 2013, for example, some 
Dutch insurers offered 75 euro cashback to new applicants. Free gifts to new applicants, 
such as gift cards, are another example of welcome gifts.
3.2.2 switching costs
Switching costs are the costs consumers associate with switching insurer (Jones et 
al., 2002; Burnham et al., 2003). Firstly, making a switching decision involves (pre-
switching) transaction costs, i.e. the time and effort it takes to make a decision and to 
actually switch insurer (Strombom et al., 2002). The lack of comparable information on 
insurers’ contracted providers and reimbursement levels for non-contracted providers 
may increase consumers’ transaction costs in some European countries (Van de Ven 
et al., 2013). Moreover, transaction costs could be substantial if consumers have to 
analyze information about a large number of (differentiated) health insurance products 
(Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004). In this respect, consumers can be overwhelmed by too 
much choice (i.e. the cognitive overload theory as defined by behavioral economists) 
(e.g. Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2004; Elbel, 2007; Frank and Lamiraud, 
2009). Employer-sponsored health insurance, like in the United States, may decrease 
consumers’ transaction costs by offering only a limited number of subsidized options 
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(Van Beusekom et al., 2004; Cunningham, 2013). Moreover, a disenrollment service 
(i.e. the new insurer will inform the old insurer after receiving the enrollment form) and 
the possibility of switching via the Internet may decrease consumers’ transaction costs 
(Van de Ven et al., 2013). Low-risks may face lower transaction costs than high-risks, 
because the former group may be mainly interested in price information, while the latter 
may consider quality information as well (Hendriks et al., 2010).
Secondly, after switching, consumers are confronted with learning costs, i.e. the 
time and effort it takes to learn the rules and procedures (e.g. the administrative require-
ments) of a new insurer (Klemperer, 1995; Jones et al., 2002; Strombom et al., 2002; 
Burnham et al., 2003; Handel, 2013). High-risks may face higher learning costs than 
low-risks, because particularly high-risks should gain insight into their entitlements and 
how they should submit a claim (Schlesinger et al., 1999).
Thirdly, switching may involve ‘benefit loss’ costs, i.e. the benefits that are lost if the 
relationship with the current insurer is terminated (Klemperer, 1995; Jones et al., 2002; 
Burnham et al., 2003). In the United States, employees with an employer-sponsored 
health insurance may receive a premium contribution from their employer and subsi-
dies in the form of tax credits. Consumers switching to a non-subsidized insurer may 
lose these advantages. In the Netherlands and Switzerland, the perceived loss of the 
favorable conditions of SI is a major switching cost for high-risks. In these countries, 
BI and SI are offered as a joint product and high-risks are afraid that another insurer 
would not accept them for SI or would charge them a high premium (Dormont et al., 
2009; Roos and Schut, 2012; see Chapter 4). In Ireland, the largest provider of private 
health insurance closely ties its health insurance and travel insurance products (the 
Irish Competition Authority, 2007). Consumers switching to another insurer for health 
insurance lose their travel insurance or face a price increase of their travel insurance.
Fourthly, switchers may be confronted with uncertainty costs, i.e. the costs of ac-
cepting the psychological uncertainty surrounding the performance of other insurers 
with a potential for negative outcomes, e.g. additional costs or waiting times (Jones et 
al., 2002; Burnham et al., 2003). Uncertainty costs are likely to be larger for high-risks 
than for low-risks (Hendriks et al., 2010).
Fifthly, switching insurer may imply the costs of (not) switching to another healthcare 
provider. Selective contracting in healthcare increases the probability that a new insurer 
has not contracted consumers’ current provider. If a consumer switches to another 
healthcare provider, it will take time and effort to initiate a relationship with this new pro-
vider (Royalty and Solomon, 1999; Jones et al., 2002; Strombom et al., 2002; Burnham 
et al., 2003). In contrast, if a consumer stays with the current, non-contracted, health-
care provider he or she will have to pay the healthcare costs (partially) out-of-pocket. 
The costs of (not) switching to another provider may be a substantial switching cost 
in Israel and the US. In these countries, insurers largely restrict consumers’ provider 
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choice and reimburse non-contracted providers only to a limited extent (Van de Ven et 
al., 2013; Cunningham, 2013). The costs of (not) switching to another provider would be 
especially a switching cost for high-risks (Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1997; Schlesinger 
et al., 1999; Strombom et al., 2002).
Sixthly, sunk costs, i.e. consumers’ perceptions of the non-recoverable invest-
ments – in terms of time, money, and effort – in establishing and maintaining a relation-
ship with the current insurer, are a psychological switching cost (Jones et al., 2002; 
Patterson and Smith, 2003; Whitten and Wakefield, 2006; Chebat et al., 2011). This 
switching cost may result in irrational behavior, such as status quo bias (Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser, 1988). Consumers with an established relationship with their current 
insurer, e.g. elderly consumers, may face high sunk costs (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988; Zhang et al., 2012). This is consistent with the results of Frank and Lamiraud 
(2009) who found that longer tenures of enrollment continuously reduce the likelihood 
of switching. Moreover, high-risks may face high sunk costs, because they may be quite 
familiar with the rules and procedures of their current insurer and may have expended a 
great deal of effort in obtaining prior authorization (Nuscheler and Knaus, 2005).
Table 3.1 summarizes the determinants of the different switching benefits and costs.
table 3.1 Determinants of the switching benefits and costs in the health insurance market
Determinant(s)
Switching benefit
Price Insurers’ freedom to set its own prices
Insurers’ service quality Availability and quality of consumer information
Contracted provider network (1) Insurers’ freedom to selectively contract with healthcare providers 
and (2) availability and quality of consumer information
Benefits of supplementary insurance Joint purchase of basic and supplemental benefits
(Financial) welcome gift Insurers’ freedom to provide welcome gifts
switching cost
(Pre-switching) transaction costs (1) Availability and quality of consumer information; (2) number of 
consumers’ choice options; (3) availability of a disenrollment service; 
and (4) possibility of switching via the Internet
(Post-switching) learning costs Insurers’ freedom to set its own rules and procedures
‘Benefit loss’ costs (1) Availability of employer-sponsored health insurance; (2) joint 
purchase of basic and supplemental benefits; and (3) joint purchase of 
basic health insurance and other insurance products (e.g. car or home 
insurance)
Uncertainty costs Availability and quality of consumer information
Costs of (not) switching to another 
healthcare provider
Insurers’ freedom to selectively contract with healthcare providers
Sunk costs Insurers’ freedom to set its own rules and procedures
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3.3 tHe netHerlanDs as a Case stUDy
We used an online questionnaire to assess to what extent the different switching benefits 
and costs were consumers’ main reasons for (not) switching insurer in the Netherlands 
in the period November 2012 to January 2013 (i.e. switching insurer in 2013).
3.3.1 Description of the Dutch competitive health insurance market
The introduction of the Health Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet) in 2006 was a major 
step towards a competitive health insurance market (Enthoven and Van de Ven, 2007). 
All inhabitants are legally obliged to take out standardized BI from a private health 
insurer. In 2013, 26 different insurers offered BI (Vektis, 2013). An annual open enroll-
ment period, community-rated premiums, a risk equalization model, and a standardized 
basic benefit package facilitate consumer choice. Although BI is standardized, insurers 
are free to specify consumers’ precise entitlements (e.g. the contracted providers and 
pharmaceuticals) in the BI contract. Consumers can voluntarily take out SI for benefits 
not covered by BI, e.g. dental and paramedic care. In 2013, about 85 percent of the 
Dutch consumers took out SI (Vektis, 2013). Due to the joint purchase of BI and SI, 
more than 99 percent of the consumers take out their BI and SI from the same insurer 
(Vektis, 2012). Consequently, the expected switching benefits and costs concerning SI 
influence the decision to switch insurer for BI.
Each insurer is free to set its own community-rated premium for each of its products. 
In 2013, the average BI-premium equals about 1,280 euro per adult per year (Vektis, 
2013). BI premiums equal 50 percent of the total insurers’ revenues for BI. The other 
50 percent consists of income-related contributions that are allocated to the insurers 
via the risk equalization fund. A new phenomenon in the Dutch health insurance market 
is the so-called ‘budget policy’ that imposes restrictions upon consumers’ healthcare 
provider choice (BS Health Consultancy, 2012). The (very) low price of the ‘budget 
policy’ may be the main reason for consumers to take out this policy.
Insurers may provide premium discounts up to 10 percent to consumers belonging 
to a group, such as employees. Moreover, employees or low-income consumers may 
receive earmarked subsidies from their employer or municipality for the purchase of 
insurance from listed insurers. Consumers who switch to a non-listed insurer may lose 
these premium discounts or subsidies. Thus, the loss of the obtained benefits provided 
by the employer or municipality is a potential ‘benefit loss’ cost in the Netherlands. The 
loss of the favorable conditions of SI is another ‘benefit loss’ cost (see Section 3.2). 
Finally, consumers may lose other obtained benefits if they switch insurer. For example, 
a Dutch insurer introduced a special saving program for consumers. In this program, 
consumers accumulate bonus points for obtaining discounts on the SI premium or on 
sport articles. Consumers switching to another insurer would lose these points.
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3.3.2 Data and methods
Before the actual data collection, our constructed questionnaire was pretested amongst 
colleagues. Moreover, we conducted three cognitive interviews (DeMaio et al., 2002) 
to determine whether respondents understood the questions used. After the pretests, 
some minor revisions were made.
In February 2013, the questionnaire was distributed among members of the Stem-
Punt-panel of Motivaction. Members of this panel complete regularly questionnaires at 
home. An invitation to fill in the questionnaire was sent to 3,755 members aged 18 or 
older. In total, 1,091 of them completed the questionnaire. Because consumers could 
only fill in the questionnaire on the Internet, consumers without Internet access were 
excluded. This may (partly) explain why the sample of respondents was not completely 
representative of the Dutch population (Table 3.2). We used five weighting factors (0.6
5 – 0.87 – 1.09 – 1.34 – 1.55) to avoid selection bias. All respondents are assigned to 
one of the weighting factors based on their age, gender, education, region, and values-
and-lifestyle characteristics (i.e. Mentality model; see for more information about the 
Mentality model www.motivaction.nl/en/mentality). The over-represented respondents 
received a weight of 0.65 or 0.87, while the under-represented respondents received a 
weight of 1.09, 1.34, or 1.55. Section 3.4 shows the weighted results.
table 3.2 Background characteristics of respondents
% Population
(aged 18-80)
% sample 
(unweighted)
% sample
(weighted)
% switchers per 
group (weighted)
gender
Males 49.5 54.4 49.1 9.0
Females 50.5 45.6 50.9 12.6
age
18-24 years 10.9 8.0 10.3 22.5
25-34 years 16.1 12.9 16.0 12.0
35-44 years 19.3 17.0 19.8 12.5
45-54 years 19.8 19.1 19.8 8.8
55-64 years 17.7 22.7 17.2 8.0
65-80 years 16.2 20.3 16.8 6.0
self-reported health
Bad or moderate 19.9 21.5 21.2 10.4
Good, very good, or excellent 80.1 78.5 78.8 10.8
education
Low 25.8 22.5 24.1 7.6
Middle 50.0 52.0 51.2 11.7
High 24.2 25.5 24.7 12.3
total 100.0 100.0 (n=1,091) 100.0 (n=1,091) 10.8
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We asked all respondents whether they switched insurer in 2013. The switching rate in 
our sample (i.e. 10.8 percent) is higher than the switching rate in the Dutch population (i.e. 
7.2 percent) (Vektis, 2013). Dutch insurers are allowed to offer BI under different names 
(i.e. under different labels). The switching rate in the Dutch population refers only to the 
consumers switching to another insurer and does not include consumers switching to 
another label of their current insurer. However, most consumer information sources (e.g. 
websites that compare the products of different insurers) present the different labels as 
different insurers. Therefore, a first explanation for our high switching rate may be that 
respondents who switched to another label of their current insurer perceived that they 
switched insurer. These perceptions do not influence our conclusions, because switching 
to another label of the current insurer involves the same potential switching benefits and 
switching costs as switching to another insurer. For example, one Dutch insurer offers 
BI under two different labels (i.e. ‘’De Friesland Zorgverzekeraar’’ and ‘’Kiemer’’). In this 
case, consumers switching to the other label of their current insurer are confronted with 
the same switching benefits as consumers switching to another insurer, because the 
BI products and SI products offered by these labels differ (e.g. the prices, the benefits 
covered by SI, and the freedom to choose a provider or drug differ). Moreover, switching 
costs are the same because consumers are confronted with premium surcharges on their 
SI premium if they do not switch label for SI too. In addition, low-income consumers who 
receive earmarked subsidies from their municipality for the purchase of insurance from 
the one label will lose these subsidies if they switch to the other label. This implies that 
‘benefit loss’ costs are – just as the other switching costs – relevant when consumers 
switch to another label offered by their current insurer.
Secondly, switchers may be more eager to respond to a questionnaire about health 
insurance than non-switchers (Kerssens and Groenewegen, 2005). Thirdly, the online 
questionnaire only reaches consumers with Internet access. It takes probably less time and 
effort for these consumers to switch insurer than for consumers without Internet access.
Respondents have revealed their main reason for (not) switching insurer in 2013. Despite 
the limited number of respondents who switched insurer (n=118), switchers’ main reasons 
for choosing a new insurer may serve as an illustration of the relevance of the different 
switching benefits. Moreover, we asked the non-switchers which benefits they associ-
ated with switching. In addition, we investigated to what extent the non-switchers have 
indicated one of the switching costs as the main reason for not switching insurer (see 
Table 3.3). We associated satisfaction as main reason for not switching with low perceived 
switching benefits. Finally, we evaluated whether the reasons for not switching insurer dif-
fer across groups of consumers. These groups are based upon gender, age, self-reported 
health, education level, and interactions between age and self-reported health. We used 
Pearson’s Chi square tests to determine whether two variables are correlated.
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3.4 resUlts
In 2013, about 64 percent of all switchers changed insurer because of price and 16 percent 
of all switchers mentioned the benefits of SI as their main reason for switching insurer 
(Table 3.4). The contracted provider network was for only 4 percent of the switchers the 
main reason for switching, while insurers’ service quality was not mentioned at all as main 
reason for switching. In total, 38 percent of the non-switchers reported that they did not 
associate any benefits with switching and 34 percent of the non-switchers did not know 
whether there were any benefits associated with switching. Non-switchers mentioned price 
(20 percent) and the benefits of SI (7 percent) also as main potential switching benefits. 
These consumers actually did not switch because of satisfaction with their current insurer or 
because of switching costs that did not outweigh the perceived switching benefits.
table 3.3 Operationalization of the switching benefits and costs in the questionnaire
Switching benefits
Switchers Why did you choose your current insurer?
Non-switchers What was your main expected benefit from switching insurer?
answer category in the questionnaire
Price 1. Price of basic health insurance
2. Price of supplementary insurance
3. Discount via group
Insurers’ service quality Insurers’ service quality
Contracted provider network 1. Quality of the contracted providers
2. Out-of-pocket payments for visits to non-contracted providers
3. Composition of the provider network
Benefits of supplementary insurance Content of supplementary insurance
(Financial) welcome gift (Financial) welcome gift
switching costs
Non-switchers What was your main reason for not switching insurer?
answer category in the questionnaire
(Pre-switching) transaction costs It takes a lot of time and effort to switch insurer
(Post-switching) learning costs It takes a lot of time and effort to learn the rules and procedures of a new insurer
‘Benefit loss’ costs 1. I am afraid that another insurer would not accept me for SI
2. I expect that I have to pay a higher premium for SI than other consumers with the 
same SI
3. My employer or municipality pays partly the premium of my current insurer, but 
not of another insurer
4. I accumulate bonus points at my current insurer
Uncertainty costs Switching involves feelings of uncertainty
Costs of (not) switching to another 
provider
I am afraid that I would no longer have access to my current healthcare provider(s)
Sunk costs 1. I take out insurance from this insurer already for many years
2. I take out my other insurance products (e.g. car or home insurance) also from 
this insurer
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Satisfaction was for 50 percent of the non-switchers the main reason for not switching 
insurer (Table 3.5). However, half of them reported one of the switching costs as another 
important – but not the main – reason for not switching insurer. For 55 percent of the 
consumers aged 55 or older satisfaction was the main reason for not switching insurer 
compared to 47 percent of the consumers aged 18-55. Moreover, healthy consumers 
mentioned satisfaction significantly more frequently as the main reason for not switch-
ing than unhealthy consumers (52 percent versus 40 percent).
For 43 percent of the non-switchers one of the switching costs – instead of satisfac-
tion – was the main reason for not switching insurer (Table 3.5). One of the switching 
costs was for 55 percent of the unhealthy consumers the main reason for not switch-
ing compared to 40 percent of the healthy consumers. Moreover, 61 percent of the 
unhealthy consumers aged 18-55 reported one of the switching costs as their main 
reason for not switching insurer.
‘Benefit loss’ costs, sunk costs, learning costs, and transaction costs were the four 
most reported switching costs as main reason for not switching. These costs were for, 
respectively, 16 percent, 15.6 percent, 4.7 percent, and 4.3 percent of the non-switchers 
the main reason for not switching insurer (Table 3.6). Regarding the ‘benefit loss’ costs, 
the loss of obtained benefits provided by the employer or municipality, the loss of the 
favorable conditions of SI, and the loss of obtained benefits were for, respectively, 7.2 
percent, 8.4 percent, and 0.4 percent of the non-switchers the main reason for not 
switching insurer.
‘Benefit loss’ costs were for 18 percent of the consumers aged 18-55 the main 
reason for not switching compared to 13 percent of the consumers aged 55 or older. 
table 3.4 Perceived switching benefits in the Dutch health insurance market
Main reason for switching insurer % of switchers (n=118)
Price 63.8
Benefits of supplementary insurance 15.6
(Financial) welcome gift 6.9
Contracted provider network 3.8
Insurers’ service quality 0.0
Other reason(s) (not specified) 9.9
Expected switching benefit % of non-switchers (n=971)
None 38.0
I do not know 31.4
Price 19.6
Benefits of supplementary insurance 6.8
Contracted provider network 2.6
Insurers’ service quality 0.7
Other benefit(s) (not specified) 0.9
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However, 20 percent of the latter group mentioned sunk costs as the main reason 
for not switching compared to 14 percent of the former group. Sunk costs were for 
21 percent of the unhealthy consumers the main reason for not switching compared 
to 14 percent of the healthy consumers. High-risks did not mention transaction and 
learning costs frequently as their main reasons for not switching insurer. Low-educated 
consumers frequently reported sunk costs as their main reason for not switching, while 
high-educated consumers mentioned ‘benefit loss’ costs and learning costs relatively 
frequent as their main reason for not switching.
table 3.5  Percentage (per group) of non-switchers (n=967) that mentioned satisfaction or one of the 
switching costs as the main reason for not switching insurer
satisfaction 
(%)
one of the switching costs1 
(%)
Non-switchers (n=967) 49.62 42.82
Males (n=484) 49.4 42.1
Females (n=483) 49.9 43.5
Aged 18-55 (n=642) 46.9
**3
43.9
Aged 55 or older (n=325) 54.9 40.7
Unhealthy consumers4 (n=206) 39.5
***
55.1
***
Healthy consumers5 (n=761) 52.3 39.6
Low education (n=242) 54.1 39.9
Middle education (n=493) 49.3 44.5
High education (n=232) 45.3 42.5
age and self-reported health
Unhealthy consumers aged 18-55 (n=108) 34.3
*
61.1
*
Unhealthy consumers aged 55 or older (n=98) 45.9 48.0
Healthy consumers aged 18-55 (n=535) 49.5
**
40.4
Healthy consumers aged 55 or older (n=226) 59.0 37.6
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
1 Transaction costs, learning costs, ‘benefit loss’ costs, uncertainty costs, costs of (not) switching to another 
provider, or sunk costs mentioned as main reason for not switching insurer.
2 In total, 7.6 percent (100 percent-49.6 percent-42.8 percent) of the non-switchers mentioned another main 
reason for not switching insurer.
3 Thus, the Pearson’s Chi square test shows that consumers aged 55 or older mentioned satisfaction signifi-
cantly more frequent (at the 5%-level) as main reason for not switching insurer than consumers aged 18-55.
4 Bad or moderate self-reported health.
5 Good, very good, or excellent self-reported health.
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3.5 DIsCUssIon
One could be inclined to conclude that a competitive health insurance market works 
well if many consumers switch insurer. This may result in wrong conclusions, because 
the goal of a competitive health insurance market is not maximizing switching rates. 
A high fraction of switchers can even have negative side-effects, such as high admin-
istrative costs (De Jong et al., 2008). Moreover, some consumer inertia can prevent 
adverse selection in the health insurance market (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Cutler 
and Zeckhauser, 2000a; Handel, 2013).
The aim of a competitive health insurance market is enhancing efficiency, quality, 
and consumer responsiveness in healthcare. Consumers’ (perceived) freedom to easily 
switch insurer is one of the essential preconditions for achieving this. In healthcare, 
consumer preferences are highly heterogeneous. To discipline insurers to be respon-
sive to these heterogeneous preferences, all consumer groups must perceive low 
switching costs compared to their switching benefits. However, our results indicate that 
switching costs restricted in particular consumer choice of unhealthy consumers. This 
substantially reduces insurers’ incentives to invest in high-quality care for high-risks. 
Therefore, strategies should be developed that aim at increasing consumer choice.
The integration of BI and SI into one basic-plus-insurance would be an effective so-
lution to reduce the ‘benefit loss’ costs (Duijmelinck and Van de Ven, 2014; see Chapter 
table 3.6  Top 4 most reported types of switching costs1 by (groups of) non-switchers (n=967) as the main 
reason for not switching insurer
‘Benefit loss’ 
costs (%)
sunk 
costs (%)
(Post-switching) 
learning costs (%)
(Pre-switching) 
transaction costs (%)
Non-switchers (n=967) 16.0 15.6 4.7 4.3
Males (n=484) 17.1 13.8 3.5
*
5.0
Females (n=483) 14.9 17.4 6.0 3.7
Aged 18-55 (n=642) 17.8
**2
13.6
**
5.3 5.3
**
Aged 55 or older (n=325) 12.6 19.8 3.4 2.5
Unhealthy consumers (n=206)3 19.9
*
20.9
**
4.4 4.4
Healthy consumers (n=761)4 15.0 14.2 4.9 4.2
Low education (n=242) 10.3
**
22.6
***
1.7
**
2.1
Middle education (n=493) 17.1 14.6 5.3 5.1
High education (n=232) 19.4 10.3 6.9 4.7
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
1 Only 2 percent and 0.2 percent of the non-switchers mentioned, respectively, uncertainty costs and the 
costs of (not) switching to another provider as main reason for not switching insurer.
2 Thus, the Pearson’s Chi square test shows that consumers aged 18-55 mentioned ‘benefit loss’ costs 
significantly more frequent (at the 5% level) as main reason for not switching insurer than consumers aged 
55 or older.
3
 Bad or moderate self-reported health.
4
 Good, very good, or excellent self-reported health.
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4). Due to the features of a basic-plus-insurance, consumers will no longer face the 
risk that another insurer imposes less favorable conditions for SI in the next contract 
period than their current insurer does. The introduction of a basic-plus-insurance will not 
threaten the affordability of BI, because insurers are still bound to open enrollment and 
community-rated premiums for the basic benefits. As soon as ‘benefit loss’ costs are no 
longer a (substantial) switching cost, transaction and learning costs may become more 
important switching costs in the health insurance market. Consumers who (consider 
to) switch insurer will then be confronted with the time and effort it takes to make a 
switching decision, to actually switch insurer, and to learn the rules and procedures of a 
new insurer. Therefore, policymakers should develop strategies to reduce consumers’ 
transaction and learning costs. In this respect, policymakers should also pay attention 
to the question to what extent the government should facilitate the switching process in 
the health insurance market (see e.g. Enthoven and Schaeffer, 2011).
Our research has some limitations that may be addressed in future research. Firstly, the 
use of an online questionnaire reaches only consumers with Internet access. Because 
consumers without Internet access may face higher switching costs than those with In-
ternet access, future research could include this former group of consumers. Secondly, 
we only investigated whether consumers perceived a specific switching cost in the health 
insurance market. Future research may also pay attention to the size – e.g. in terms 
of time and money – of the different switching costs. Thirdly, a lack of knowledge and 
misunderstandings about the right to switch may also hinder consumers from switching 
insurer. We did not pay attention to these aspects. This may be an interesting area for 
future research. Fourthly, we solely focused on switching insurer, while Dutch insurers 
are allowed to offer more than one BI contract. Future research may focus on the extent 
to which consumers switch to another BI contract offered by the same insurer and their 
reasons for (not) doing so. Fifthly, Hirschman (1970) described that – next to the exit 
option – consumers could express dissatisfaction with their current insurer by using the 
‘voice option’. This option involves, for example, complaining, participating in consumer 
councils, and completing consumer satisfaction questionnaires. Future research may 
examine to what extent groups of consumers make use of the voice option.
3.6 ConClUsIons
Consumer choice of insurer has become a key element of an increasing number of 
countries’ healthcare system. In these countries, consumer choice must stimulate 
insurers to distinguish themselves from their competitors by continuously improving 
efficiency and quality in healthcare. Consumers will switch insurer if their perceived 
switching benefits outweigh their perceived switching costs. Price, insurers’ service 
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quality, insurers’ contracted provider network, the benefits of supplementary insurance, 
and welcome gifts are potential switching benefits, while transaction costs, learning 
costs, ‘benefit loss’ costs, uncertainty costs, the costs of (not) switching provider, and 
sunk costs are potential switching costs. A Dutch case study in 2013 showed that switch-
ing costs restricted in particular consumer choice of the unhealthy consumers: about 
55 percent of the non-switching unhealthy consumers mentioned one of the switching 
costs as their main reason for not switching insurer. However, this substantially reduces 
insurers’ incentives to invest in high-quality care for unhealthy consumers. Because 
an essential precondition of a competitive health insurance market – consumers’ 
(perceived) freedom to easily switch insurer – is not yet fulfilled, policymakers should 
develop strategies to improve consumer choice.
4
Choice of insurer for basic health 
insurance restricted by supplementary 
insurance 
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abstraCt
Choice of insurer is an essential precondition for achieving efficiency in healthcare 
systems based on regulated competition. However, supplementary insurance (SI) may 
restrict choice of insurer for basic health insurance (BI) due to a joint purchase of BI and 
SI. Roos and Schut (2012) found that the belief in not being accepted by another insurer 
for SI was an important reason for not switching insurer for BI for about 4 percent of 
the non-switching Dutch population in 2006. This increased to about 7 percent in 2009. 
We provide evidence that in 2011 and 2012 about 10 percent of the Dutch population 
expected that another insurer would not accept them for SI. An additional 20 percent 
of the consumers expected to be accepted by another insurer, but only for a higher 
premium than other consumers with the same SI. About one third of the elderly (55+) 
consumers and more than half of the consumers with a bad or moderate self-reported 
health, expected their current insurer to offer them more favorable conditions for SI, in 
terms of acceptance and premium, than other insurers do for similar SI. However, if dis-
satisfied high-risk consumers, due to a joint purchase of BI and SI, do not switch insurer 
for BI, the disciplining effect of ‘voting with one’s feet’ is substantially reduced. This is a 
serious problem that may increase in coming years. We discuss several potential solu-
tions. Our conclusion is that the integration of BI and SI into one basic-plus-insurance is 
an effective solution under current EU legislation. This conclusion may also be relevant 
for other countries.
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4.1 IntroDUCtIon
The introduction of the Health Insurance Act (HIA, Zorgverzekeringswet, 2006) was an 
important step towards regulated competition in the Dutch healthcare system (Enthoven 
and Van de Ven, 2007). Insurers are assumed to be prudent buyers of care on behalf 
of their consumers and to increase efficiency and quality of healthcare delivery (Schut 
and Ven de Ven, 2005). Consumers who are dissatisfied with the premium or purchased 
care by their insurer must be free (and must feel free) to easily switch insurer (Enthoven, 
1978). For this reason, Dutch insurers are legally obliged under the HIA to accept all 
applicants for mandatory basic health insurance (BI) for a community-rated premium. 
Consumers’ decision to switch insurer depends on their expectation of whether their 
switching benefits (e.g. price or contracted provider network) will outweigh their switch-
ing costs (e.g. transaction costs or the costs of (not) switching healthcare provider) 
(Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004).
In the Netherlands, insurers are allowed to selectively contract with healthcare 
providers. This may increase product differentiation in the BI market. High-risks (i.e. 
elderly or unhealthy consumers) make an above-average use of the purchased care by 
their insurer. Product differentiation increases their health insurance options. Therefore, 
these consumers have a great interest in the possibility of switching each year. Previous 
studies indicated that in particular elderly consumers place value on the (quality of 
the) insurers’ contracted provider network (Beaulieu, 2002), while young consumers 
seem to be mainly interested in price (Buchmueller, 2000). The probability of switching 
decreases with age (see Chapter 2). High switching costs may explain the low switch-
ing rates among high-risks (see Chapter 2). However, if only young individuals switch, 
insurers may have low incentives to invest in high-quality care for elderly consumers. In 
the Netherlands, voluntary supplementary insurance (SI) may restrict consumer choice 
of high-risks. In this chapter, we focus solely on this potential barrier to switching for BI.
Consumers can take out SI for benefits that are not covered by BI. Dutch insurers 
are allowed to offer both BI and SI. In 2011 and 2012, about 90 percent of the Dutch 
population took out SI and 99.8 percent of them took out their BI and SI from the same 
insurer (Vektis, 2012). In contrast to BI, SI is based on free market principles, which 
means that insurers are allowed to apply risk rating and selective underwriting for SI. 
Roos and Schut (2012) have indicated that in 2009 almost all Dutch insurers offered 
BI and SI as a joint product. For example, insurers offered SI only in combination with 
BI or they required premium surcharges if a consumer only applied for SI. This joint 
purchase can generate two negative spillover effects of SI on BI: (1) SI can be used as 
a tool for risk selection in BI and (2) SI can reduce consumer choice of insurer for BI. 
Improving the risk equalization scheme can counteract the first effect (Roos and Schut, 
2012). In this chapter we focus on the latter effect, which is maybe harder to solve than 
the first effect. If high-risk consumers are ‘locked’ in their current SI, they would also not 
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switch insurer for BI. Consequently, insurers may have low incentives to be responsive 
to the preferences of high-risks and to invest in high-quality care for them. As a result, 
effective competition among insurers may decline. It is likely that in coming years, due 
to rising healthcare expenses, benefits will be removed from BI. Because insurers may 
extend their SI with the benefits that are being removed from BI, SI may become more 
important and the problem that SI can restrict choice of insurer for BI is likely to increase 
in the coming years.
Roos and Schut (2012) showed that an increasing proportion of high-risks did not 
(consider to) switch insurer for BI because they expected that another insurer would 
reject them for SI. In 2006, for about 4 percent of the non-switching Dutch population 
the belief in not being accepted for SI by another insurer was an important reason for 
not switching for BI. This percentage increased to about 7 in 2009 (Roos and Schut, 
2012). In this chapter, we investigate to what extent consumers expected in 2011 and 
2012 that another insurer would not accept them for SI. In addition, we pay attention to 
the question of whether consumers expect that another insurer would accept them, but 
would charge them a higher premium than other consumers with the same SI.
The aim of this chapter is fourfold: (1) to analyze the problem that SI restricts choice of 
insurer for BI when BI and SI are offered as a joint product; (2) to examine the extent to 
which SI was a barrier to switching in the Netherlands in 2011 and 2012; (3) to provide 
an effective solution in order to increase choice of insurer for BI; and (4) to discuss the 
relevance of our conclusions for countries with a healthcare system characterized by 
elements of regulated competition and SI that is offered in combination with BI (e.g. 
Belgium, Germany, Israel, and Switzerland) (Wasem et al., 2004).
4.2 analysIs of tHe ProbleM
A joint purchase of BI and SI can restrict consumer choice of insurer for BI (Roos and 
Schut, 2012). For example, in the period 2006-2009 in the Netherlands, the probability 
of switching insurer was about 20 percent lower for a consumer with SI than for a 
consumer without SI (Boonen et al., 2011b). By 2009, almost all Dutch insurers used 
at least one of the following instruments to offer BI and SI as a joint product: (1) they 
offered SI only in combination with BI; (2) they required premium surcharges for SI 
if a consumer only applied for SI; (3) they required premium surcharges for SI if a 
consumer switched to another insurer for BI; (4) they used stringent acceptation policies 
if a consumer only applied for SI or; (5) they used parent-child-tie-in provisions (Roos 
and Schut, 2012). Consumers may have strong preferences for a joint purchase of BI 
and SI because it may facilitate the coordination of basic and supplemental benefits (in 
particular for types of care that are partly covered by BI and partly by SI (NZa, 2009b)), 
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and because one-stop shopping lowers search and transaction costs (Paolucci et al., 
2007).
Given the joint purchase of BI and SI, several features of SI can restrict consumer 
choice of insurer for BI. In this chapter we will primarily focus on the guaranteed re-
newability (GR) of SI. Dutch insurers have incorporated a GR in each SI without any 
legal duty to do this (Roos and Schut, 2012). For other types of insurance  – like car 
insurance, burglary insurance, or fire insurance – GR is not incorporated. The GR of 
SI consists of a guaranteed renewal of SI each year without any discrimination in the 
adjustment of the premium and the policy conditions for all current consumers with this 
specific SI. This means that a consumer who has developed a chronic disease during 
the previous contract period will be offered the same premium and policy conditions 
for the next contract period as a consumer who has not developed a chronic disease. 
GR imposes an acceptance duty and premium-rate restrictions for the insurer with 
respect to renewing SI of their own enrollees, but this does not hold for new applicants. 
Consequently, high-risks can expect their current insurer to offer them more favorable 
conditions in terms of acceptance, premium, and waiting periods than other insurers do. 
In other words, because of GR, high-risks may be ‘married with their insurer’ (Van de 
Ven and Schut, 2011).
In 2006 and 2007, all Dutch insurers informally agreed not to refuse new applicants 
for SI (except for extensive dental coverage) (Roos and Schut, 2012). Moreover, during 
these years, risk rating was only applied by a few insurers and these insurers only used 
a few risk factors to determine the premium of SI (De Bruijn and Schut, 2006). As a 
result, in 2006 and 2007, all Dutch consumers had the possibility of taking out SI with 
an (almost) community-rated premium. However, in 2008, the informal agreement was 
no longer continued. Therefore, since 2008, high-risks can expect their current insurer 
to offer more favorable conditions in terms of acceptance, premium, and waiting periods 
than other insurers do for a similar SI.
4.3  CHoICe of InsUrer for basIC HealtH InsUranCe 
HInDereD by gUaranteeD reneWabIlIty of 
sUPPleMentary InsUranCe?
The previous section has indicated that GR of SI can, in theory, restrict high-risks’ 
choice of insurer for BI. Two methods are used to determine the extent to which GR of 
SI, in practice, restricted choice of insurer for BI in 2011 and 2012. Firstly, a consumer 
questionnaire was used to determine whether - and, if so, which - consumers expect 
their current insurer to impose more favorable conditions than other insurers do for simi-
lar SI next year. Table 4.1 presents the question used and the corresponding answer 
categories.
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Data were collected in February 2011 and February 2012 through the Internet by using 
the CentERpanel. In 2011, the CentERpanel consisted of 2,665 respondents aged 18 
years or older who completed questionnaires at home every week. In 2012, the Cen-
tERpanel consisted of 2,419 respondents aged 18 years or older. The response rates in 
2011 and 2012 were, respectively, 73.8 percent and 76.6 percent.
Background characteristics of all respondents are presented in Table 4.2. The 
sample of respondents was significantly older and healthier than the general Dutch 
population. The percentage of respondents older than 65 years, among respondents of 
20 years or older, was in our research 27 compared to 21 in the general Dutch popula-
tion. In addition, the percentage of respondents reporting a bad or poor health status 
was 16 compared to 20 in the general Dutch population.
table 4.1 Consumer questionnaire
Question: suppose you want to take out similar sI from another insurer. What do you expect this other 
insurer would do? Choose the answer category that best applies to you.
I expect I have to pay a lower premium than other consumers with the same SI at this insurer
I expect I have to pay the same premium as other consumers with the same SI at this insurer
I expect I have to pay a higher premium than other consumers with the same SI at this insurer
I think another insurer would reject me
I do not know
table 4.2 Background characteristics of respondents
2011 2012
% of total (n=1,968) % of total (n=1,852)
age
Aged 18-55 48.6 45.3
Aged 56 or older 51.4 54.7
self-reported health
Bad or moderate 16.1 16.4
Good, very good, or excellent 83.9 83.6
gender
Female 46.5 46.0
switched insurer
Yes 4.6 4.7
supplementary insurance
Yes 84.6 83.7
No 8.8 11.5
Do not know 6.7 4.8
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Secondly, in 2011, six employees of six Dutch health insurance companies were inter-
viewed to determine whether insurers applied risk rating, selective underwriting, and 
product differentiation for SI and whether they expect to change their behavior in the 
near future. In addition, questions were asked about GR and questions were asked 
to determine the main motives of insurers for their current behavior (see Table 4.3). 
We selected these six employees because they were responsible for the design, the 
premium setting, and the policy conditions of the SI products offered. The interviewed 
employees were working, for example, as chiefs of departments for product design and 
development, for both large and small insurance companies.
During the interviews, it was possible to keep on asking questions in order to clarify 
answers. In addition, the interviewer could guarantee an unambiguous interpretation 
of the concepts of risk rating, selective underwriting, product differentiation, and GR by 
exemplifying these concepts during the interviews. Each interview was recorded, with 
the permission of the interviewee, and transcribed. After each interview, a summary 
was sent to the interviewee concerned for checking. Thus, the results are based on 
authorized interviews. Potential biases in the employees’ answers were counteracted 
by comparing their answers with consumer information on insurers’ websites and on 
other public information sources (e.g. http://www.kiesbeter.nl). Public information 
sources were further used to determine whether non-interviewed Dutch insurers apply 
risk rating, selective underwriting, and product differentiation for SI.
table 4.3 Interview topics
risk rating1 Current application of risk rating
Motives for current behavior
Expected application of risk rating in the future
selective underwriting2 Current application of selective underwriting
Motives for current behavior
Expected application of selective underwriting in the future
Product differentiation3 Various types of SI offered by the insurer
guaranteed renewability Motives for incorporating GR in SI
1 Risk rating: “adjusting the premium for each product to the individual’s risk” (Van de Ven and Schut, 2011).
2 Selective underwriting: ‘’adjusting the accepted risk to the stated premium of a given product’’ (Van de 
Ven and Schut, 2011).
3 Product differentiation: ‘’adjusting the product to attract various risk groups per product and charge premi-
ums accordingly’’ (Van de Ven and Schut, 2011).
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Expectations of Dutch consumers
Table 4.4 shows consumers’ expectations concerning the behavior of other insurers 
if they decide to switch insurer for a similar SI. A Pearson’s Chi square test was used 
to determine whether two variables were correlated. In both years, about 10 percent 
of all Dutch consumers aged 18 years or older expected that another insurer would 
reject them for SI. Roos and Schut (2012) found that in 2006 for about 4 percent of 
the non-switching Dutch population, the belief in not being accepted for SI by another 
insurer was an important reason for not switching for BI. This percentage increased 
to about 7 in 2009. Although the question used in the present study differs slightly 
from that used in the research by Roos and Schut (2012), there is a clear indication 
that the proportion of consumers who expected that another insurer would not accept 
them for SI has increased in the period 2006-2012. In addition, about 20 percent of the 
respondents expected that another insurer would accept them, but would charge them 
a higher premium than other consumers with the same SI. In 2011, about 27 percent of 
the respondents expected their current insurer to offer a more favorable SI than other 
insurers. This increased to 31.5 percent in 2012. Given the total adult Dutch population 
of 12 million individuals, in 2012 almost one third, i.e. 3.75 million individuals, expected 
their current insurer to offer a more favorable SI than other insurers.
Table 4.4 shows that more than half of the consumers with a bad or moderate self-
reported health and about a third of the consumers aged 55 years or older expected 
their current insurer to offer a more favorable SI than other insurers. This problem is 
caused by GR of each SI. Due to the joint purchase of BI and SI, these high-risks would 
most likely not switch insurer for BI. Because these non-switching consumers make an 
table 4.4  Percentage of respondents that expects that another insurer would reject them for similar SI or 
expects that another insurer would accept them, but would charge them a higher premium than 
other consumers with the same SI¹
1. expect to be rejected 2 expect higher premium 3.expect higher premium 
or to be rejected
2011 (n=992) 2012 (n=881) 2011 (n=992) 2012 (n=881) 2011 (n=992) 2012 (n=881)
aged 18-55 5.1%
***
5.6%
***
16.0% 22.7% 21.0%
***
28.3%
**
aged 56 or older 15.7% 14.1% 16.9% 20.3% 32.6% 34.5%
good, very good,  
or excellent health
6.2%
***
5.6%
***
15.6%
*
20.2%
**
21.7%
***
25.8%
***
bad or moderate health 31.9% 32.0% 21.3% 27.9% 53.1% 59.9%
total 10.4% 10.0% 16.4% 21.5% 26.8% 31.5%
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
¹ Individuals who indicated that they do not know whether another insurer would apply the instruments of 
risk rating and/or selective underwriting for SI are left out of the analyses (26.8 percent of the respondents 
with SI in 2011 and 22.1 percent of the respondents with SI in 2012). The remaining sample size is 992 
respondents in 2011 and 881 respondents in 2012.
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above-average use of the purchased care by insurers, they have a great interest in the 
possibility of switching insurer each year. Therefore, if these consumers do not switch 
if they are dissatisfied, the disciplining effect of ‘voting with one’s feet’ is substantially 
reduced. This is a serious problem that is expected to increase in coming years, if SI 
becomes more important. The conclusion is that currently an essential precondition for 
achieving efficiency in the Dutch system of regulated competition is largely unfulfilled.
Actual behavior of Dutch health insurers
Interviews with individuals working at various health insurance companies indicated 
that Dutch insurers substantially applied product differentiation for SI. Insurers stated 
that they have offered, for example, special SI products for women, young consumers, 
and families to respond to the various preferences of various groups of consumers. 
Insurers informed us that they have not applied selective underwriting and risk rating to 
a major extent. Supplementary dental insurance products and the most comprehensive 
SI products can be considered as exceptions. The same conclusions can be drawn 
from the extensive review of publicly available information sources. Our conclusions 
are consistent with those of Roos and Schut (2012). If a consumer has been refused for 
a high-option SI, an alternative low-option SI will be offered. Insurers referred to their 
social foundation, the importance of solidarity for health insurance, and the transaction 
costs as explanations for their limited use of selective underwriting and risk rating for 
SI. Moreover, due to public pressure in 2004 and 2005, insurers incorporated the GR 
in each SI.
Nevertheless, the previous section has shown that about 30 percent of the respon-
dents expected that another insurer would apply risk rating or selective underwriting 
for SI. This implies that a discrepancy exists between the actual insurers’ practices 
and consumers’ expectations about these practices. Consumers’ experiences with risk 
rating and selective underwriting in private health insurance before 2006 or in other 
insurance products may explain this discrepancy.
Expected behavior of Dutch health insurers in the future
In coming years, benefits may be excluded from the BI and included in the SI. As a con-
sequence, the current SI would be extended and insurers’ incentives to apply risk rating 
and selective underwriting may increase. Paolucci et al. (2009) examined the potential 
premium range of SI in the Netherlands in 2002 and the potential premium range if SI 
only covered the total expenses for certain specific types of care. Table 4.5 presents 
the premium range if no risk factors are used (i.e. the community-rated premium), if 
only demographic risk factors are used, and if health-related risk factors are also used 
in premium setting. The magnitude of the premium range is especially substantial for 
benefits like pharmaceuticals and medical devices. The potential gains from using 
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health-related risk factors in addition to demographic factors are quite limited for the SI 
as it was in 2002 (Paolucci et al.¸ 2009).
Table 4.5 gives an indication of the potential premium range of SI in 2011 and 2012. 
In these years, SI consisted, among others, of benefits that were covered by SI in 
2002, for example alternative care and cross-border care. From 2004, reimbursement 
of dental and paramedic care by BI has been reduced. Currently, dental and paramedic 
care are the main benefits covered by SI. In 2011, for example, expenses for dental and 
paramedic care formed about 75 percent of the total expenses covered by SI (Vektis, 
2013). From Table 4.5 we conclude that the premium range of SI covering these benefits 
is relatively limited (in absolute euros) and primarily determined by demographic factors 
and not so much by health-related risk factors. However, from 2012, pharmaceuticals to 
treat gastric acid, the most used pharmaceuticals in the Netherlands (Croonen, 2009), 
were no longer reimbursed by BI. To the extent that these pharmaceuticals are covered 
by SI, the potential premium range of SI in 2012 increased and health-related factors 
became important as well.
If, in the future, more benefits (e.g. medical devices or pharmaceuticals) are transferred 
from BI to SI, insurers would have more incentives to apply risk rating and selective 
underwriting for SI. As soon as one insurer starts doing so, other insurers would have 
to follow, otherwise their low-risks would switch to the insurer that applies risk rating 
or selective underwriting, and they would be left with the high-risks only. During the 
interviews, the individuals working at various health insurance companies revealed that 
they indeed keep a close watch on the behavior of their competitors. They stated that 
if important competitors started to apply risk rating and selective underwriting more 
extensively, they would adjust their behavior to do the same.
table 4.5  Potential premium range of SI in 2002 and of insurance covering total expenditures (BI and SI) 
on certain types of care
Community-rated 
premium
Demographic  
risk factors
Demographic and health-related 
risk factors
sI in 2002 € 75 € 6 - € 125 € 6 - € 138
Dental care € 83 € 35 - € 143 € 27 - € 143
Paramedic care € 70 € 18 - € 176 € 13 - € 314
Medical devices € 76 € 17 - € 299 € 12 - € 723
Pharmaceuticals € 309 € 57 - € 813 € 38 - € 2,175
Source: Paolucci et al. (2009)
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4.4 solUtIons
The previous section has indicated that GR of SI restricts choice of insurer for a 
substantial group of high-risks. Section 4.4.1 discusses potential solutions that have 
previously been suggested, but for several reasons are no longer promising. Section 
4.4.2 describes a new effective solution under current EU legislation.
4.4.1 Potential solutions
Roos and Schut (2012) have suggested four strategies to reduce the lock-in effect for 
high-risks. However, for several reasons these solutions (currently) do not seem to be 
highly promising.
Firstly, a strict legal separation between BI and SI is not a legally feasible solution 
because both BI and SI are private insurances subject to the Third European Non-life 
Insurance Directive. Under this directive, the government is not allowed to control policy 
conditions or prices of insurance products. BI falls under an exemption on this prohibi-
tion (Article 54) because it replaces the social security scheme. SI does not replace the 
social security scheme, so the government is not allowed to regulate it. Consequently, 
the Dutch government is not allowed to control policy conditions of the SI that link SI 
and BI, or to stop an insurer that offers BI from also offering SI, and vice versa.
Secondly, limiting the role of SI by confining its role to only ‘luxury’ benefits has 
become unrealistic due to the financial crisis and the urgent need for the government 
to reduce the public healthcare expenses. The increasing importance of SI seems 
unavoidable. For the same reason, the potential solution “providing information to 
consumers about the unimportance of the benefits that are covered by SI” may not be 
very promising anymore. The Dutch government holds the view that all necessary and 
cost-effective care is included in the publicly financed BI and that the SI covers only 
those benefits for which no need for public financing exits (Ministerie van VWS, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the percentage of consumers with SI is very high in the Netherlands 
(about 90 percent). Therefore, it could be the case that consumers have insufficient 
knowledge of the benefits that are covered by SI or attach too great importance to SI. 
The question arises, however, as to whether consumers would believe an informa-
tion campaign that states that taking out SI may be unnecessary if SI becomes more 
important in the coming years.
As a third strategy, Roos and Schut (2012) suggested monitoring insurers’ under-
writing practices and publishing the results to make insurers reluctant to engage in 
stringent underwriting practices because they don’t want to lose their reputations. In 
the short term this solution may be effective because insurers may face the trade-off 
between underwriting practices and the potential loss of reputation. However, if in the 
coming years benefits are transferred from BI to SI, insurers’ incentives to apply risk 
rating and selective underwriting will increase. The competitive SI market will induce 
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them to apply risk rating and selective underwriting for SI more extensively (see Section 
4.3). Therefore, this strategy can at best postpone risk rating and selective underwriting, 
but not eliminate them.
A fourth solution suggested by Roos and Schut (2012) is to improve consumers’ 
knowledge of insurers’ underwriting practices. The previous section has shown that a 
discrepancy exists between the expectations of consumers about the insurers’ practices 
and the actual insurers’ practices for SI. Disseminating information about actual switch-
ing opportunities, particularly to high-risks, could decrease this discrepancy. However, 
if in the coming years benefits are transferred from BI to SI, insurers’ incentives to apply 
risk rating and selective underwriting will increase. If some insurers start applying these 
instruments more frequently, the adverse selection spiral will also force other insurers 
to apply risk rating and selective underwriting in the coming years more often than 
currently. In that case, a (successful) campaign that states that high-risks would not 
be confronted with risk rating or selective underwriting for SI would provide incorrect 
information.
4.4.2 one basic-plus-insurance
Description of one basic-plus-insurance
An alternative potential solution is to integrate the current BI and SI into one insurance 
product: a basic-plus-insurance (BPI), as suggested for example by Enthoven (1978, 
1980) and Chinitz (1994). Insurers that offer BI would then also be allowed to offer a 
BPI. This solution takes into account that almost all Dutch health insurers currently offer 
BI and SI as a joint product. The income-solidarity and risk-solidarity for BI can remain 
unchanged. That is: risk equalization refers only to BI and insurers should maintain 
a separate financial administration for basic benefits and supplemental benefits; the 
mandatory deductible only refers to the basic benefits; and the care allowance is based 
on the premium of BI only.
The current Health Insurance Act (HIA) should be adjusted in four ways:
1. Basic-plus-insurance policy: at this moment, the HIA describes a more or less fixed 
basic benefit package. It is an economic crime if insurers offer a BI contract that 
covers more than the legally defined basic benefits. The introduction of the BPI 
would allow insurers to offer, in addition to BI, a BPI contract covering the benefits 
of the current mandatory BI plus supplemental benefits.
2. Open enrollment requirement: currently, insurers must accept each applicant for 
BI without exclusions and waiting periods before coverage of benefits. After the 
introduction of the BPI, this open enrollment requirement should also hold for any 
BPI. To prevent adverse selection, waiting periods for supplemental benefits could 
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be allowed if an applicant had no coverage for these supplemental benefits in the 
previous contract period.
3. Risk rating: currently, each consumer has to pay a community-rated premium 
for BI. After the introduction of the BPI, insurers would still be obliged to charge 
a community-rated premium for the basic benefits. However, to prevent low-risk 
individuals taking out a separate SI for a low premium (see Section 4.3), risk rat-
ing for the supplemental benefits within the BPI should be allowed. Insurers have 
the freedom to decide which risk factors (e.g. age or health status) they use in 
their premium setting. However, an insurer must charge individuals with the same 
risk characteristics the same premium for the same BPI. Currently, due to the GR, 
insurers may charge their current enrollees a lower premium than new enrollees 
with the same risk characteristics for the same SI. After the introduction of the BPI, 
insurers must charge groups of enrollees with equal risk characteristics and the 
same supplemental benefits, the same premium.
4. Separate basic health insurance: after the introduction of the BPI, an insurer 
should be obliged to offer at least a separate BI without supplemental benefits. 
This obligation guarantees that a consumer can still choose a BI without unwanted 
supplements. Moreover, this obligation guarantees transparency in the market for 
BI. Consumers can still compare the premiums of various BI products and insurers 
with each other.
To sum up, the introduction of a BPI differs from the current joint products of BI and SI 
in several aspects. Firstly, BI and SI are two separate contracts with the insurer, while 
BPI integrates BI and SI into one contract. Secondly, insurers are allowed to apply 
selective underwriting for separate SI. However, insurers must accept each applicant 
for supplemental benefits within BPI and consumers would no longer face the risk that 
another insurer would reject them for supplemental benefits. Consumers who opt for a 
BPI would further have no uncertainty about waiting periods if they switch insurer for a 
similar BPI. Thirdly, a BPI will eliminate GR of current SI by obliging insurers to charge 
the same premium to all consumers (i.e. both current and new enrollees) with equal 
risk characteristics and the same BPI. Consequently, consumers who opt for a BPI 
would no longer face the risk that another insurer imposes less favorable conditions for 
supplemental benefits in the next contract period than their current insurer does. GR of 
SI would no longer be a restriction on consumer choice.
Compliance with EU legislation
According to the Dutch government, the current BI – which restricts the insurers in risk 
rating, selective underwriting and defining their insurance coverage – is in accordance 
with the EU regulations including the European Non-life Insurance Directive. These 
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restrictions to protect the general good must be objectively necessary and proportionate 
to the objective concerned. The latter condition is not fulfilled if there is an alterna-
tive that is less restrictive and offers the same protection of the general good. The 
proposed BPI offers the same protection of the general good, but is less restrictive 
than the current BI because foreign insurers that are solely interested in the possibility 
of offering a BPI are at present (under the BI) hindered in entering the Dutch health 
insurance market, while under BPI this would not be the case. Therefore, the proposed 
BPI is more proportionate than the current BI, which makes the proposed BPI more in 
accordance with the EU regulations than the current BI (which, according to the Dutch 
government, is in accordance with the EU regulations). So, from the perspective of 
EU regulations, BPI is to be preferred to BI. In addition, the introduction of the BPI is 
not in conflict with the European Non-life Insurance Directive because insurers are not 
obliged to offer BPI in addition to BI. Insurers that, for example, do not want to accept all 
applicants for supplemental benefits, can decide to continue offering separate SI. BPI 
can be considered as an extra option for insurers that offer BI.15
Would insurers opt for the basic-plus-insurance?
Given a voluntary option for insurers to introduce a BPI, the question arises as to why 
insurers would prefer a BPI to separate SI. We can imagine two reasons why insurers 
would offer BPI contracts. Firstly, in recent years, insurers voluntarily enforced a joint 
purchase of BI and SI (Roos and Schut, 2012) by using different instruments (see Sec-
tion 4.2), because the combination of BI and SI has several advantages for consumers 
and insurers (e.g. one-stop-shopping, low transaction costs, and a good coordination 
of basic and supplemental benefits). After the introduction of the BPI, insurers would 
be legally allowed to sell BI and SI together as one combined BPI and insurers would 
no longer have to use these instruments. Secondly, insurers apply risk rating for SI to 
a limited extent. However, the consumer information surplus may result in an adverse 
selection spiral (Van de Ven and Van Vliet, 1995). Consequently, if insurers prefer not 
to lose low-risk consumers, the free market principles force them to apply risk rating or 
selective underwriting.16 In a BPI, insurers are legally allowed to apply risk rating. We 
expect that with this explicit legal permission, insurers would not be hindered by a loss 
of reputation if they prefer to risk rate for the supplemental benefits within the BPI rather 
than applying selective underwriting for separate SI.
15 The introduction of a BPI may further encourage competition by eliminating current features 
of SI that are important restrictions for high-risk consumers to switch insurer.
16 If low-risks no longer take out SI or switch to another SI or a BPI, the risk profile of the old 
contract will worsen (adverse selection) and insurers will have to charge high-risk consumers 
a high, actuarially fair premium (Roos and Schut, 2012).
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Due to adverse selection, there may be no business case for a separate SI covering 
only the most comprehensive supplemental benefits. An exception may be the most 
comprehensive SI products covering high dental expenses, but the joint purchase of BI 
and that kind of SI do not take place frequently and these SI policies would not lead to 
a severe restriction on consumer choice for BI.
Potential objections to the introduction of the basic-plus-insurance
Four potential objections to the introduction of BPI can be discerned. A first objection 
could be that transparency in the health insurance market may decrease, because 
insurers can offer many different health insurance contracts. In theory, with the current 
more or less fixed basic benefit package, consumers can focus their attention on dif-
ferences in price and quality rather than on what is covered and what is not covered 
(Enthoven, 1994). However, in practice this is not the case because currently insurers 
offer many different SI products and consumers already consider BI and SI as one 
product. Therefore, transparency in the health insurance market may not decrease after 
the introduction of BPI.
A second potential objection could be that insurers may invest in competition on 
supplemental benefits rather than on basic benefits. Consequently, competition in the 
market for BI may decline. However, given the joint purchase of BI and SI, insurers 
could currently also have more incentives to invest in competition on SI rather than in 
competition on BI.
A third potential objection could be that insurers may use the design of supplemental 
benefits to attract consumers for whom the risk equalization system for BI provides an 
overcompensation. At present, the Dutch risk equalization system is not sufficiently 
refined (Van de Ven et al.¸ 2013). As a consequence, insurers are able to identify groups 
of consumers for whom the risk equalization system provides over- and undercompen-
sation. However, given the joint purchase of BI and SI, the current SI offers exactly the 
same instrument for risk selection. Therefore, the introduction of BPI would not provide 
insurers with new instruments to use supplemental benefits to attract especially those 
consumers for whom the risk equalization system provides an overcompensation.
A fourth potential objection could be that insurers may charge consumers for whom 
the risk equalization system provides an undercompensation (e.g. chronically ill individu-
als), a higher premium for the supplemental benefits covered by BPI than consumers 
for whom the risk equalization system provides a sufficient compensation. Therefore, 
high-risks could be charged a much higher premium than low-risks. However, given 
the joint purchase of BI and SI, the current SI provides insurers with exactly the same 
instrument for risk rating.
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4.5 relevanCe for otHer CoUntrIes
In recent decades, elements of regulated competition have also been implemented in 
the social health insurance systems in Belgium, Germany, Israel, and Switzerland. A 
mandatory health insurance system, a guaranteed periodic consumer choice among 
health insurers, and SI are important common elements of these countries’ healthcare 
systems (Van de Ven et al., 2003; Van de Ven et al., 2013). Below we discuss the 
relevance of our conclusions for these countries.
In Belgium, consumers are legally obliged to take out BI and SI from the same 
insurer and insurers are not allowed to refuse applicants by age or health status. Choice 
of insurer for BI is hardly restricted by SI in Belgium (Van de Ven et al., 2013). The BPI 
differs from SI in Belgium, because Dutch insurers are not obliged to offer SI in combi-
nation with BI.17 In addition, in Belgium, consumers are obliged to take out mandatory 
SI while taking out SI is voluntary in the Netherlands.
In Germany, two types of SI can be distinguished: mandatory SI and voluntary SI. 
BI and mandatory SI are legally offered as a joint product. BI providers are allowed to 
offer extra benefits, e.g. spa treatments and hospice treatment, up to a maximum of 5 
percent of BI expenditures, on top of BI. Open enrollment also applies to mandatory 
SI and insurers must charge a single contribution for BI and mandatory SI. Therefore, 
choice of insurer for BI is hardly restricted by mandatory SI (Van de Ven et al., 2013). In 
fact, mandatory SI which is legally offered as a joint product with BI, can be considered 
as a kind of BPI. However, this kind of SI is mandatory while in the Netherlands consum-
ers could voluntarily opt for a BPI. Moreover, in the Netherlands, insurers should be 
obliged to offer at least a separate BI without supplemental benefits.
The German market for voluntary SI is unregulated. German insurers that offer BI are 
not allowed to offer voluntary SI. However, insurers that offer BI cooperate with insurers 
that offer voluntary SI. Consumers are offered premium discounts for the voluntary SI if 
they take out voluntary SI from the insurer that is cooperated with. A consumer will lose 
this premium discount if he or she switches insurer for BI (Van de Ven et al., 2013). As 
a consequence, the voluntary SI can restrict choice of insurer for BI. The integration of 
BI with voluntary SI into one BPI may be a solution for Germany as well.
In Israel, BI can be considered as a minimum benefit package and insurers are thus 
allowed to offer extras in BI (Van de Ven et al., 2013). Insurers are further allowed to 
offer SI to their own enrollees. Since 1998, the Israeli SI market has been regulated. 
According to the regulations, insurers are not allowed to apply selective underwriting 
17 Because SI is subject to the Third European Non-life Insurance Directive (see Section 4.4.1), 
the Dutch government is not allowed to legally oblige consumers to take out BI and SI from 
the same insurer. In Belgium, the regulations concerning SI may be in conflict with the Third 
European Non-life Insurance Directive (Van de Ven and Van Vliet, 1995).
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for SI and they can only charge risk-rated SI-premiums based on age (Gross and 
Brammli-Greenberg, 2004). In Israel, however, waiting periods imposed by SI restrict 
consumer choice for BI (Shmueli et al., 2007; Shmueli, 2011; Van de Ven et al., 2013). 
The introduction of a BPI may solve this problem, because insurers are then obliged to 
accept each applicant for supplemental benefits without waiting periods before cover-
age of these benefits.
The Swiss healthcare system has a similar structure to the Dutch healthcare system 
(Dormont et al., 2009; Roos and Schut, 2012). As in the Netherlands, insurer-estab-
lished joint purchase of BI and SI can be observed (Dormont et al.¸ 2009). Dormont 
et al. (2009) found that holding a SI substantially decreases the propensity to switch. 
The problem in Switzerland, that SI restricts choice of insurer for BI, is comparable to 
the problem in the Netherlands and therefore the introduction of a BPI may also be a 
potential solution for Switzerland.
4.6 ConClUsIons
The introduction of the Health Insurance Act (HIA) in 2006 was an important step to-
wards regulated competition in the Dutch healthcare system. Choice of insurer is an es-
sential precondition for achieving efficiency in healthcare systems based on regulated 
competition. In addition to a mandatory basic health insurance (BI), about 90 percent 
of the Dutch population voluntarily take out supplementary insurance (SI). Insurers can 
apply risk rating and selective underwriting for SI, but not for BI. Because almost all 
Dutch insurers offer BI and SI as a joint product, consumer choice of insurer for BI can 
be restricted by SI, e.g. by the GR in each SI contract.
The findings of our empirical research indicate that more than half of the Dutch 
consumers with a bad or moderate self-reported health and a third of the elderly (55+) 
consumers expected in 2011 and 2012 their current insurer to impose more favor-
able conditions than other insurers do for a similar SI. These consumers expected 
that another insurer would either reject them or would charge them a higher premium 
than other consumers with the same SI. Due to the joint purchase of BI and SI, these 
high-risks would most likely not switch insurer for BI. Because these non-switching 
consumers make an above-average use of the purchased care by insurers, they have a 
great interest in the possibility of switching insurer each year. Therefore, if dissatisfied 
consumers do not switch insurer for BI, the disciplining effect of ‘voting with one’s feet’ 
is substantially reduced. This is a serious problem that may increase if SI becomes 
more important.
A negative effect of a restricted choice of insurer for BI for high-risks is that insurers 
have low incentives to be responsive to high-risks’ preferences and to invest in high-
quality care for them. As a result, effective competition among insurers may decline. 
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We discussed several potential solutions to improve consumer choice of insurer for 
BI. We conclude that the integration of BI and SI into one BPI is an effective solu-
tion under current EU legislation. A BPI takes into account that almost all Dutch health 
insurers currently offer BI and SI as a joint product and that a joint product has several 
advantages for consumers (e.g. one-stop-shopping, low transaction costs, and a good 
coordination of basic benefits and supplemental benefits). Our conclusion may also be 
relevant for other countries.
5
Supplementary insurance as a switching 
cost for basic health insurance: 
theory and practice from the Netherlands 
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abstraCt
Previous studies showed that high-risks perceive supplementary insurance as a 
switching cost for basic health insurance. Because consumers’ current insurer offers 
a supplementary insurance contract with a guaranteed renewability, changing supple-
mentary insurance involves a switching cost if insurers apply selective underwriting 
to new enrollees. In the last years, Dutch insurers’ incentives to protect themselves 
against the adverse selection spiral increased. Tools to do so are selective underwriting, 
risk rating, and product differentiation. These tools have different consequences for 
supplementary insurance as a switching cost for basic health insurance. We investi-
gated to what extent insurers used these tools between 2006-2009 and 2014-2015. 
Only some insurers applied selective underwriting: in 2015, 86 percent of insurers used 
open enrollment for all their supplementary insurance products. As measured by our 
indicators, the proportion of insurers applying risk rating or product differentiation did 
not increase. We hypothesize that, due to the fear of reputation loss, insurers used 
‘less visible strategies’ to counteract the adverse selection spiral. These strategies are 
forms of risk rating and product differentiation and do not result in switching costs. So, 
although many high-risks perceive supplementary insurance as a switching cost, most 
insurers apply open enrollment for supplementary insurance. Providing information 
to high-risks about their switching opportunities could improve consumer choice and 
thereby insurers’ incentives to invest for high-risks in high-quality care in basic health 
insurance.
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5.1 IntroDUCtIon
Several countries (e.g. Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United States) 
have introduced a competitive market for basic health insurance (BI) to enhance ef-
ficiency, quality, and consumer responsiveness in healthcare. BI is a standardized 
basic benefit package defined by the government. Health insurers have the major task 
of purchasing (and/or delivering) care on behalf of their consumers. The possibility of 
consumers switching to a competitor must continuously stimulate insurers to success-
fully fulfill this task. The government sets the rules of the game (e.g. an open enroll-
ment period, community-rated premiums, and a risk equalization system) to facilitate 
consumer choice for BI.
In the Netherlands, insurers offer BI and voluntary supplementary insurance (SI) 
for benefits not covered by BI as a joint product (Roos and Schut, 2012). Therefore, 
consumers’ decision to switch insurer for BI is also influenced by their expectations re-
garding SI. Because of EU regulation, the Dutch government is not allowed to regulate 
the SI market. Thus, insurers are permitted to refuse applicants or to charge risk-rated 
premiums for SI. Previous studies (Roos and Schut, 2012; Duijmelinck and Van de Ven, 
2014; see Chapter 4) showed that many high-risks (i.e. elderly or unhealthy consumers) 
perceive SI as a switching cost for BI. In 2012, 32 percent of the unhealthy consumers 
expected another insurer will not accept them for SI (Duijmelinck and Van de Ven, 2014; 
see Chapter 4). SI as a perceived switching cost by high-risks is a serious problem, 
because it reduces insurers’ incentives to invest in high-quality care for this category of 
consumers.
Dutch insurers guarantee to renew annual SI contracts of their current enrollees. SI is a 
(perceived) switching cost for BI because high-risks fear that other insurers apply selec-
tive underwriting in their acceptance procedures for new enrollees. Thus, high-risks fear 
that another insurer will not accept them for SI, while the renewal of their current SI is 
guaranteed. Insurers can apply selective underwriting to protect themselves against 
the adverse selection spiral. Adverse selection can be described as the tendency of 
high-risks to take out more insurance than low-risks (i.e. young or healthy consumers) 
because of a consumer information surplus (Cummins et al., 1983; Van de Ven and Van 
Vliet, 1995). This tendency may seriously threaten the stability of an insurance market 
(Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000b). Besides applying selective underwriting, insurers can 
also apply risk rating or product differentiation to counteract the adverse selection spiral 
(Schut, 1995; Van de Ven and Van Vliet, 1995; Godfried et al., 2001). SI is hardly a 
switching cost if insurers use these tools without selective underwriting, because con-
sumers’ current insurer and other insurers will then charge them quite similar premiums 
for comparable SI products.
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In the period 2006-2009, about 20 percent of the insurers used health questionnaires in 
the acceptance procedure for new enrollees for at least one of their SI products (Roos 
and Schut, 2009; Roos and Schut, 2012). The remaining 80 percent used open enroll-
ment (i.e. they accepted all applicants without the exclusion of pre-existing conditions) 
for all of their SI products. In the following years, insurers’ incentives to protect them-
selves against adverse selection increased because of the larger potential premium 
range of SI and the increased financial risk for the medical costs covered by BI. If this 
would have led to more selective underwriting, consumers’ switching costs resulting 
from SI would have increased. Therefore, we focus on the following important ques-
tion for policymakers: how did Dutch insurers protect themselves against the adverse 
selection spiral in recent years, by applying ’selective underwriting’ and/or by applying 
’risk rating and/or product differentiation’? To answer this question, we will extensively 
review insurers’ practices in the SI market by evaluating the policy conditions of the SI 
products offered. Our conclusions may help policymakers to design effective solutions 
to increase high-risk individuals’ consumer choice for BI and thereby increase insurers’ 
incentives to invest in high-quality care for them. Other countries that have introduced 
a competitive BI market and allow a joint purchase of BI and SI (e.g. Switzerland) can 
learn from the Dutch experiences.
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, we describe the background of the 
problem. Secondly, we describe when SI is a switching cost for BI. Thirdly, we pay 
attention to the behavior of Dutch insurers in the SI market between 2006-2009 and 
2014-2015. Fourthly, we discuss our results and conclude.
5.2 baCKgroUnD of tHe ProbleM
About 85-90 percent of the Dutch population take out SI (Vektis, 2012; Vektis, 2013; 
Vektis, 2014). More than 99 percent of them take out BI and SI from the same insurer 
(NZa, 2014a), because 1) one-stop shopping has several advantages (e.g. a good 
coordination of basic and supplemental benefits) (Kifmann, 2006); 2) almost all insurers 
make it unattractive or impossible to take out separate SI (Roos and Schut, 2012); and 
3) consumers may be unaware that they are allowed to take out BI and SI from different 
insurers (Dormont et al., 2009).
Insurers are allowed to refuse applicants or to charge risk-rated premiums for SI. 
In 2006 and 2007, insurers collectively agreed – under societal pressure – to accept 
all applicants for the majority of their SI products and to charge mostly community-
rated premiums for SI (De Bruijn and Schut, 2006; Roos and Schut, 2012). Therefore, 
consumers had the possibility to take out their preferred SI product with an (almost) 
community-rated premium. Although after 2007 this collective agreement did no longer 
exist, insurers had incorporated a guaranteed renewability clause (GR) in each SI con-
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tract (Roos and Schut, 2012). This GR consists of a guaranteed renewal of the annual 
SI contract with an equal adjustment of the premium and the policy conditions for all 
consumers with that specific SI. Thus, all consumers with the same SI are at renewal 
of this SI – irrespective of changes in their health status – confronted with the same 
changes in the premium and policy conditions.
Due to the agreement among insurers and the GR in each SI contract, SI is a 
perceived switching cost by in particular high-risks. In 2012, 6 percent of the healthy 
consumers expected another insurer will not accept them for SI, while 32 percent of the 
unhealthy consumers revealed this expectation (Duijmelinck and Van de Ven, 2014; see 
Chapter 4). These expectations may be influenced by the close media attention to the 
examples of high-risks who were refused for SI. Boonen et al. (2015) showed that con-
sumers with SI have a 10.6%-point lower switching propensity than consumers without 
SI, ceteris paribus. Moreover, they showed that old consumers having SI are less likely 
to switch insurer than young consumers having SI. SI as a perceived switching cost 
by high-risks has adverse consequences, because it substantially reduces insurers’ 
incentives to invest in high-quality care for high-risks.
Thus, SI is a perceived switching cost for BI because consumers fear that insurers 
apply selective underwriting in the acceptance procedures for new enrollees. Insurers 
can apply selective underwriting to protect themselves against the adverse selection 
spiral for both SI and BI. This spiral is caused by low-risks leaving the SI product. 
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figure 5.1  Percentage of consumers without a supplementary insurance in the period 2006-2015
 Source: Vektis (2015)
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Consequently, the premium of the SI product has to go up, which led to the next group 
of low-risks leaving the SI product. The result is a so-called ‘death spiral’.
Different developments in the SI market could indicate (the existence of) adverse selec-
tion. Firstly, the percentage of consumers without a SI increased from 7 in 2006 to 16 
in 2015 (Figure 5.1) (Vektis, 2015). Reitsma-van Rooijen and De Jong (2014) showed 
that the majority of the consumers without a SI (i.e. 72 percent in 2014) did not take out 
SI because they do not need the care covered by SI. Secondly, the consumers with a 
SI take out products with less comprehensive coverage. For example, the demand for 
SI products covering physiotherapy decreased from 66 percent in 2011 to 49 percent in 
2012 (Gezondheidsnet, 2012). Thirdly, different consumer organizations (e.g. “Consu-
mentenbond’’ and www.independer.nl) and current affairs programs (e.g. ‘’Radar’’) have 
advised low-risks to be critically and to carefully evaluate whether a SI is attractive to 
them. These tendencies increase insurers’ incentives to protect themselves against the 
adverse selection spiral. Moreover, the larger the potential premium range of SI – i.e. 
the difference between the maximum and the minimum premium if insurers charge 
risk-rated premiums (Paolucci et al., 2009) – the more insurers will be inclined to protect 
themselves against the adverse selection spiral for SI. Paolucci et al. (2009) showed 
that this range is substantial for benefits like medical devices and pharmaceuticals, 
while it is limited for benefits like dental and paramedic care. In the last years, the poten-
tial premium range of SI increased due to the transfer of different medical devices (e.g. 
walking frames) and pharmaceuticals (e.g. pharmaceuticals to treat gastric acid) from 
BI to SI. Consequently, the total expenses for medical devices and drugs as percentage 
of the total expenses covered by SI increased from 8.4 in 2009 (total SI expenditures: 
3.5 billion euros) to 10.5 in 2012 (total SI expenditures: 3.9 billion euros) (Vektis, 2011; 
Vektis, 2014).
Moreover, insurers’ incentives to apply selective underwriting may have increased 
due to stronger incentives to protect themselves against adverse selection for BI. The 
BI market is characterized by community-rated premiums and open enrollment. A risk 
equalization system should eliminate predictable differences in healthcare expenditures 
among different risk groups of insured. However, risk equalization is still imperfect and 
insurers are undercompensated for the high-risks and overcompensated for the low-
risks (Van Kleef et al., 2013). Insurers’ financial risk for the medical costs covered by BI 
increased from about 50 percent in 2006 to 90 percent in 2012 (Van Kleef, 2012), while 
the risk equalization model was still imperfect. On balance, the financial incentives for 
selection were in 2011 a third larger than in 2007 (Van Kleef et al., 2012). Consequently, 
due to the joint purchase of BI and SI, insurers’ incentives to use SI as a selection 
device for BI may have increased. The idea behind this strategy is that high-risks who 
are refused for SI will most likely also not take out BI (Paolucci et al., 2007; Roos and 
Schut, 2012).
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To sum up, recent changes in the Dutch health insurance market have increased in-
surers’ incentives to protect themselves against adverse selection spirals for BI and 
for SI. However, selective underwriting is not the only tool insurers can use to protect 
themselves against adverse selection.
5.3  InSurErS’ toolS to countEract thE advErSE SElEctIon 
sPIral
Insurers can apply selective underwriting, risk rating, and product differentiation to 
protect themselves against the adverse selection spiral. These tools have different 
consequences for SI as a switching cost for BI.
5.3.1 Protecting against the adverse selection spiral
Insurers applying selective underwriting adjust the accepted risk to the stated premium 
of a given product (Van de Ven and Schut, 2011) (e.g. by refusing applicants, exclud-
ing pre-existing medical conditions from coverage, or requiring premium surcharges 
based on pre-existing medical conditions (Light, 1992; Schut, 1995; Shmueli, 1998; 
Van de Ven and Schut, 2011)). Insurers intending to apply selective underwriting will 
use mostly health questionnaires to obtain information on applicants’ health status. 
Risk rating implies that insurers adjust the premium for each product to the individual’s 
risk (Van de Ven and Schut, 2011). If insurers apply product differentiation, they adjust 
their SI products to attract different risk groups per product and charge premiums 
accordingly (Van de Ven and Schut, 2011). For example, they can offer SI products 
that are targeted at specific groups, such as women and young consumers. Because 
high-risks will choose SI products with comprehensive coverage (and high premiums) 
and low-risks will choose SI products with restricted coverage (and low premiums), 
product differentiation works as a self-selection mechanism that may result in market 
segmentation. Thus, product differentiation can be considered as (indirect) risk rating 
across the market, while (direct) risk rating results in different premiums per product. 
Due to the joint purchase of BI and SI, insurers may be inclined to use the pricing of 
their SI products (i.e. risk rating) that may be targeted at specific groups (i.e. product 
differentiation) to charge ‘the consumers for whom they are undercompensated by risk 
equalization for BI’ higher premiums for SI than ‘the consumers for whom they are 
overcompensated by risk equalization for BI’ to protect themselves against the adverse 
selection spiral for BI (Kifmann, 2006).
As soon as one serious competitor starts applying selective underwriting, risk rating, 
or product differentiation, other insurers will follow, because otherwise their low-risks 
would switch to this insurer and they would be left with the high-risks only.
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5.3.2 supplementary insurance as a switching cost
Due to the GR in each SI contract, SI is a switching cost for BI if insurers apply selective 
underwriting in their acceptance procedures for new applicants for SI. High-risks face 
then the risk that another insurer will not accept them for SI, while their current insurer 
guarantees to renew their SI.
SI is hardly a switching cost if insurers apply risk rating or product differentiation 
without selective underwriting. The GR offers no protection against risk rating, because 
it only prescribes that all current consumers must be confronted with the same changes 
in the premium and policy conditions (Patel and Pauly, 2002). Thus, insures are allowed 
to start charging all their current enrollees and new enrollees risk-rated premiums. For 
example, in 2015, one Dutch insurer that previously used community-rated premiums 
for SI (i.e. ‘de Amersfoortse’) started applying risk rating for SI for all their current en-
rollees and new enrollees. SI may be a temporary switching cost for the high-risks for 
whom the current insurer still charges community-rated premiums, while (some) other 
insurers have started charging risk-rated premiums. However, in the following year(s) 
(e.g. after 1 or 2 year(s)), their premium will go up. This is either the result because their 
insurer is forced by the market to differentiate their premium (to prevent that low-risks 
switch to a risk-rating premium) or because the low-risks switch to the insurers applying 
risk rating. Consequently, the risk profile of high-risks’ current SI product will worsen 
and their current insurer must also charge them a high, actuarially fair premium. SI is 
then no longer a switching cost for these high-risks.
If insurers apply product differentiation, other insurers may offer high-risks compa-
rable and same-priced SI products as high-risks’ current insurer does. If high-risks’ cur-
rent insurer does not apply product differentiation while other insurers do, SI can even 
become a switching benefit (i.e. a reason to switch insurer). High-risks could perceive 
that another insurer offers a SI product that perfectly fits their preferences, while their 
current insurer does not.
In sum, SI is a switching cost for BI if insurers apply selective underwriting for SI; SI is 
hardly a switching cost for BI if insurers apply risk rating or product differentiation for 
SI without selective underwriting. Section 5.2 shows that insurers’ incentives to protect 
themselves against adverse selection increased. The important question is which tools 
insurers increasingly used to do so: ‘selective underwriting’ – which results in less 
open enrollment for SI – and/or ‘risk rating and/or product differentiation’. If the results 
indicate less open enrollment for SI, consumers’ switching costs resulting from SI have 
increased in the last years.
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5.4 eMPIrICal resUlts froM tHe netHerlanDs
We extensively reviewed insurers’ practices in the Dutch SI market to evaluate to what 
extent SI was a switching cost for BI between 2006-2009 and 2014-2015.
5.4.1 Data and methods
Table 5.1 presents the indicators used to review insurers’ practices in the SI market. 
These indicators are broadly based on the information provided in previous research 
reports that investigated Dutch insurers’ behavior in the SI market in the period 2006-
2009 (De Bruijn and Schut, 2006; De Bruijn and Schut, 2007; Roos and Schut, 2008; 
Roos and Schut, 2009). Developing indicators based on this information was essential 
to compare insurers’ practices in the period 2006-2009 with their practices in later 
years. Based on the main indicators, we measured open enrollment, risk rating, and 
product differentiation in the SI market. The additional indicators provided background 
information.
table 5.1 Indicators for measuring open enrollment, risk rating, and product differentiation for SI
Indicators
open enrollment1 Main indicator
* Percentage of insurers without health questionnaires or additional questions for 
new applicants for all of their SI products offered
Additional indicator
* Percentage of insurers without health questionnaires or additional questions for 
new applicants for at least one of their SI products offered
risk rating Main indicator
* Percentage of insurers charging different premiums2 for at least one of their SI 
products offered
Additional indicators
Among all SI products for which insurers applied risk rating:
* Average relative difference between the highest and lowest premium charged for 
the same SI product (i.e. highest premium / lowest premium).
* Average number of risk classes used (e.g. age classes) to determine the 
premium of the SI product
Product differentiation Main indicator
* Percentage of insurers targeting SI at specific groups
Additional indicator
* Average number of SI products targeted at specific groups among the insurers 
that applied product differentiation
1 In this respect, stringent acceptance policies if a consumer only applied for SI (without BI) and selective 
underwriting for SI products that are targeted at specific groups are left out of consideration.
2 Exclusive discounts (e.g. group discounts) or premium surcharges if a consumer only applied for SI.
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Information on insurers’ selective underwriting practices is lacking. In 2014, for example, 
most insurers did not know how many applicants they refused for SI (NZa, 2014b). In-
surers intending to apply selective underwriting will use health questionnaires to obtain 
information on the health status of applicants. The use of health questionnaires does 
not necessarily imply that insurers indeed refuse applicants or exclude pre-existing 
conditions from coverage. Because we can conclude that insurers without health ques-
tionnaires for SI used open enrollment for SI, we focused on the proportion of insurers 
using open enrollment for SI; i.e. not using health questionnaires.
We used the results of the previous reports to describe insurers’ behavior in the SI 
market in the period 2006-2009. If necessary, we made additional calculations, e.g. 
based on the provided tables in the appendices of these reports. We used the policy 
conditions and the provided information on insurers’ websites to evaluate whether insur-
ers used open enrollment or applied risk rating or product differentiation in 2014 and 
2015. Regarding product differentiation, we focused on the names and descriptions 
of the SI products. For example, we concluded that the insurer offering a SI product 
named ‘Supplementary insurance student’ applied product differentiation. We drew the 
same conclusion for the insurer promoting one of its SI products as: ‘This SI product fits 
the preferences of young consumers’. The previous reports (De Bruijn and Schut, 2006; 
De Bruijn and Schut, 2007; Roos and Schut, 2008; Roos and Schut, 2009) excluded 
the SI products that only provided coverage for dental care. Because our primary aim is 
to compare our results with the results of these previous reports, we also excluded the 
SI products from our analyses that only provided coverage for dental care. In total, we 
reviewed 159 SI products offered in 2014 by 29 different insurers, and 145 SI products 
offered in 2015 by 28 different insurers.
5.4.2 results
The percentage of insurers using open enrollment for all of their SI products increased 
from 77 in 2008 towards 86 in 2015 (Figure 5.2). Insurers using health questionnaires 
for at least one of their SI products did also offer one or more SI products with open 
enrollment (Table 5.2). Thus, during the period considered, all insurers used open 
enrollment for at least one of their SI products. Insurers used health questionnaires 
especially for their most comprehensive SI products. In particular high-risks prefer 
these products. Therefore, the high-risks who prefer to switch to the BI of an insurer 
using health questionnaires for its most comprehensive SI products may be confronted 
with a trade-off between the price and quality of this BI and the comprehensiveness of 
their SI product.
Figure 5.3 shows an increasing trend towards risk rating in the period 2007-2009. 
However, this trend did not continue in later years: 45 percent of the insurers applied 
risk rating for at least one of their SI products in 2009 compared to 32 percent in 2015. 
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figure 5.2  Percentage of insurers without health questionnaires or additional questions for new applicants 
for all of their SI products offered in 20061, 20071, 20081, 20091, 2014, and 2015
  1 Own estimates based on previous reports (De Bruijn and Schut, 2006; De Bruijn and Schut, 
2007; Roos and Schut, 2008; Roos and Schut, 2009).
table 5.2 Additional information regarding open enrollment, risk rating, and product differentiation for SI
20061 20071 20081 20091 2014 2015
number of insurers 32 33 30 29 29 28
open enrollment
Percentage of insurers without health questionnaires or 
additional questions for new applicants for at least one 
of their SI products offered
Information 
not 
available
100 100 100 100 100
risk rating
Average relative difference between the highest and 
lowest premium charged for the same SI product
1.71 1.78 1.902 1.842 1.87 1.89
Average number of risk classes used (i.e. age classes) 
to determine the SI premium
3.40 3.75 3.00 2.62 3.50 3.56
Product differentiation
Average number of SI products targeted at specific 
groups among the insurers that applied product 
differentiation
3.4 2.4 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.2
Percentage of insurers using at least one ‘tool 
to counteract adverse selection’ (i.e. no open 
enrollment, risk rating, product differentiation) for at 
least one sI product
50.0 51.5 70.0 75.9 62.1 60.7
Percentage of insurers with open enrollment and 
with no risk rating and product differentiation for all 
of their sI products
50.0 48.5 30.0 24.1 37.9 39.3
1 Own estimates based on previous reports (De Bruijn and Schut, 2006; De Bruijn and Schut, 2007; Roos 
and Schut, 2008; Roos and Schut, 2009).
2 In 2008 and 2009, respectively, 1 SI product and 4 SI products were offered for free to consumers aged 
18-22. In these calculations, these SI products are left out of consideration.
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The insurers applying risk rating used age as risk factor. The average number of age 
classes was highest in 2007 (i.e. 3.75) and lowest in 2009 (i.e. 2.62) (Table 5.2). In 
the period considered, the relative difference between the highest and lowest premium 
charged for the same SI product varied between 1.7 and 1.9.
In the period 2006-2009, there was a trend of increasing product differentiation (Fig-
ure 5.3). However, this trend did not continue in later years either. In 2015, 39 percent 
of the insurers offered SI product(s) that were targeted at specific groups (e.g. young 
and elderly consumers, students, and families) compared to about 59 percent in 2009. 
The average number of SI products offered by an insurer targeted at specific groups 
remained stable in the period considered (Table 5.2).
In contrast to our expectations, the percentage of insurers using at least one tool to 
protect themselves against the adverse selection spiral as measured by our indicators 
(i.e. no open enrollment, risk rating, or product differentiation) decreased from 76 in 
2009 to 61 in 2015 (Table 5.2). This is an unexpected and somehow surprising result 
that needs further explanation.
5.5 PotentIal exPlanatIons for tHe UnexPeCteD fInDIngs
In the SI market, insurers face the trade-off between 1) the need to protect themselves 
against the adverse selection spiral and 2) the strong societal pressure to offer all 
consumers an affordable SI. Dutch insurers are strongly confronted with different forms 
of the latter. Firstly, insurers’ selective underwriting practices are closely monitored by 
consumer organizations and the results are publicly available. Secondly, an indepen-
dent commission emphasized in its report to the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport 
the potential use of SI as a selection device for BI (Commissie Evaluatie Risicovereve-
ning Zvw, 2012). Thirdly, different groups of politicians are strong proponents of the 
introduction of a legal periodic open enrollment period and community-rated premiums 
for SI, which is currently not feasible because of EU regulation (Tweede Kamer 2012; 
Ministerie van VWS, 2013; Tweede Kamer 2013; Tweede Kamer 2014). Due to the fear 
of reputation loss, insurers may have used ‘less visible strategies’ to protect themselves 
against adverse selection than the strategies measured by our indicators. Below we 
discuss these ‘less visible strategies’ and conclude that insurers did indeed use some 
of these strategies.
Firstly, insurers may promote their insurance product(s) to a targeted consumer 
group only (i.e. selective marketing). For example, they may advertise their product(s) 
only on television or radio channels that focus on the target group. This strategy can be 
considered as a form of product differentiation, unmeasured by our indicators.
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Secondly, insurers may increase premiums over time of their most comprehensive SI 
products intending that low-risks switch to less comprehensive and lower-priced alter-
natives (Herring and Pauly, 2006). Consequently, the risk profile of the most compre-
hensive SI products will worsen and eventually high-risks will have to pay an actuarially 
fair premium. This strategy has the same effect as product differentiation: low-risks take 
out (low-priced) SI products with restricted coverage, while high-risks prefer SI products 
with comprehensive coverage that are high-priced.
Thirdly, insurers may stop offering their most comprehensive SI products to new 
applicants, while they still renew these SI products of their current enrollees. Simultane-
ously, they could try to drive out low-risk enrollees from these products by, for example, 
introducing less comprehensive SI products that are lower-priced. If these low-risks 
switch to other SI products, high-risks’ premium will eventually increase to actuarially 
fair premiums (Hall, 2002; Herring and Pauly, 2006), which has the same effect as 
product differentiation.
Fourthly, insurers may use group insurance to protect themselves against the ad-
verse selection spiral. Insurers could apply risk rating by providing groups of low-risks 
(e.g. student organizations and high-educated consumers) with a significant premium 
discount for a particular SI product (Commissie Evaluatie Risicoverevening Zvw, 2012)). 
Recently, discounts of 25 percent or more have been observed. Insurers could also 
offer specific SI products to specific groups only. Because these SI products may not 
be available or visible for other individuals or groups, this strategy may result in product 
differentiation. Because information on the premium discounts and SI products offered 
to groups is not publicly available, these forms of risk rating and product differentiation 
are not included in the results presented in Figure 5.3.
Fifthly, the Dutch Healthcare Authority (2014b) has concluded that some insurers 
used their application processes and websites to deter specific consumer groups from 
taking out BI from them. For example, consumers not belonging to the target group 
could only take out BI in written form or by phone, while consumers belonging to the 
target group could easily take out BI via the Internet. Via their websites, some insurers 
have further steered different consumer groups – after consumers have revealed some 
personal characteristics such as age – to different BI products, which can be considered 
as a form of product differentiation for BI. Insurers may have used the same strategies 
for SI.
Sixthly, insurers may reduce the coverage of the SI products that in particular high-
risks take out without reducing prices. There are indications that Dutch insurers used 
this strategy (NZa, 2014a, Heijne, 2013; Ridderbos, 2013). For example, in 2014 most 
insurers limited the coverage of physiotherapy in their SI products compared to previous 
years. Consequently, the number of insurers offering access to unlimited physiotherapy 
was substantially reduced. This strategy can be considered as a subtle form of selective 
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underwriting, because most insurers refused to accept any applicant for unlimited ac-
cess to physiotherapy. Because insurers apply this subtle form of selective underwriting 
to both their current and new enrollees, it does not influence consumers’ switching costs 
resulting from SI.
To sum up, the ‘less visible strategies’ that insurers have used to protect themselves 
against the adverse selection spiral – and which we did not measure by our indicators 
(as presented in Table 5.1) – are forms of risk rating and product differentiation. These 
tools to counteract adverse selection do not result in switching costs for BI (see Section 
5.3.2).
5.6 ConClUsIons anD DIsCUssIon
In several countries the possibility of consumers switching to a competitor for BI must 
continuously stimulate insurers to improve efficiency and quality in healthcare. In the 
Netherlands, most insurers offer BI and SI as a joint product. Dutch insurers guarantee 
to renew SI of their current enrollees. SI is a switching cost for BI because high-risks 
fear that other insurers apply selective underwriting in their acceptance procedures 
for new enrollees. SI as a perceived switching cost by high-risks is a serious problem, 
because it reduces insurers’ incentives to act as quality-conscious purchasers of care 
on behalf of high-risk individuals.
Insurers can apply selective underwriting to counteract the adverse selection spi-
ral. Risk rating and product differentiation are other tools insurers can use to protect 
themselves against adverse selection. SI is not a switching cost for BI if insurers use 
these tools for SI without selective underwriting. In the last years, insurers’ incentives 
to protect themselves against adverse selection increased due to several changes in 
the Dutch health insurance market. If this would have led to more selective underwriting 
for SI, consumers’ switching costs resulting from SI would have increased. Therefore, 
we focused on which tools insurers increasingly used to counteract the adverse se-
lection spiral: ‘selective underwriting’ – which results in less open enrollment in the 
SI market – and/or ‘risk rating and/or product differentiation’. An extensive review of 
insurers’ practices in the Dutch health insurance market between 2006-2009 and 2014-
2015 shows that most insurers used open enrollment for SI. In 2015, 86 percent of the 
insurers used open enrollment for all of their SI products and no insurer used health 
questionnaires in the acceptance procedure for new enrollees for all of their SI products 
offered. This implies that high-risks had the possibility to take out at least one SI product 
from another insurer without being confronted with selective underwriting practices. A 
lot of media attention to the rare examples of high-risks who were refused for SI may 
explain the high proportion of high-risks perceiving SI as a switching cost for BI.
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Despite the increasing insurers’ incentives to protect themselves against adverse selec-
tion, our results indicate that the proportion of insurers applying risk rating or product 
differentiation as measured by our indicators (see Table 5.1) did not increase either 
in the period considered. We therefore hypothesize that insurers have used ‘less vis-
ible strategies’ to protect themselves against adverse selection than the strategies we 
measured by our indicators. These ‘less visible strategies’ appeared to be forms of risk 
rating and product differentiation. These tools to counteract adverse selection did not 
result in switching costs for BI.
In conclusion, although an increasing number of high-risk consumers perceive SI as a 
switching cost, in reality most insurers apply open enrollment for all of their SI products. 
Because high-risks’ perceptions regarding SI restrict their choice of insurer for BI, we 
recommend that the government as regulator of the BI market should disseminate in-
formation to high-risk consumers about their switching opportunities (Roos and Schut, 
2012). For example, the Dutch government could launch an information campaign dur-
ing the annual switching period (November to January). This campaign should underline 
that insurers use largely open enrollment for SI. The government can use different 
information sources; e.g. they can provide information to consumers on television, in 
newspapers, on the websites that compare the different insurance products of insurers, 
and on the websites of patient and consumer organizations. Such an information cam-
paign can increase high-risks’ consumer choice for BI and thereby increase insurers’ 
incentives to invest in high-quality care for high-risks. However, our findings are based 
upon a situation with low switching rates among high-risks. In such a situation, insurers 
may not have had a strong need to apply selective underwriting (Dormont et al., 2009). 
So, it is still an open question how insurers will protect themselves against the adverse 
selection spiral if an increasing number of high-risks switch insurer. Therefore, insurers’ 
behavior should be continuously monitored.18
Reflection on our results
We hypothesized that Dutch insurers relied on ‘less visible strategies’ instead of the 
straightforward tools (i.e. selective underwriting, risk rating, and product differentiation) 
to protect themselves against the adverse selection spiral. One example of such a 
strategy is to stop offering unlimited access to physiotherapy, which now appears to 
18 In April 2015, Dutch insurers announced to have the opinion that all consumers should 
have the possibility to take out similar SI from another insurer without being confronted with 
selective underwriting practices (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, 2015). Further research may 
examine whether this statement is in line with insurers’ current behavior.
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be an ‘uninsurable risk’ (Berliner, 1982). High-risks but also risk-averse low-risks are 
therefore no longer able to take out SI with unlimited access to physiotherapy.
An explanation for the fact that insurers do not use the straightforward tools to protect 
themselves against the adverse selection spiral, is that the Dutch society holds the view 
that there should be solidarity with respect to SI. However, in the long run, it is an unre-
alistic expectation that solidarity can coexist with an unregulated competitive market. In 
the last years, solidarity did already decrease in the SI market, because an increasing 
proportion of consumers – particularly young and healthy consumers – did no longer 
take out SI or took out SI with only restricted coverage. Insurers are confronted with the 
apparent incompatibility between the need to protect themselves against the adverse 
selection spiral and the societal pressure to maintain solidarity for SI. Due to the fear 
of reputation loss, insurers relied on the ‘less visible strategies’ to protect themselves 
against the adverse selection spiral. However, creating solidarity on a competitive SI 
market is the responsibility of the government and cannot be expected from competing 
insurers. Because of EU regulation, the Dutch government is not allowed to regulate 
the SI market in order to maintain solidarity. Therefore, if society desires solidarity 
for certain benefits that are currently covered by SI, this could be achieved by giving 
subsidies to the high-risk individuals or by including these benefits in the standard basic 
benefit package.
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What can Europe learn from the 
managed care backlash in the United 
States? 
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abstraCt
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have taken steps towards regulated 
competition in healthcare to enhance efficiency and consumer responsiveness. The 
rationale of regulated competition is that individual insurers manage the care for their 
enrollees. The United States were about 20 years ago confronted with a substantial 
backlash against managed care. We evaluate the causes of this backlash and formulate 
lessons for European policymakers and insurers. First, the greatest backlash against 
managed care came from providers. For example, even during the managed care 
backlash period the proportion of consumers with a managed care insurance product 
increased. Second, insurers should offer consumers the choice between a standard 
insurance product with a standard premium and a lower-priced insurance product with a 
lower reimbursement for out-of-network use than the standard product. Third, American 
consumers held the opinion that insurers were only interested in cost containment and 
not in the quality of care. Therefore, insurers should provide information to consum-
ers on the quality of their contracted providers and use input from consumers in their 
decisions regarding managed care. Three other lessons for Europe are: 1) provide 
information on the features and effects (in terms of price and quality) of managed care; 
2) establish formal grievance mechanisms for consumers to contest denied care; and 
3) limit the administrative costs associated with managed care. European countries with 
a competitive health insurance market should pay attention to these lessons, because 
regulated competition can only succeed if insurers (are able to) effectively manage the 
care.
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6.1 IntroDUCtIon
Several European countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) have in-
troduced elements of regulated competition in their health insurance market. For many 
years, these countries attempted to deal with increasing healthcare expenditures by 
using supply-side regulation. However, because this top-down strategy did not contain 
sufficient incentives to enhance efficiency, quality, and consumer responsiveness, it has 
been replaced with regulated competition. In a regulated competition setting, individual 
risk-bearing insurers have to fulfill the agency function besides their insurance function 
(Schut and Doorslaer, 1999). This implies that insurers have to act as effective purchas-
ers of care on behalf of their consumers. Thus, insurers are no longer only payers of 
care, but become also purchasers and managers of care (Van de Ven et al., 1994). 
The possibility of consumers switching to a competitor – which is facilitated by open 
enrollment, a risk equalization system, premium rate restrictions, and a standardized 
basic benefit package – must continuously stimulate insurers to effectively manage the 
care for their enrollees. Managed care is assumed to enhance efficiency, quality, and 
consumer responsiveness in healthcare.
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have – at least to some extent – taken 
steps towards managed care. While Europe had its first experiences with managed care 
only in recent years, managed care has a long history in the United States. Despite the 
great ability of the managed care tools to control the American healthcare expenditures 
(Harris et al., 2000; Simonet, 2007), the United States were during the late 1990s 
confronted with a substantial backlash19 against managed care. Due to this backlash, 
insurers limited their managed care activities, which resulted in increasing healthcare 
expenditures (Mays et al., 2004; Lagoe et al., 2005). Against this background the goal 
of this chapter is to answer the question ‘’What can Europe learn from the managed 
care backlash in the United States?’’. In doing so, we evaluate the main causes of the 
managed care backlash in the United States. In this respect, our aim is to gain insight 
into the reasons of healthcare providers and consumers to dislike managed care. This 
chapter is relevant for European policymakers, because regulated competition among 
insurers without managed care will not enhance efficiency in healthcare.
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, we pay attention to the tools insurers 
can use to manage the care for their enrollees. Secondly, we describe which of these 
tools European insurers (are allowed to) use. Thirdly, we focus on managed care in 
the United States and present the main causes of the managed care backlash in this 
country. Based on these causes, we formulate lessons for Europe. Finally, we discuss 
our results and conclude.
19 According to the Cambridge dictionary, we have used the following definition of backlash: ‘’a strong 
feeling among a group of people in reaction to a change or recent events in society or politics’’.
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6.2 WHat Is ManageD Care?
Baker (2011) defined managed care as follows:
‘’Managed care in the broadest sense, encompasses a range of activities, 
organization structures, and financial incentives designed to better integrate 
health insurance and health care delivery in order to more effectively manage 
the delivery of health care and achieve goals such as lower costs, increased 
quality, and improved efficiency.’’
Three main types of tools that insurers can use to manage the care for their enrollees 
can be discerned. The first tool – which is considered by most analysts as the most 
important one (Miller and Luft, 1994; Folland et al., 2010) – encompasses selective 
contracting with healthcare providers. This tool provides insurers with the possibility to 
contract (or vertically integrate) with only those providers who deliver efficient and high-
quality care. Because the contracted providers are guaranteed a patient flow, insurers 
are in a good position to negotiate with providers on, for example, prices, quality, and 
waiting times (Mays et al., 2003; McGuire, 2011). The threat of having no contract 
with insurers, which may result in less patients, creates competition among healthcare 
providers. Insurers may use differentiated reimbursement levels for contracted and 
non-contracted providers to steer consumers to the contracted providers (Glied, 2000).
The second tool is utilization management and includes strategies for insurers 
to influence healthcare utilization. Prior authorization requirements, gatekeeper ar-
rangements, evidence-based guidelines, disease management programs (DMPs), 
and integrated care networks are examples of such strategies (Glied, 2000; Baker, 
2011). Insurers using prior authorization requirements will only reimburse the costs of 
a treatment, drug, or hospital stay if they have approved it. If insurers use gatekeeper 
arrangements, they require consumers to obtain a referral from a gatekeeper – who can 
be a primary care physician or a general practitioner (GP) – before consulting a special-
ist (Glied, 2000; Baker, 2011). DMPs aim at improving the integration and coordination 
of care for patients with specific chronic diseases (Busse, 2004). The use of guidelines, 
patient education, and quality management systems are features of DMPs (Greβ et 
al., 2006). While DMPs focus on the coordination of ambulatory care, integrated care 
networks intend to coordinate cross-sector care (e.g. by coordinating ambulatory and 
hospital care) (Busse and Blümel, 2014).
The third managed care tool consists of the introduction of financial incentives for 
providers to improve efficiency. Insurers can, for example, share financial risk with 
providers by providing them a fixed periodic payment for each patient regardless of the 
patient’s actual healthcare use; i.e. capitation (Glied, 2000; Baker, 2011). Insurers could 
use bundled payments (i.e. episode-based payments; a prospective fixed payment that 
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covers the costs of providing some or all services to a patient (Charlesworth et al., 
2012)) to stimulate the development of DMPs and integrated care networks.
Potential resistance to managed care
Potential resistance to managed care may come from healthcare providers and con-
sumers. Providers may be hostile towards all three managed care tools. Firstly, they 
may dislike selective contracting because this may result in price competition (and less 
patients for some of them), which could reduce their income. Secondly, providers may 
hold the opinion that insurers’ utilization management strategies threaten their profes-
sional autonomy, because guidelines and prior authorization requirements influence 
the treatment providers (have to) provide to patients. Moreover, utilization management 
by insurers may increase providers’ administrative costs. Thirdly, providers may be op-
ponents of capitation, because this payment system makes them financial responsible 
for the care they provide. This places them in the uncomfortable position in which they 
should rationing care to safeguard their income. In addition, capitation creates financial 
uncertainty among providers since part of the risk is transferred from the insurer to the 
provider. If providers are risk-averse they may oppose capitation also for this reason.
Consumers may dislike selective contracting, utilization management, and capita-
tion because these tools create barriers for them when they need healthcare. Due to 
selective contracting in healthcare, insurers may not (fully) reimburse the providers 
with whom consumers have an established relationship. In addition, due to gatekeeper 
arrangements and prior authorization requirements, consumers cannot directly visit a 
specialist or receive a treatment. Moreover, capitation may result in underprovision and 
waiting times. In Section 6.5 we will describe the results of our empirical analyses on 
the reasons why providers and consumers in the United States disliked managed care.
6.3 ManageD Care In eUroPe
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have in common that they have taken 
steps towards a competitive health insurance market. However, the managed care 
tools insurers (are allowed to) use differ significantly across these countries (Table 6.1). 
There are indications that insurers in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are 
confronted with a backlash against managed care even before they actually manage 
the care for their enrollees.
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6.3.1 Insurers’ tools to manage the care
Germany
Since 2004, German insurers increasingly used utilization management strategies, 
such as gatekeeper arrangements, DMPs, and integrated care networks (Lisac et al., 
2010). This can be explained by the financial incentives insurers have to establish 
DMPs and integrated care networks (e.g. insurers receive additional payments from the 
risk adjustment model for consumers enrolled in a DMP) (Greβ et al., 2006; Busse and 
Blümel, 2014). In 2012, 10,385 DMPs were certified and the number of participating 
consumers in a DMP increased from 2.7 million in 2006 to 7.2 million in 2012 (Busse 
and Blümel, 2014). The programs focused on asthma, breast cancer, chronic heart 
failure, COPD, coronary heart disease, diabetes type I, and diabetes type II (Stock 
et al., 2011). Although the individual insurer has to sign the DMP contract, insurers 
negotiate mostly collectively with the provider associations on DMPs (Busse, 2004; 
Greβ et al., 2006). In 2011 and 2012, there were about 6,000 integrated care contracts 
with 2 million consumers participating. The total healthcare expenses on integrated 
care networks were 1.5 percent of the total expenses (Amelung et al., 2012; Busse 
and Blümel, 2014). Financial incentives for providers (e.g. bundled payments (Blümel, 
2013)) and for consumers (e.g. a reduction in co-payments (Greβ et al., 2006)) have 
been introduced to stimulate the development and use of integrated care networks.
table 6.1  Managed care tools that insurers (are allowed to) use in Germany, the Netherlands, and Swit-
zerland
germany the netherlands switzerland
selective 
contracting
-  Not allowed for hospital care
-  Selective contracting allowed 
for the other types of care, 
but the provider always has 
the collective contract as 
alternative to choose
- Used to a limited extent
-  Reimbursement level for non-
contracted providers is about 
75 percent
- Only allowed for managed 
care insurance products
Utilization 
management
In the managed care sector:
Tools used to 
a large extent
-  Disease management 
programs
- Integrated care networks
- Gatekeeper arrangements
-  Disease management 
programs
- Integrated care networks
- Gatekeeper arrangements
- Guidelines
Tools used 
to a limited 
extent
-  Gatekeeper arrangements
-  Prior authorization 
requirements
- Guidelines
-  Prior authorization 
requirements
-  Disease management 
programs
-  Prior authorization 
requirements
financial 
incentives
- Bundled payments
- Capitation
- Capitation
- Prospective payments
- Bundled payments
- Capitation
Sources: Shmueli et al. (2015) and sources mentioned in text
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Individual insurers are not allowed to selectively contract with hospitals. For hospital 
care, representatives of insurers collectively negotiate and contract with provider as-
sociations. In contrast, insurers are allowed to selectively contract for generic drugs, 
gatekeeper arrangements, integrated care networks, and outpatient specialist care 
(Schlette et al., 2009; Van de Ven et al., 2013; Busse and Blümel, 2014; Shmueli et al., 
2015). However, providers can choose whether they join contracts with individual insur-
ers or rely on the collective contract for these types of care. Thus, selective contracting 
with providers is not an effective managed care tool for German insurers. A mix of 
reimbursement designs exists, e.g. fee-for-service, capitation, and lump sum (Shmueli 
et al., 2015).
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, individual insurers are allowed to selectively contract with all types of 
healthcare providers and to negotiate with them on the content of the contract (Van de 
Ven et al., 2013). Insurers can use differentiated reimbursement levels for contracted and 
non-contracted providers to steer consumers to the contracted providers. However, the 
Health Insurance Act and jurisprudence state that the insurer’s reimbursement level for non-
contracted providers may not hinder consumers from visiting these providers. This implies 
that a minimum reimbursement level of about 75 percent is required for all of the insur-
ance products offered by an insurer. This minimum reimbursement level is a restriction on 
selective contracting (Van Kleef et al., 2014). Currently, insurers are reluctant to selectively 
contract with healthcare providers; e.g. most insurers contract with nearly all hospitals.
GPs are the gatekeepers for specialist care. These GPs play also a central role in the 
DMPs. Since 2007, bundled payments promote the establishment of DMPs for patients with 
diabetes type II, COPD, and those at risk for a cardiovascular disease event (Tsiachritas 
et al., 2014). Insurers pay a single fee to a group of providers (called ‘’care-groups’’) for 
the delivery of all primary care needed for the chronically ill (Bakker et al., 2012). In 2010, 
there were 97 care-groups (De Jong-van Til et al., 2012). Moreover, insurers use different 
financial incentives, such as capitation and prospective payments (Shmueli et al., 2015).
Switzerland
In Switzerland, two types of managed care insurance products can be distinguished: 
the family doctor model (i.e. the physician network model) and the Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO). Both insurance products are integrated care networks that are 
characterized by gatekeeper arrangements and guidelines (Peytremann-Bridevaux et 
al., 2011). Selective contracting is restricted to the managed care insurance products. 
For the other insurance products, the price negotiations are largely conducted by 
associations of insurers and providers (Van de Ven et al., 2013). The percentage of 
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consumers enrolled in a managed care insurance product increased from below 10 until 
2004 to about 37 in 2009 (Reich et al., 2012; OECD and WHO, 2011).
DMPs are scarce in Switzerland (Peytremann-Bridevaux and Burnand, 2009; 
Berchtold and Peytremann-Bridevaux, 2011). For example, Peytremann-Bridevaux and 
Burnand (2009) identified only seven DMPs for chronic diseases (i.e. diabetes, hyper-
tension, heart failure, obesity, psychosis, and breast cancer), for which the number 
of participants varied between 65 and 250. In 2010, in 84 percent of the managed 
care insurance products healthcare providers shared financial responsibility with health 
insurers (OECD and WHO, 2011). Shmueli et al. (2015) described that provider net-
works received risk-adjusted capitation payments that should cover all care provided 
or prescribed.
6.3.2 a managed care backlash before managed care?
In Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, healthcare providers and consumers are 
not familiar with insurers as managers of care. Consequently, policymakers and insur-
ers in these countries are confronted with major objections – in particular of healthcare 
providers – against managed care. This can be illustrated by different examples. Firstly, in 
Germany, the national assembly of physician associations initially boycotted the introduc-
tion of DMPs, because they feared that DMPs initiated by insurers would harm the quality 
of care. In addition, they were afraid that the guidelines used in DMPs would reduce their 
professional autonomy (Busse, 2004; Greβ et al., 2006; OECD and WHO, 2011). Secondly, 
in 2003, the German government intended to introduce selective contracting for all types of 
care except GPs. However, these plans were abandoned because of providers’ resistance 
(Busse and Blümel, 2014). Thirdly, in order to remove the restriction on selective con-
tracting in the Netherlands (see Section 6.3.1), the minister of Health, Welfare and Sport 
proposed an amendment to the Health Insurance Act allowing insurers to provide no reim-
bursement if a consumer visits a non-contracted provider or hospital. However, together 
with consumer organizations and patient organizations, healthcare provider organizations 
signed a manifest against this proposal (VvAA, 2014), because they were hostile towards 
restrictions on healthcare provider choice. Eventually, the proposal was rejected by the 
Senate. Fourthly, in 2014, some Dutch GPs rejected to contract with insurers because they 
did not accept financial incentives imposed by insurers to influence healthcare delivery 
(Croonen, 2014). Fifthly, in 2012, the Swiss federal government proposed legislation that 
aimed at expanding managed care. Providers were hostile towards this proposal, because 
they opposed financial responsibility for healthcare delivery (Rischatsch, 2015). During a 
referendum, 76 percent of the Swiss voters rejected the proposal, because they disliked 
restrictions on their provider choice (Amelung, 2013; Zweifel, 2013).
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These examples indicate a backlash from providers and consumers against different 
proposals to increase insurers’ managed care tools. Thus, there seems to be a man-
aged care backlash in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland even before there is 
actually managed care. However, for a successful implementation of regulated competi-
tion it is crucial that insurers (are allowed to) effectively manage the care. The United 
States have been confronted with a managed care backlash about twenty years ago. 
We will evaluate the causes of this backlash and seek lessons for European countries.
6.4 ManageD Care In tHe UnIteD states
Managed care has a long history in the United States. Because of the managed care 
backlash in the late 1990s, insurers were confronted with the difficult question of how to 
deal with the increasing healthcare expenditures.
6.4.1 features of managed care
Indemnity insurance has many years dominated the American health insurance mar-
ket. This insurance product is characterized by consumers’ free choice of healthcare 
provider, the absence of insurers’ strategies to influence healthcare utilization, and 
fee-for-service payments (United States General Accounting Office, 1997). The Health 
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 strongly promoted the development of managed 
care insurance products. For example, this act provided start-up funding and required 
large employers that offered their employees an indemnity insurance product to of-
fer them also a managed care product (Kongstvedt, 2007). In later years, indemnity 
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figure 6.1  Percentage of insured consumers with an indemnity insurance product or a managed care 
insurance product in the period 1988-2002
 Source: The Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research & Educational Trust (2012)
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insurance was largely replaced with managed care. For example, the percentage of 
consumers with an indemnity insurance product decreased from 73 in 1988 towards 4 
in 2002 (Figure 6.1).
Three main types of managed care insurance products can be discerned: an Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO), a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), and a 
Point of Service Plan (POS) (Figure 6.2). Traditional HMOs do limit consumer choice 
of healthcare provider severely by providing no reimbursement for out-of-network use, 
except in the case of emergencies or when the consumer needs care far away from 
the service area (Kongstvedt, 2007). HMOs are further characterized by guidelines, 
gatekeeper arrangements, prior authorization requirements, and risk-based provider 
payments (i.e. capitation and prospective payments) (Bodenheimer, 1996; Glied, 2000; 
Mays et al., 2003; Kongstvedt, 2007; Baker, 2011). In 1987, for example, 93 percent 
and 88 percent of the HMOs used, respectively, gatekeeper arrangements and prior 
authorization requirements (Langwell, 1990).
POSs can be considered as a combination of HMOs and PPOs. The main difference 
between POSs and PPOs is that PPOs do generally not use gatekeeper arrangements, 
while POSs do. In contrast to HMOs, PPOs and POSs do not restrict consumer choice 
of healthcare provider, but use incentives to stimulate consumers to use preferred 
providers (Glied, 2000). For example, consumers visiting non-contracted providers are 
confronted with higher out-of-pocket payments than those visiting contracted provid-
ers. Table 6.2 shows that the individual out-of-pocket payments for out-of-network use 
compared to the individual out-of-pocket payments for in-network use are relatively 
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figure 6.2  Percentage of consumers – among those with a managed care insurance product – enrolled in 
an HMO, PPO, and POS1 in the period 1988-2002
 1 Information was not available for POS insurance products in 1988.
 Source: The Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research & Educational Trust (2012)
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higher under POSs than under PPOs. PPOs do usually not use financial incentives for 
providers (United States General Accounting Office, 1997).
6.4.2 the managed care backlash
A great success of managed care was its ability to control healthcare expenditures (Har-
ris et al., 2000; Jacobson, 2003; Rich and Erb, 2005; Simonet, 2007), while it did not 
have a negative effect on the quality of care (Miller and Luft, 1997; Miller and Luft, 2002; 
Dowd, 2005; Rich and Erb, 2005). Despite the positive effects, managed care was con-
fronted with a substantial backlash from healthcare providers and consumers during the 
late 1990s. As a response to this backlash, most insurers changed their strategies used 
to manage the care for their enrollees (Draper et al., 2002; Hall, 2005). Firstly, insurers 
that originally offered only an HMO started offering a PPO as an alternative insurance 
product to their consumers (Draper et al., 2002). Secondly, insurers did expand the 
provider networks for their HMO products (Draper et al., 2002). Between 1990 and 
2000, the average number of contracted providers in an HMO did nearly quadrupled, 
while the average number of contracted hospitals more than doubled (Stires, 2002). In 
addition, during this period, the percentage of HMOs reimbursing out-of-network use 
(at least to some extent) tripled and was 63 percent in 2000 (Stires, 2002). Thirdly, the 
percentage of HMOs without a gatekeeper arrangement increased from 13 in 1997 to 
21 in 1999 (Martinez, 2001). Fourthly, insurers reduced the number and types of health-
care services that required prior authorization (Draper et al., 2002; Hall, 2005). Felt-Lisk 
and Mays (2002) focused on the utilization management tools used by 48 insurers 
and showed that between 1998 and 2000 20 of them eliminated prior authorization 
requirements. Fifthly, between 1998 and 2001, 38 percent of the insurers reduced the 
financial incentives used for providers in their HMO products. These insurers reduced, 
table 6.2  Average individual out-of-pocket payments (in dollars) for in-network and out-of-network use for 
PPOs and POSs and the relative difference in the period 1988-2001
PPo  
in-network use
PPo  
out-of-network use
relative 
difference
Pos  
in-network use
Pos  
out-of-network use
relative 
difference
1988 106 177 +67%1 Information not 
available
Information not 
available
N.A.
1993 170 289 +70% Information not 
available
Information not 
available
N.A.
1996 181 313 +73% 71 324 +356%2
1999 190 315 +66% 41 359 +775%
2000 187 361 +93% 79 367 365%
2001 201 407 +102% 84 406 +383%
1 Calculation of relative difference: [(PPO out-of-network use / PPO in-network use) -1] x 100%
2 Calculation of relative difference: [(POS out-of-network use / POS in-network use) -1] x 100%
Source: Gabel et al. (2001)
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for example, the scope of services for which they used financial incentives and the 
number of members covered under these risk contracts (Hurley et al., 2002). Due to 
these changes, the differences between HMO products and PPO products largely 
disappeared.
Simultaneously, many states introduced legislation placing restrictions on managed 
care. Hall (2005) concluded that this legislation was not responsible for the changes in 
the managed care market as described above. Insurers stated that before the introduc-
tion of legislation they did already change the tools used to manage the care for their 
enrollees.
Due to the powerful lobby of healthcare providers against selective contracting, 
many states introduced any willing provider (AWP) laws and freedom of healthcare 
provider choice (FOC) legislation (Marsteller et al., 1997; Ohsfeldt et al., 1998). AWP 
laws require insurers to contract with all providers who are willing to accept the terms 
of the contract, while FOC legislation gives patients the freedom to visit any provider 
(Marsteller et al., 1997). At the end of 1996, 17 of the 28 AWP laws and 25 of the 29 
FOC laws focused on pharmacies only, and about 30 percent of these laws applied to all 
managed care products (i.e. HMOs, PPOs, and POSs) (Marsteller et al., 1997). Three 
types of FOC laws are possible. Firstly, most states have introduced FOC laws that 
permit insurers to use differentiated co-payments or deductible levels for contracted 
and non-contracted providers. For example, Utah has introduced this type of FOC law 
and allows insurers to steer their consumers to preferred providers, but requires insur-
ers to use at least a reimbursement level of 75 percent for non-contracted providers 
(Marsteller et al., 1997). Secondly, weak versions of FOC laws provide consumers only 
a free choice of healthcare provider if a network provider is not reasonably accessible 
or in the case of an emergency situation. Thirdly, strong versions of FOC laws require 
insurers to use the same reimbursement levels for in-network and out-of-network use 
(Marsteller et al., 1997). Marsteller et al. (1997) showed that the strength of selective 
contracting restrictions in 50 states is as follows: in 10 states none, in 13 states weak, in 
13 states weak to medium, in 9 states medium to strong, and in 5 states strong.20 This 
implies that the selective contracting restrictions in most states are limited in scope.
Furthermore, until 2003, 41 states have passed legislation permitting consumers to 
have direct access to specialists without the need to obtain a referral from a gatekeeper, 
40 states have enacted legislation requiring insurers to establish an external review 
process for denials of care, and 30 states have introduced legislation prohibiting insur-
20 Strong versions of selective contracting restrictions protect all providers and regulate all insur-
ance products, while weak versions apply, for example, to pharmacies only (Marsteller et al., 
1997).
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ers to use financial incentives for healthcare providers (Rich and Erb, 2005; Pinkovskiy, 
2014).
6.4.3 How did insurers deal with the increasing healthcare expenditures 
after the backlash?
The decrease of managed care led to increasing healthcare expenditures and premiums 
(Harris et al., 2000; Draper et al., 2002; Lagoe et al., 2005). To deal with these increasing 
expenditures, insurers introduced a wide range of new products; e.g. consumer-driven 
health insurance products (Mays et al., 2003; Lagoe et al., 2005; Regopoulos et al., 
2006). In consumer-driven insurance products, consumers – instead of insurers – are 
assumed to act as well-informed buyers of care in the healthcare provider market. Con-
sumers are stimulated to act as price-conscious buyers of care by the high deductibles 
they face (i.e. consumers must pay a high share of their healthcare costs out-of-pocket 
before the insurer takes over) (Christianson et al., 2008; Dowd, 2005). In addition, many 
insurers introduced DMPs to reduce the healthcare costs of consumers with chronic 
diseases, such as diabetes, asthma, hypertension, cardio vascular diseases, hyperten-
sion, and high-risk pregnancies (Draper et al., 2004; Mays et al., 2004; Lagoe et al., 
2005).
A remarkable tendency after years was the reintroduction of some managed care 
tools complying with the adopted legislation. For example, Mays et al. (2004) described 
the re-introduction of prior authorization requirements that were less restrictive than 
the requirements used before the managed care backlash. These requirements were 
particularly added to the PPO products because of the increasing popularity and costs 
of these products (Felt-Lisk and Mays, 2002; see also Figure 6.2). In addition, insur-
ers introduced insurance products that used tiered provider networks. Such products 
divide providers into tiers based on their costs and quality. Tiered provider networks 
stimulate consumers to visit the preferred providers by reducing cost-sharing for these 
providers (Mays et al., 2004). These networks are generally allowed under legislation, 
because FOC laws mostly permit insurers to use differentiated reimbursement levels for 
providers (see Section 6.4.2). The rationale of the reintroduction of selective contracting 
and utilization management was that rising premiums have made consumers willing 
to accept these cost containment strategies (Mays et al., 2004; Schur et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, insurers introduced new incentive-based payment systems that aimed at 
stimulating providers to deliver efficient and high-quality care, such as shared saving 
programs and pay-for-performance programs (Mays et al., 2003; Mays et al., 2004; 
Folland et al., 2010).
So, due to the backlash, American insurers limited selective contracting, utilization 
management, and financial incentives in the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, 
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which resulted in increasing healthcare expenditures. After years, they fell back on 
managed care to deal with these increasing expenditures. Europe may learn from the 
causes of the managed care backlash in the United States.
6.5 lessons for eUroPe
We discuss causes of the backlash against ‘’managed care in general’’ as well as causes 
of the backlash against the different managed care tools (i.e. selective contracting, 
utilization management, and financial incentives). Based on these causes, we formulate 
lessons for European countries that can contribute to a successful implementation of 
regulated competition. Table 6.3 summarizes these lessons.
6.5.1 the backlash against managed care in general
In the United States, particularly healthcare providers did make many negative state-
ments about managed care. Simultaneously, the proportion of consumers with a man-
aged care insurance product did continuously increase during the period 1988-2002 
(see Figure 6.1). This implies that even during the “managed care backlash period” an 
increasing proportion of consumers switched from an indemnity insurance product to-
wards a managed care insurance product. Moreover, consumer questionnaires showed 
that most consumers with a managed care product were quite satisfied with their health 
table 6.3 Overview of the lessons from the American managed care backlash for Europe
lessons from the managed care backlash in general
Be aware that the greatest backlash against managed care may come from the healthcare providers
Provide information to providers and consumers on the effects of managed care (in terms of efficiency and 
quality)
Use input from providers and consumers regarding managed care
lessons from the backlash against selective contracting
Offer consumers the choice between a standard insurance product with a standard premium and a lower-priced 
product with a lower reimbursement for out-of-network use than the standard product
Provide information to consumers on the (quality of the) contracted providers and the reimbursement levels for 
non-contracted providers
lessons from the backlash against utilization management
Respect the professional autonomy of the medical profession:
- Use in particular utilization management tools that are controlled by healthcare providers
- Involve providers in the development of the utilization management tools
Provide information to consumers on the motives to deny care
Establish formal grievance mechanisms for consumers to contest delayed or denied care
Limit the administrative costs associated with prior authorization requirements and gatekeeper arrangements
lessons from the backlash against financial incentives
Use a blended payment system for providers instead of a capitation-based payment system
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insurer and the care they received (Davis et al., 1995; Enthoven and Singer, 1998; 
Mechanic, 2004). Therefore, an important lesson for Europe is that they may expect 
the greatest backlash against managed care to come from healthcare providers. This is 
in line with the results of Section 6.3.2 that show that it were mainly the providers who 
strongly resisted proposals to introduce managed care in Europe.
Moreover, because of consumers’ great trust in healthcare providers, the consider-
able opposition of providers against managed care aroused worries amongst consumers 
about the effects of managed care (Mechanic, 2004). While healthcare providers and 
the media (see e.g. Brodie et al., 1998) openly expressed their aversion to managed 
care, American health insurers failed in showing the effects of managed care in terms 
of efficiency and quality. Therefore, a lesson for Europe is to provide insight into these 
effects.
In addition, American insurers faced a credible commitment problem and were un-
able to overcome this problem. Consumers held the opinion that insurers were only 
interested in cost containment and not in the quality of care (Zelman, 1997; Rich and 
Erb, 2005; Miller, 2006; Lepolstat et al., 2009). For example, Lepolstat et al. (2009) 
found that 61 percent of the consumers with a managed care insurance product held 
the opinion that insurers were more concerned with saving money than with giving 
patients the best treatment. European insurers could overcome such a credible commit-
ment problem by using input from consumers in their decisions regarding managed care 
(i.e. the so-called ‘voice option’ (Hirschman, 1970)) (Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en 
Zorg, 2014). Insurers can use a wide range of strategies to facilitate this voice option. 
For example, they can establish consumer councils for (formal) advice about the tools 
to manage the care for their consumers.
6.5.2 the backlash against selective contracting
The lack of consumer choice of insurance product is a first cause of consumers’ dis-
satisfaction with selective contracting in healthcare. Several studies (Davis et al., 1995; 
Ullman et al., 1997; Gawande et al., 1998; Enthoven et al., 2001) showed that consum-
ers are more satisfied with their insurer if they have a choice of insurance product. 
Insurers should therefore offer consumers a choice among different insurance products. 
Enthoven et al. (2001) demonstrated that consumers who could choose between an 
HMO product and an indemnity insurance product or a PPO insurance product were two 
to four times more satisfied with their insurance product than consumers who could only 
take out an HMO. A lesson for Europe is therefore that insurers should offer consumers 
the choice between a standard insurance product with a standard premium and a lower-
priced product with a lower reimbursement for out-of-network use than the standard 
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product.21 A choice of insurance product will also increase consumers’ trust in their 
insurer (Zelman, 1997; Zheng et al., 2002; Dorr Goold et al., 2006), which may therefore 
also reduce the credible commitment problem of insurers.
Secondly, American consumers held the opinion that their insurer only contracted 
with the least costly providers instead of with the best healthcare providers (Harris 
et al., 2000; Miller, 2006; Simonet, 2007). Because of a lack of objective and reliable 
information regarding the quality of the contracted healthcare providers, insurers were 
not able to contradict these expectations. Therefore, insurers and policymakers should 
provide objective, understandable (i.e. without the use of technical language), and 
reliable information to consumers on the quality of the contracted healthcare providers 
(Boonen and Schut, 2011; Bes et al., 2013). Because this quality information is lacking 
in Germany and Switzerland, this is in particular an important lesson for these countries 
(Shmueli et al., 2015). In the Netherlands, quality information is becoming increasingly 
publicly available. The next step for this country is to verify whether the information 
provided on the quality of the contracted providers is accurate and easy accessible for 
consumers (Schippers, 2015a).
Thirdly, consumers’ hostility against selective contracting was intensified by the lack 
of adequate and clear information on insurers’ contracted providers and the reimburse-
ment level for non-contracted providers (Enthoven and Singer, 1998; Kyanko and Busch, 
2012). The lesson for insurers is to provide consumers timely with adequate information 
on the contracted providers and the reimbursement levels for non-contracted providers. 
This is an important lesson for all European countries considered, because this informa-
tion is still lacking in these countries (Van de Ven et al., 2013).
6.5.3 the backlash against utilization management
Because prior authorization requirements, guidelines, and gatekeeper arrangements 
are – at least to some extent – used in the three European countries considered, the 
lessons from the backlash against utilization management are relevant for all three 
European countries.
21 A potential objection against such a choice is that low-income individuals cannot afford the 
products with free choice of provider and are forced to choose the insurance products with 
a restricted healthcare provider choice. However, this depends on the system of subsidies. 
If the subsidies (including the risk equalization) are such that the insurance product with 
free choice of provider is affordable for everyone, then everyone has a choice between an 
insurance product with free choice of provider and a lower-priced product with a restricted 
network of providers. Without the option of selective contracting, consumers would not have 
this choice. Even more, the lack of selective contracting in healthcare will, ceteris paribus, 
result in higher premiums for all consumers and particularly low-income individuals will be 
badly affected by these high premiums (Schut et al., 2015).
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Firstly, American providers put forward that insurers’ strategies to establish influence on 
healthcare utilization – such as guidelines and prior authorization requirements – did 
severely undermine their professional autonomy and authority (Mechanic, 2004). 
Providers did strongly feel that unqualified persons influenced clinical decision-making 
(Enthoven and Singer, 1998). An important lesson for European countries is to respect 
the professional autonomy of the medical profession. They can do this by using par-
ticularly utilization management tools that are controlled by the healthcare providers 
(guidelines and gatekeeper arrangements) instead of tools that are mainly controlled 
by insurers (e.g. prior authorization requirements) (Enthoven and Singer, 1998; Deom 
et al., 2010). As long as insurers use prior authorization requirements, they could gain 
providers’ acceptance by involving them in the development of the criteria used in the 
review processes (Goldberg, 1998). Although guidelines reduce an individual provider’s 
professional autonomy, they do not reduce the professional autonomy of the medical 
profession as long as the healthcare providers themselves develop these guidelines. 
Respect for the professional autonomy of the medical profession may increase the 
acceptance of utilization management among providers.
Secondly, consumers experienced insurers’ prior authorization requirements and 
gatekeeper arrangements mostly in terms of barriers to access to healthcare (Boden-
heimer, 1996; Robinson, 2001). Due to the poorly motivated authorization denials (Har-
ris et al., 2000; Draper et al., 2002), consumers had the impression that insurers denied 
care to save money. A lesson for European insurers is therefore to provide information 
to consumers on the motives to deny care.
Thirdly, the absence of formal grievance mechanisms is another cause of consum-
ers’ hostility against insurers’ utilization management strategies. European insurers 
should give consumers the right to contest delayed or denied care by establishing an 
independent grievance process (Jacobson, 2003).
Fourthly, providers’ and consumers’ dissatisfaction with gatekeeper arrangements 
and prior authorization requirements was intensified by the administrative costs and 
hassle associated with it (Felt-Lisk and Mays, 2002; Mays et al., 2003). An important 
lesson for Europe is to limit the administrative costs associated with managed care.
6.5.4 the backlash against financial incentives
American healthcare providers did largely complain about the capitation-based pay-
ment system. They emphasized that this payment system placed them in the impossible 
position of acting in the patient’s best interest, while also taking cost considerations 
into account. Providers put forward that this trade-off created a fundamental ethical 
dilemma for them (Bodenheimer, 1996; Enthoven and Singer, 1998; Jacobson, 2003; 
Simonet, 2004). To cease providers’ hostility, American insurers and policymakers 
have successfully introduced blended payment systems that combine elements of 
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fee-for-service payments with that of capitation-based payments (Robinson, 1999; 
Zuvekas and Cohen, 2010). These blended payments can be further combined with 
financial incentives for providers to deliver high-quality care (e.g. pay-for-performance). 
An important lesson for Europe is to implement blended payment systems instead of 
capitation-based payment system.
6.6 ConClUsIons anD DIsCUssIon
Several European countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) have 
taken steps towards regulated competition in the health insurance market to enhance 
efficiency and consumer responsiveness. The rationale of a competitive health insur-
ance market is that individual risk-bearing health insurers manage the care for their 
enrollees. Three tools to manage the care can be discerned: 1) selective contracting 
with healthcare providers; 2) utilization management (e.g. prior authorization require-
ments and gatekeeper arrangements); and 3) financial incentives. While European 
countries had their first experiences with managed care only in recent years, the history 
of managed care in the United States goes back more than 30 years ago. Despite the 
great ability of managed care tools to control healthcare expenditures, the United States 
were during the late 1990s confronted with a substantial backlash against managed 
care. We evaluated the causes of this backlash to answer the question: ‘’What can 
Europe learn from the managed care backlash in the United States?’’
We formulated the following lessons for European insurers and policymakers: 1) be 
aware that the greatest backlash against managed care may come from the healthcare 
providers; 2) provide information on the features and effects (in terms of price and qual-
ity) of managed care; 3) use input from providers and consumers in the development 
of managed care tools; 4) establish formal grievance mechanisms for consumers to 
contest denied care; 5) offer consumers the choice between a standard insurance prod-
uct with a standard premium and a lower-priced product with a lower reimbursement 
for out-of-network use than the standard product; 6) provide information to consumers 
on the (quality of the) contracted providers, the reimbursement level for non-contracted 
providers, and the motives to deny care; 7) respect the professional autonomy of the 
medical profession; 8) limit the administrative costs associated with managed care; and 
9) use blended-payment systems for providers. European countries should pay careful 
attention to these lessons, because regulated competition will only succeed if insurers 
(are able to) effectively manage the care.
Besides the above lessons, we have two additional policy recommendations. Firstly, 
while the European countries have taken steps towards regulated competition among 
insurers, policymakers were reluctant to allow insurers to actually manage the care 
for their enrollees. For example, German and Swiss insurers can only selectively con-
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tract with providers to a limited extent, and Dutch insurers are bound to a minimum 
reimbursement level of about 75 percent for non-contracted providers. The backlash 
from mainly healthcare providers against proposals to provide insurers with more man-
aged care tools may explain policymakers’ behavior. The formulated lessons may help 
European policymakers to overcome this backlash.
Secondly, in the regulated competition setting, a risk equalization model should 
eliminate predictable differences in healthcare expenditures among different risk groups 
of consumers. However, risk equalization is still imperfect in most European countries 
and insurers are undercompensated for the high-risk consumers and overcompensated 
for the low-risk consumers (Van de Ven et al., 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2013). Due to 
imperfect risk equalization, insurers will have incentives to select against high-risk 
consumers. Because insurers can use the described managed care tools also for risk 
selection (Van de Ven et al., 2003) – e.g. by not contracting with the best healthcare 
providers – improving the risk equalization model should be a priority for European 
policymakers.
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7.1 ansWers to tHe researCH QUestIons
The introduction of the Health Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet) in 2006 was an 
important step towards regulated competition in the Dutch basic health insurance (BI) 
market. For many years, the government planned the capacity and regulated the tariffs 
in healthcare. Because this top-down strategy did not contain sufficient incentives to 
enhance efficiency, quality, and consumer responsiveness in healthcare, it has been 
replaced with regulated competition. The role of insurers has changed fundamentally: 
instead of being only the third-party ‘payers of care’, insurers have become also the 
third-party ‘purchasers of care’. In this new role, insurers have to negotiate with health-
care providers on the price, quality, and quantity of care. As critical purchasers of care 
on behalf of their enrollees, they are allowed to selectively contract; e.g. with only the 
best and most efficient healthcare providers. During each switching period, consumers 
must have the opportunity to choose the insurer and the insurance product that best 
satisfy their preferences. In this respect, consumers could take out insurance products 
with (some) restrictions on their choice of healthcare provider or higher-priced insur-
ance products with an unlimited free choice of healthcare provider.
Consumer choice of insurer must continuously stimulate insurers to be responsive 
to consumer preferences. As regulator of the BI market, the government facilitates this 
choice by enforcing open enrollment, a standardized benefit package, community-rated 
premiums, and a risk equalization system. In markets with homogeneous preferences, 
a critical choice of a minority is mostly sufficient to spur insurers to be responsive to 
consumer preferences. However, in healthcare, consumer preferences are highly 
heterogeneous. This implies that if groups of consumers with specific preferences 
are not free or feel not free to easily switch insurer, insurers have lower incentives to 
accommodate the specific preferences of these consumers than the preferences of 
other consumers. This would be particularly problematic if these consumers are those 
with the most healthcare needs (i.e. elderly or unhealthy consumers), because insurers 
have then most likely reduced incentives to act as quality-conscious purchasers of care 
for them. The central question of the first part of this dissertation is: ‘’Are all consumer 
groups with specific preferences free and do they feel free to easily switch insurer in the 
Dutch basic health insurance market? If not, what are potential strategies to improve 
consumer choice of insurer?’’
If consumers feel free to switch insurer, they will be able to choose the insurer 
and the insurance product that best satisfy their preferences. Most analysts consider 
selective contracting with healthcare providers as the main tool that insurers have to 
stimulate efficiency in healthcare. The credible threat for healthcare providers of having 
no contract with an insurer – which may result in less patients and less income for 
them – stimulates price- and quality competition in the healthcare provision market. 
However, if consumers are unwilling to give up (to some extent) their unlimited free 
114 Chapter 7
choice of healthcare provider22 in return for a lower premium, they will not take out 
the insurance products with a limited healthcare provider choice. Because the threat 
of selective contracting will then be substantially reduced for healthcare providers, 
regulated competition will be less able to enhance efficiency in healthcare. The United 
States were about 20 years ago confronted with a substantial backlash against selec-
tive contracting (i.e. the ‘’managed care backlash’’). The central question of the second 
part of this dissertation is: ‘’What can the Netherlands learn from the managed care 
backlash in the United States?’’.
7.1.1 Consumer choice of health insurer
In order to answer the first central question, we formulated 5 research questions that 
were answered by means of quantitative and qualitative research methods.
Switching rates, switching benefits, and switching costs
With the first research question – which has a descriptive character – we aimed at 
gaining insight into the switching behavior of low-risks (i.e. young or healthy consumers) 
and high-risks (i.e. elderly or unhealthy consumers):
Q1: To what extent do switching rates differ between low-risks and high-risks?
Chapter 2 gave insight into the switching behavior of low-risks and high-risks in 2009 
by analyzing administrative data on nearly the entire Dutch population (n=15.3 million 
individuals) with objective health status information (i.e. medically diagnosed diseases 
and pharmaceutical use) and with information on healthcare expenses. Most consum-
ers are unwilling to decide on their health insurance each switching period. Therefore, 
we also compared low-risks’ and high-risks’ switching behavior over a three-year period 
(2010-2012) by using sample data with subjective health status information (i.e. self-
reported health and self-reported disease(s)) of 1,152 individuals.
Both the administrative data and the sample data indicated that switching rates 
strongly decrease with age. In 2009, for example, the annual switching rate was 3.81 
percent for consumers aged 25-44 and decreased to 0.37 percent for consumers aged 
75 or older. Moreover, the results showed that switching rates substantially decrease as 
the predicted healthcare expenses increase: about 5 percent of the consumers with very 
low predicted healthcare expenses switched insurer compared to about 0.5 percent of 
the consumers with very high predicted healthcare expenses. Another important finding 
22 The degree to which consumers are free to choose their healthcare provider depends upon: 1) 
the size of the contracted provider network and 2) the reimbursement level for non-contracted 
providers.
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was that although healthy consumers switched twice as much as unhealthy consumers, 
this difference becomes much smaller after adjusting for the age differences between 
these groups.
Consumers will switch insurer if their perceived switching benefits outweigh their per-
ceived switching costs. During the research period, switching benefits were quite com-
parable for young and elderly consumers. For example, insurers did mainly compete 
on price, which is a relevant switching benefit for both young and elderly consumers. In 
addition, the contracted provider network – which is particularly an important switching 
benefit for high-risks because of their high healthcare use – was because of the lack of 
selective contracting an irrelevant switching benefit during the research period. How-
ever, consumers’ potential switching benefits are influenced by their switching behavior 
in previous years: the switching benefits for the consumers who did not switch insurer 
in previous years will be relatively higher than the switching benefits for the consumers 
who switched insurer. For example, the latter group may have switched to lower-priced 
insurance products, while the former group may still have to pay a high price. During 
the period 2006-2008, elderly consumers were – just as in later years – less inclined 
to switch insurer than young consumers (Vektis, 2006; Vektis, 2007; Vektis, 2008). 
Consequently, during our research period, elderly consumers faced on average higher 
potential switching benefits than young consumers. This implies that the substantial 
lower switching rate of the elderly consumers compared to that of the young consumers 
cannot be explained by higher switching benefits for the young consumers. The conclu-
sion is that elderly consumers faced higher switching costs than young consumers.
Low switching rates for elderly consumers resulting from high switching costs com-
pared to the switching benefits can have different negative effects. Firstly, high switch-
ing costs for elderly consumers reduce insurers’ incentives to act as quality-conscious 
purchasers of care for the elderly consumers. Because young consumers with low 
switching costs can switch to lower-priced alternatives, a second negative effect is 
that – in case of an imperfect risk equalization model – cross-subsidies among risk 
groups may be threatened. Because of these potential negative effects, it is important to 
have insight into the switching benefits and switching costs that influence the decision 
of (groups of) consumers to switch insurer. This led to the following research questions:
Q2: What are potential switching benefits and costs in the competitive health insurance 
market?
Q3: What are the main perceived switching benefits and costs in consumers’ decision 
to (not) switch insurer?
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These questions were addressed in chapter 3. We integrated evidence from different 
disciplines – such as behavioral economics, health economics, and health policy – to 
develop a conceptual framework with potential switching benefi ts and costs in the com-
petitive health insurance market. In total, we identifi ed fi ve potential switching benefi ts 
and six potential switching costs (see Figure 7.1). We developed a consumer question-
naire to empirically examine the relevance of the different switching benefi ts and costs 
in consumers’ decision to (not) switch insurer in 2013. In total, 1,091 members of an 
Internet panel completed the questionnaire. The results indicated that consumers men-
tioned particularly price (64 percent of the switchers) and the benefi ts of supplementary 
insurance (SI) (16 percent of the switchers) as the main reasons for changing insurer. 
For half of the non-switchers, satisfaction with the current insurer was the main reason 
for not switching insurer. However, about 50 percent of them reported one of the switch-
ing costs as another important reason – but not the main reason – for not changing 
insurer. About 43 percent of the non-switchers mentioned one of the switching costs as 
their main reason for not changing insurer.23
Satisfaction with the current insurer was for 55 percent of the non-switching elderly 
(55+) consumers the main reason for not changing insurer. Due to this satisfaction, 
most elderly consumers will currently not consider the high switching costs they face 
23 The other 7 percent of the non-switchers mentioned another main reason for not changing 
insurer.
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figure 7.1  Potential switching benefi ts and switching costs in the competitive health insurance market
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as problematic. However, as soon as insurers do no longer accommodate the specific 
preferences of elderly consumers, this consumer group will experience that they cannot 
vote with their feet. The questionnaire indicated that for 55 percent of the non-switching 
unhealthy consumers – i.e. those with a bad or moderate self-reported health – one of 
the switching costs was the main reason for not switching insurer. Thus, particularly 
unhealthy consumers perceived high switching costs compared to their switching ben-
efits. The threat of healthy consumers switching to a competitor is greater for an insurer 
than the treat of unhealthy consumers switching. This reduces insurers’ incentives to be 
responsive to the preferences of unhealthy consumers.
‘Benefit loss’ costs are the switching cost that hinder most consumers from switching 
insurer. In total, 16 percent of the non-switchers mentioned ‘benefit loss’ costs as their 
main reason for not switching insurer. The loss of the favorable conditions of SI is one 
of the ‘benefit loss’ costs. We aimed at getting detailed insight into this switching cost 
to help policymakers developing effective strategies to improve high-risks’ choice of 
insurer.
Supplementary insurance as a switching cost for basic health insurance
About 85-90 percent of all consumers voluntarily take out SI for benefits not covered 
by BI. More than 99 percent of them take out BI and SI from the same insurer, because 
one-stop shopping has several advantages (e.g. a good coordination of care covered 
by both BI and SI) and most insurers make it unattractive or impossible for consumers 
to take out separate SI. Consequently, consumers’ decision to switch insurer for BI is 
influenced by their perceived switching benefits and costs regarding SI.
Because of EU regulation, the government is not allowed to regulate the SI market. 
This implies that insurers are permitted to refuse applicants or to charge risk-rated 
premiums for SI. However, the first two years after the introduction of the HIA, insurers 
collectively agreed to accept all consumers for the majority of their SI products and 
to charge mostly community-rated premiums for these products. This implies that all 
consumers had the possibility to take out their preferred SI product with an (almost) 
community-rated premium. Although since 2008 the collective agreement did no longer 
exist, all insurers have incorporated a guaranteed renewability (GR) in each SI. This GR 
consists of a guaranteed renewal of the annual SI contract with an equal adjustment of 
the premium and the insurance conditions for all current consumers with that specific 
SI. Thus, GR imposes an acceptance duty and premium-rate restrictions for the insurer 
with respect to renewing SI of their current consumers, but this does not hold for new 
applicants. Because switching to another insurer may result in the loss of the favorable 
conditions of SI, SI is a potential switching cost for BI. This led to the fourth research 
question:
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Q4: To what extent is supplementary insurance a switching cost for basic health insur-
ance?
Chapter 4 and 5 addressed this question. The first step was to evaluate whether 
consumers perceived SI as a switching cost for BI. In 2006 and 2009, respectively, 4 
percent and 6 percent of the non-switching consumers reported that the belief in not 
being accepted for SI was an important reason for not switching insurer for BI (Roos 
and Schut, 2012). A consumer questionnaire (n=992 in 2011; n=881 in 2012) indicated 
that in 2011 and 2012 about 10 percent of the consumers expected that another insurer 
would not accept them for SI. This clearly indicates that the proportion of consumers 
expecting that another insurer would not accept them for SI increased. We further found 
that an additional 20 percent of the consumers expected to be accepted by another in-
surer, but only for a higher premium than other consumers with the same SI. Particularly 
high-risks perceive SI as a switching cost for BI: about one third of the elderly (55+) 
consumers and more than half of the consumers with a bad or moderate self-reported 
health expected their current insurer to offer them more favorable conditions for SI than 
other insurers do for similar SI.
The second step was to determine whether SI was indeed a switching cost for BI. Insur-
ers have different tools to counteract adverse selection in the health insurance market: 
selective underwriting, risk rating, and product differentiation. These tools have different 
consequences for SI as a switching cost for BI. Because of the GR of each SI, SI is 
a switching cost if insurers apply selective underwriting to new enrollees. High-risks 
face then the risk that another insurer will not accept them, while their current insurer 
guarantees to renew their SI. In contrast, SI is hardly a switching cost if insurers apply 
risk rating or product differentiation without selective underwriting, because consumers’ 
current insurer and other insurers will then charge them quite similar premiums for 
comparable SI products. The GR offers no protection against risk rating, because it 
only prescribes that all current consumers must be confronted with the same premium 
adjustments. Thus, insurers are allowed to start charging all their current consumers 
and new enrollees risk-rated premiums.
We conducted six interviews with employees of six different insurance companies 
and reviewed the policy conditions of the products offered in the SI market to determine 
which tools insurers used to counteract adverse selection. The interviews showed that 
insurers were reluctant to apply selective underwriting for SI. In contrast, insurers stated 
that they did largely apply product differentiation for SI to be responsive to the hetero-
geneous preferences of consumers. The extensive review of the policy conditions of the 
SI products also indicated that the proportion of insurers applying selective underwriting 
for SI was limited. For example, in 2015, 86 percent of the insurers used open enroll-
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ment for all of their SI products. The other 14 percent did use health questionnaires for 
their most comprehensive SI products. In particular high-risks prefer these compre-
hensive products. Therefore, SI is a switching cost for the high-risks who would like to 
switch for BI to an insurer that uses health questionnaires for its most comprehensive 
SI product(s). However, because the majority of insurers applies open enrollment for 
all their SI products, a discrepancy exists between the actual insurers’ practices and 
consumers’ expectations about these practices. This led to the conclusion that although 
many high-risks perceive SI as a switching cost, most insurers apply open enrollment 
for SI. A lot of media attention to the rare examples of high-risks who were refused for SI 
may explain this discrepancy. SI as a perceived switching cost by high-risks is a serious 
problem, because it reduces insurers’ incentives to invest in high-quality care for this 
category of consumers. This led to the following question:
Q5: What are potential solutions to reduce supplementary insurance as a switching cost 
for basic health insurance?
Disseminating information to high-risks about their switching opportunities could be a 
solution to improve high-risks’ consumer choice and thereby increase insurers’ incen-
tives to be responsive to the preferences of high-risks. The Dutch government could, 
for example, launch an information campaign during the annual switching period that 
underlines that insurers use largely open enrollment for their SI products. However, 
currently, insurers may not have had a strong need to apply selective underwriting for 
SI because of the low switching rates among high-risks. It is still an open question 
how insurers will protect themselves against adverse selection if an increasing number 
of high-risks actually switches insurer. Therefore, it is crucial to continuously monitor 
insurers’ behavior in the SI market and to adjust the information campaign if necessary.
Recently, Dutch insurers announced that they will reduce SI as a switching cost 
for BI by using open enrollment for SI for the enrollees who took out a comparable SI 
from their old insurer (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, 2015). Because consumers will no 
longer face the risk that another insurer will not accept them for a comparable SI, SI is 
no longer a switching cost for BI. Another long-term solution is the integration of BI and 
SI into one contract: the basic-plus-insurance (BPI). After the introduction of the BPI, 
open enrollment also holds for the supplemental benefits, while insurers are still allowed 
to apply risk rating for the supplemental benefits within the BPI. The introduction of the 
BPI will not threaten the affordability of the basic benefits, because insurers are still 
bound to community-rated premiums for these benefits.
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7.1.2 Consumer choice of healthcare provider
Insurers can selectively contract with healthcare providers to effectively manage the 
care for their enrollees. However, if consumers are unwilling to give up (to some extent) 
their unlimited free choice of healthcare provider in return for a lower premium, insurers 
cannot use their most effective instrument to enhance efficiency in healthcare. While 
the Netherlands – and some other European countries (e.g. Germany and Switzer-
land) – has its first experiences with selective contracting only in recent years, selective 
contracting has a long history in the United States. Despite the great ability of selective 
contracting to deal with the increasing American healthcare expenditures, the United 
States were about 20 years ago confronted with a substantial backlash against it from 
healthcare providers and consumers (i.e. ‘’the managed care backlash’’). Insight into 
the causes of this backlash may provide relevant lessons for the Netherlands. Chapter 
6 addressed the question ‘’What can the Netherlands learn from the managed care 
backlash in the United States?’’ by performing an in-depth analysis of the American 
managed care backlash. This analysis indicated that even during the ‘’managed care 
backlash period’’ an increasing proportion of consumers was willing to give up their un-
limited free choice of healthcare provider in return for a lower premium. In 2002, almost 
all American consumers (i.e. 96 percent) had (to some extent) given up their unlimited 
free choice of healthcare provider. However, the extent to which consumers gave up 
their choice of healthcare provider – in terms of the number of contracted providers and 
the reimbursement level for non-contracted providers – decreased. Initially, insurers of-
fered insurance products that did limit consumer choice of healthcare provider severely 
(the so-called Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)). Consumers who did take 
out an HMO had only access to a limited number of contracted healthcare providers and 
did not receive any reimbursement if they visited non-contracted providers.24 During the 
American managed care backlash period, the demand for HMOs relatively declined, 
while insurance products with a larger provider network and a higher reimbursement 
level for non-contracted providers gained in popularity. Thus, the American experience 
shows that consumers are willing to give up to some extent their free choice of health-
care provider in return for a lower premium. Some selective contracting in healthcare 
may be sufficient to stimulate healthcare providers to deliver efficient care.
The analysis did further show that consumers will be more satisfied with their 
insurer if they could choose between an insurance product with a limited healthcare 
provider choice and a higher-priced insurance product with a more extensive choice 
of healthcare provider. A lesson for the Netherlands is therefore that insurers should 
24 Because of insurers’ duty of care and because insurers’ reimbursement level for non-contract-
ed providers may not hinder consumers from visiting these providers, Dutch insurers will not 
be allowed to restrict consumer choice of healthcare provider as severely as the HMOs did.
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offer consumers the choice between different insurance products. In addition, American 
consumers held the opinion that insurers were only interested in cost containment and 
not in the quality of care. Therefore, insurers should provide information to consumers 
on the quality of their contracted providers. Moreover, insurers could overcome their 
credible commitment problem by using input from consumers in their decisions regard-
ing selective contracting.25 Three other important lessons for the Netherlands are: 1) 
provide information on the features and effects (in terms of price and quality) of selec-
tive contracting; 2) establish formal grievance mechanisms for consumers to contest 
denied care; and 3) limit the administrative costs associated with selective contracting.
7.2 overall ConClUsIon anD refleCtIon
An essential precondition for achieving efficiency and consumer responsiveness in 
healthcare is that all consumer groups with specific preferences are free and feel free 
to easily switch insurer. Due to legislation – e.g. the enforcement of open enrollment 
and community-rated premiums – consumers are free to switch insurer. However, the 
empirical results from the period 2009-2013 do indicate that Dutch high-risks do not 
feel free to easily switch insurer. Consequently, insurers have lower incentives to satisfy 
the specific preferences of this consumer group than to satisfy the preferences of other 
consumer groups. In the last years, the government, the Dutch Healthcare Authority 
(NZa), and insurers have acknowledged this problem and have proposed different solu-
tions to reduce high-risks’ switching costs.
The loss of the favorable conditions of SI is a major switching cost for high-risks. 
Dutch insurers announced that they will reduce SI as a switching cost for BI by using 
open enrollment for SI for the enrollees who took out a comparable SI from their old 
insurer (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, 2015). The question arises whether this solu-
tion is equally effective as the integration of BI and SI into one basis-plus-insurance. 
The solution proposed by insurers is a form of self-regulation. The informal agreement 
among insurers of not refusing new applicants for SI in 2006 and 2007 was also a 
form of self-regulation. This agreement was no longer continued in later years. So, it is 
questionable how sustainable solutions based on self-regulation are. As soon as one 
insurer ignores the rules imposed by self-regulation, the other insurers may have also 
increased incentives to protect themselves against adverse selection. This increases 
the possibility that also other insurers ignore the rules imposed by self-regulation and 
25 In April 2015, Dutch insurers announced that they will: 1) improve the information provided on 
their contracted provider network, 2) increase the input from consumers regarding (selective) 
contracting in healthcare, 3) reduce consumers’ switching barriers and 4) improve the risk 
equalization model (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, 2015).
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start applying selective underwriting. In addition, self-regulation by insurers may be in 
conflict with the competition rules. Therefore, the introduction of a basic-plus-insurance 
(BPI) seems to be a more sustainable and appropriate solution to reduce SI as a switch-
ing cost for BI. However, the Dutch Health Authority (NZa) considers the purchase of 
BI and SI as one product as undesirable, for example, because SI can be used as 
an instrument for risk selection for BI26 (NZa, 2015a). A BPI will not exacerbate this 
problem, because the current joint purchase of BI and SI offers insurers with exactly 
the same instruments to use SI as risk selection tool for BI. Moreover, it is important to 
realize that a strict legal separation between BI and SI is not a legally feasible solution 
because both BI and SI are subject to the Third European Non-life Insurance Directive. 
This implies that the government is not allowed to stop an insurer that offers BI from 
also offering SI, and vice versa. In addition, a joint purchase of BI and SI has several 
advantages for consumers, such as low transaction costs and a good coordination of 
basic and supplemental benefits. This lead to the conclusion that the introduction of a 
BPI seems to be the most effective long-term solution to reduce SI as a switching cost 
for BI.
As soon as the loss of the favorable conditions of SI is no longer a switching cost for 
BI, consumers may increasingly perceive transaction costs, because consumers who 
(consider to) switch insurer may be confronted with the time and effort it takes to make 
a switching decision and to actually switch insurer. Insurers and the Dutch government 
have formulated different strategies to decrease consumers’ transaction costs. Insur-
ers have stated, for example, that they will clearly present their BI products on their 
websites, will provide information to consumers about their contracted providers and 
the reimbursement levels for non-contracted providers, and will explicitly bring specific 
policy conditions to consumers’ attention (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, 2015). The 
Dutch minister of Health, Welfare and Sport aims at reducing the number of BI products 
offered by insurers to decrease consumers’ transaction costs. The Dutch Healthcare 
Authority (NZa) will investigate whether there could be still effective price- and quality 
competition in a health insurance market with a limited number of BI products (Schip-
pers, 2015b).
A reduction of high-risks’ switching costs may increase their intention to switch in-
surer. However, in the case of imperfect risk equalization, increasing switching rates of 
undercompensated high-risks stimulate insurers to select against them by, for example, 
not contracting with the best healthcare providers. In other words, under imperfect risk 
equalization, a reduction of high-risks’ switching costs may eventually threaten the 
26 The Dutch risk equalization model does currently not adequately compensate insurers for the 
predictable expenses of selected groups of consumers: insurers are undercompensated for 
the chronically ill and overcompensated for the healthy consumers.
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quality of care. Therefore, improving the risk equalization model is a necessary comple-
ment of reducing high-risks’ switching costs. Recently, the minister of Health, Welfare 
and Sport announced that she aims at improving the risk equalization model (Schip-
pers, 2015a). An improvement of the risk equalization model may increase high-risks’ 
switching benefits. If high-risks become more preferred clients for insurers, insurers will 
have more incentives to invest in the switching benefits these consumers attach great 
importance to.
The improvements in the choice of insurer and the risk equalization model will in-
crease insurers’ incentives to satisfy consumer preferences. The American experiences 
show that consumers are willing to give up to some extent their unlimited free choice of 
healthcare provider in return for a lower premium. In the Netherlands, consumers did 
not have had the choice between an insurance product with a limited choice of health-
care provider and a higher-priced insurance product with a free choice of healthcare 
provider. Because Dutch consumers have to become used to this choice, it may take 
some time before they are willing to give up (to some extent) their unlimited free choice 
of healthcare provider. There are indications that they are increasingly willing to do so: 
the percentage of consumers with an insurance product that did limit their free choice 
of healthcare provider increased from 0.5 in 2010 to 4.4 in 2014. This percentage did 
further increase to 7.5 in 2015 (NZa, 2015b).
Besides consumer preferences, the tools insurers have to selectively contract with 
healthcare providers influence the extent to which selective contracting will enhance 
efficiency in healthcare. The Health Insurance Act and jurisprudence state that the 
insurer’s reimbursement level for non-contracted providers may not hinder consumers 
from visiting these providers. However, this is a legal restriction on selective contracting 
in healthcare. This implies that the efficiency gains from selective contracting may be 
limited. In addition, it is unclear which reimbursement level for non-contracted providers 
will hinder consumers from visiting these providers. Therefore, policymakers should be 
clear about which reimbursement level is (not) allowed for non-contracted providers 
(Duijmelinck and Van de Ven, 2015). For effective selective contracting it is crucial 
that this reimbursement level for non-contracted providers discourages consumers suf-
ficiently from visiting the non-contracted providers.
Areas for further research
The introduction of regulated competition can be considered as a gradual process. 
This dissertation has focused on consumer’s choice of insurer, which is one essential 
precondition for achieving the intended results of regulated competition. However, 
contestable markets, effective competition regulation, and effective quality supervision 
are examples of other essential preconditions for achieving efficiency in healthcare. 
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Therefore, all preconditions for achieving the intended results of regulated competition 
should have the constant attention of policymakers and researchers.
We recommend seven other areas for further research. Firstly, this dissertation 
focused solely on switching insurer, while Dutch insurers are allowed to offer more 
than one BI product. Switching to another BI product offered by the current insurer 
involves lower switching benefits than switching insurer; e.g. insurers’ service quality 
is then an irrelevant switching benefit. However, it involves also lower switching costs. 
For example, consumers switching to another BI of their current insurer will not lose 
their SI. Therefore, the loss of the favorable conditions of SI is an irrelevant switching 
cost for this type of switching behavior. Further research may evaluate to what extent 
different consumer groups (feel free to) switch to another BI contract offered by the 
current insurer.
Secondly, Hirschman (1970) described that – next to the exit option – consumers 
could express dissatisfaction with their current insurer by using the voice option. Insur-
ers can further use this voice option to overcome their credible commitment problem. 
The voice option involves, for example, participating in consumer councils and complet-
ing consumer satisfaction questionnaires. Dutch insurers have announced that they will 
intensify ‘the voice of consumers’ in the coming years (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, 
2015). In addition, the Dutch government intend to introduce legislation that should 
guarantee consumers’ influence on the decisions and behavior of insurers (Schippers, 
2015c). Future research may examine: (1) how insurers facilitate the voice option; (2) 
to what extent consumers use the voice option; and (3) to what extent insurers respond 
to the ‘voice of consumers’.
Thirdly, this dissertation only investigated whether consumers perceived switching 
costs in the health insurance market. Further research may also pay attention to the 
actual size – e.g. in terms of time and money – of the different switching costs.
Fourthly, we used an online questionnaire to evaluate the switching costs for dif-
ferent consumer groups. Because consumers could only fill in the questionnaire on 
the Internet, consumers without Internet access were excluded. However, consumers 
without Internet access may face higher switching costs than those with Internet access. 
For example, the absence of the possibility of switching via the Internet may lead to high 
transaction costs. Because the group of consumers without Internet access may be a 
specific consumer group with specific preferences, we recommend further research on 
the switching costs for consumers without Internet access.
Fifthly, the empirical research did take place during a period (2009-2013) in which 
insurers did (almost) not selectively contract with healthcare providers. Therefore, dur-
ing the research period, the costs of (not) switching to another healthcare provider 
were irrelevant switching costs. In later years, Dutch insurers started to selectively 
contract with healthcare providers more frequently. The costs of (not) switching to an-
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other healthcare provider may have become a more important switching cost, while 
the insurers’ contracted provider network may have become a more relevant switching 
benefit in the health insurance market. For achieving the intended results of regulated 
competition it is important that the switching costs do not increase more rapidly than the 
switching benefits. Future research may pay further attention to the switching benefits 
and switching costs resulting from selective contracting in healthcare.
Sixthly, this research did pay only limited attention to psychological factors that may 
explain consumers’ switching behavior. Therefore, future research may investigate the 
importance of specific psychological factors – such as cognitive overload, regret avoid-
ance, and loss aversion (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) – in consumers’ decision 
to switch insurer.
Seventhly, because selective contracting has a long history in the United States, we 
extensively reviewed the American insurance market to formulate lessons for the Neth-
erlands. However, we did not pay attention to the potential cultural differences between 
the two countries. Therefore, some lessons based on the American experience with 
selective contracting may be less relevant for the Netherlands, while the Netherlands 
may be confronted with other difficulties regarding selective contracting that were – due 
to cultural reasons – not relevant in the United States. Future research may focus on 
Dutch consumers’ opinion regarding selective contracting. In this respect, it would be 
interesting to perform a discrete choice experiment that evaluates Dutch consumers’ 
trade-off between price and freedom to choose a healthcare provider.
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The introduction of the Health Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet) in 2006 was an 
important step towards regulated competition in the Dutch basic health insurance 
(BI) market. For many years, the government planned the capacity and regulated the 
tariffs in healthcare. However, because this top-down strategy did not contain sufficient 
incentives to enhance efficiency, quality, and consumer responsiveness in healthcare, 
it has been replaced with regulated competition. Since the beginning of this century, 
risk-bearing health insurers have the important role of third-party purchasers of care. 
By doing so, they have to negotiate with healthcare providers on the price, quality, and 
quantity of care. As critical purchasers of care on behalf of their consumers, insurers 
are allowed to selectively contract; e.g. with only the best and most efficient healthcare 
providers. In the regulated competition setting, the government sets as regulator of the 
market the rules of the ‘regulated competition game’. During each switching period, 
consumers must have the opportunity to choose the insurer and the insurance product 
that best satisfy their preferences. In this respect, consumers could take out insurance 
products with (some) restrictions on their choice of healthcare provider or higher-priced 
insurance products with an unlimited free choice of healthcare provider.
The threat of consumers switching to a competitor must continuously stimulate 
insurers to be responsive to consumer preferences. In healthcare, consumer prefer-
ences are highly heterogeneous. Consequently, if groups of consumers with specific 
preferences are not free or feel not free to easily switch insurer, insurers have lower 
incentives to accommodate the specific preferences of these consumers than the pref-
erences of the other consumers. An essential precondition for achieving the intended 
results of regulated competition is therefore that all consumers with specific preferences 
must be free and must feel free to regularly switch insurer. The government enforces 
open enrollment, a standardized benefit package, community-rated premiums, and 
a risk equalization system to facilitate this choice of insurer of all consumer groups. 
However, it is unclear whether all groups of consumers with specific preferences feel 
indeed free to easily switch insurer for BI. The first aim of this dissertation is therefore 
(1) to evaluate whether all consumer groups with specific preferences feel free to easily 
switch insurer and (2) to formulate strategies to improve consumer choice of insurer. 
These results are presented in chapter 2-5.
If consumers feel free to switch insurer, they will be able to choose the insurer 
and the insurance product that best satisfy their preferences. Most analysts consider 
selective contracting with healthcare providers as the main tool that insurers have to 
stimulate efficiency in healthcare.27 The credible threat for healthcare providers of hav-
ing no contract with an insurer – which may result in less patients and less income for 
27 We use the same definition of efficiency as Van de Ven et al. (2009): ‘’as low as possible unit 
costs for a given quality of care’’.
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them – stimulates price- and quality competition in the healthcare provision market. 
However, if consumers are unwilling to give up (to some extent) their unlimited free 
choice of healthcare provider28 in return for a lower premium, they will not take out 
the insurance products with a limited healthcare provider choice. Because the threat 
of selective contracting will then be substantially reduced for healthcare providers, 
regulated competition will be less able to enhance efficiency in healthcare. While the 
Netherlands has its first experiences with selective contracting only in recent years, 
selective contracting has a long history in the United States. The United States were 
about 20 years ago confronted with a substantial backlash against selective contract-
ing (i.e. the ‘’managed care backlash’’). The second part of this dissertation evaluates 
the causes of this backlash and seeks lessons for the Netherlands. These results are 
presented in chapter 6.
Young consumers switch ten times more than elderly consumers
Chapter 2 provides insight into the switching behavior of low-risks (i.e. young or healthy 
consumers) and high-risks (i.e. elderly or unhealthy consumers) in the period 2009-
2012. We analyzed: 1) administrative data with objective health status information and 
information on healthcare expenses of nearly the entire Dutch population (n=15.3 mil-
lion individuals) and 2) 3-year sample data (n=1,152 individuals). The results indicate 
that switching rates strongly decrease with age. For example, in 2009, consumers aged 
25-44 switched 10 times more than consumers aged 75 or older. Another important 
finding is that the switching rates substantially decrease as the predicted healthcare 
expenditures increase: about 5 percent of the consumers with very low predicted 
healthcare expenses switched insurer compared to about 0.5 percent of the consumers 
with very high predicted healthcare expenses. Although healthy consumers switch twice 
as much as unhealthy consumers, this difference largely disappears after adjusting for 
the age differences between these groups.
High switching costs for high-risk consumers
The question arises why low-risks are more inclined to switch insurer than high-risks. 
Consumers will switch insurer if their perceived switching benefits outweigh their per-
ceived switching costs. Chapter 3 shows that (1) price, (2) insurers’ service quality, (3) 
insurers’ contracted provider network, (4) the benefits of supplementary insurance, and 
(5) welcome gifts are potential switching benefits, while (1) transaction costs, (2) learn-
ing costs, (3) ‘benefit loss’ costs, (4) uncertainty costs, (5) the costs of (not) switching 
28 The degree to which consumers are free to choose their healthcare provider depends upon: 1) 
the size of the contracted provider network and 2) the reimbursement level for non-contracted 
providers.
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provider, and (6) sunk costs are potential switching costs. During the research period, 
the potential switching benefits for high-risks and low-risks were quite comparable. 
Therefore, higher switching costs for high-risks than for low-risks can explain the sub-
stantial lower switching propensity of high-risks.
A questionnaire among Dutch consumers (1,091 respondents) indicates that about 
43 percent of the non-switchers mentioned one of the switching costs – instead of 
satisfaction – as their main reason for not switching insurer. In particular consumers 
with a bad or moderate self-reported health (i.e. 55 percent) did mention one of the 
switching costs as their main reason for not changing insurer.
Supplementary insurance as a switching cost for basic health insurance
The results show that 16 percent of the non-switchers mentioned the ‘benefit loss’ costs 
as their main reason for not changing insurer. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 focus on one of 
the ‘benefit loss’ costs: the loss of the favorable conditions of supplementary insurance 
(SI). About 85-90 percent of all consumers voluntarily take out SI for benefits not cov-
ered by BI and more than 99 percent of them take out BI and SI from the same insurer. 
Consequently, consumers’ decision to switch insurer for BI is influenced by their per-
ceived switching benefits and costs regarding SI. In contrast to BI, insurers are allowed 
to apply selective underwriting and risk rating for SI. However, they have – without any 
legal duty to do this – incorporated a guaranteed renewability in each SI, which consists 
of a guaranteed renewal of the annual SI contract with an equal adjustment of the 
premium and the insurance conditions for all current consumers with that specific SI.
The first step was to examine by means of a questionnaire (n=992 in 2011 and 
n=881 in 2012) to what extent consumers perceive SI as a switching cost for BI. The 
results indicate that in 2011 and 2012 about 10 percent of the consumers expected that 
another insurer would not accept them for SI. An additional 20 percent expected to be 
accepted by another insurer, but only for a higher premium than other consumers with 
the same SI. Particularly high-risks perceive SI as a switching cost: about one third of 
the elderly (55+) consumers and more than half of the consumers with a bad or moder-
ate self-reported health expected their current insurer to offer them more favorable 
conditions for SI than other insurers do for similar SI.
The second step was to determine whether SI was indeed a switching cost for BI 
for high-risks. Insurers can use the following tools to counteract adverse selection in 
the health insurance market: (1) selective underwriting, (2) risk rating, and (3) product 
differentiation. These tools have different consequences for SI as a switching cost for 
BI. Because of the guaranteed renewability of SI, SI is a switching cost for BI if insurers 
apply selective underwriting to new enrollees. High-risks face then the risk that another 
insurer will not accept them for SI, while their current insurer guarantees to renew their 
SI. SI is hardly a switching cost if insurers apply risk rating or product differentiation 
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without selective underwriting, because consumers’ current insurer and other insurers 
will charge them then quite similar premiums for comparable SI products. To determine 
which tools insurers used to counteract adverse selection, we conducted six interviews 
with employees of six different insurance companies. Moreover, we reviewed the 
policy conditions of the SI products offered (i.e. 159 SI products in 2014 and 145 SI 
products in 2015). The results indicate that insurers are reluctant to apply selective 
underwriting. In 2015, for example, 86 percent of the insurers used open enrollment 
for all their SI products. The other 14 percent used health questionnaires for their most 
comprehensive SI products. In particular high-risks prefer these products. Therefore, SI 
is a switching cost for the high-risks who would like to switch for BI to an insurer using 
health questionnaires for its most comprehensive SI product(s). However, because the 
majority of insurers applies open enrollment for all their SI products, a discrepancy 
exists between the actual insurers’ practices and consumers’ expectations about these 
practices. SI as a perceived switching cost by high-risks is a serious problem, because 
it reduces insurers’ incentives to respond to high-risks’ preferences.
The third step was therefore to provide solutions to reduce SI as a switching cost 
for BI. A first solution is disseminating information to high-risks about their switching 
opportunities. However, in the last years, insurers may not have had a strong need 
to apply selective underwriting for SI because of the low switching rates among high-
risks. It is unclear how insurers will protect themselves against adverse selection if 
an increasing number of high-risks actually switches insurer. Therefore, it is crucial to 
continuously monitor insurers’ behavior in the SI market and to adjust the information 
campaign if necessary.
Recently, Dutch insurers announced that they will reduce SI as a switching cost 
for BI by using open enrollment for SI for the enrollees who took out a comparable 
SI from their old insurer. Because consumers will no longer face the risk that another 
insurer will not accept them for a comparable SI, SI is no longer a switching cost for 
BI. Another long-term solution is the integration of BI and SI into one contract: the 
basic-plus-insurance (BPI). After the introduction of the BPI, open enrollment also holds 
for the supplemental benefits, while insurers are still allowed to apply risk rating for the 
supplemental benefits within the BPI. The introduction of a BPI will not threaten the 
affordability of the basic benefits, because insurers are still bound to community-rated 
premiums for these benefits. Given the assumption that the risk equalization model 
does sufficiently eliminate predictable differences in healthcare expenditures among 
risk groups of consumers, insurers’ incentives to satisfy consumer preferences will 
increase if SI is no longer a switching cost for BI.
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The backlash against selective contracting
If consumers are unwilling to give up (to some extent) their unlimited free choice of 
healthcare provider in return for a lower premium, insurers cannot selectively contract 
with healthcare providers. This implies that insurers cannot use their most effective 
instrument to enhance efficiency in healthcare. The United States were about 20 
years ago confronted with a substantial backlash against the most extreme types of 
selective contracting (i.e. ‘’the managed care backlash’’). Chapter 6 gives insight into 
(the causes of) this backlash and provides relevant lessons for the Netherlands. In the 
United States, the backlash against managed care came in particular from the health-
care providers and not from the consumers. Even during the ‘’managed care backlash 
period’’ an increasing proportion of consumers was willing to give up their unlimited 
free choice of healthcare provider in return for a lower premium. In 2002, almost all 
American consumers (i.e. 96 percent) had (to some extent) given up their unlimited free 
choice of healthcare provider. However, the extent to which consumers gave up their 
choice of healthcare provider – in terms of the number of contracted providers and the 
reimbursement level for non-contracted providers – decreased. Initially, insurers offered 
insurance products that did limit consumer choice of healthcare provider severely (the 
so-called Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)). Consumers who did take out an 
HMO had only access to a limited number of contracted healthcare providers and did 
not receive any reimbursement if they visited non-contracted providers.29 During the 
American managed care backlash period, the demand for HMOs relatively declined, 
while insurance products with a larger provider network and a higher reimbursement 
level for non-contracted providers gained in popularity. Thus, the American experience 
shows that consumers are willing to give up to some extent their free choice of health-
care provider in return for a lower premium. Some selective contracting in healthcare 
may be sufficient to stimulate healthcare providers to deliver efficient care.
The analysis does further indicate that consumers will be more satisfied with their 
insurer if they could choose between an insurance product with a limited healthcare 
provider choice and a higher-priced insurance product with a more extensive choice 
of healthcare provider. A lesson for the Netherlands is therefore that insurers should 
offer consumers the choice between different insurance products. In addition, American 
consumers held the opinion that insurers were only interested in cost containment and 
not in the quality of care. Therefore, insurers should provide information to consumers 
on the quality of their contracted providers. In addition, insurers could overcome their 
credible commitment problem by using input from consumers in their decisions regard-
29 Because of insurers’ duty of care and because insurers’ reimbursement level for non-contract-
ed providers may not hinder consumers from visiting these providers, Dutch insurers will not 
be allowed to restrict consumer choice of healthcare provider as severely as the HMOs did.
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ing selective contracting.30 Three other important lessons for the Netherlands are: 1) 
provide information on the features and effects (in terms of price and quality) of selec-
tive contracting; 2) establish formal grievance mechanisms for consumers to contest 
denied care; and 3) limit the administrative costs associated with selective contracting.
Conclusion
The overall conclusion is that one essential precondition for achieving efficiency in 
healthcare – the disciplining effect of ‘voting with one’s feet’ – is currently not fulfilled 
for the high-risks. This reduces insurers’ incentives to be responsive to the preferences 
of these consumers. Insurers’ initiative to use open enrollment for SI for the enrollees 
who took out a comparable SI from their old insurer and the integration of BI and SI 
into one basic-plus-insurance are effective solutions to eliminate SI as a switching cost 
for BI. Currently, the Dutch risk equalization model undercompensates insurers for the 
chronically ill and overcompensates insurers for the healthy consumers. An increasing 
switching intention of the high-risks may increase insurers’ incentives to select against 
them; e.g. by not contracting with the best healthcare providers. This implies that under 
imperfect risk equalization a reduction of high-risks’ switching costs may eventually 
threaten the quality of care. Therefore, improving the risk equalization model is a neces-
sary complement of reducing high-risks’ switching costs.31
The improvements in consumer choice of insurer and the risk equalization model 
will increase insurers’ incentives to satisfy consumer preferences. The American ex-
periences show that consumers are willing to give up to some extent their unlimited 
free choice of healthcare provider in return for a lower premium. In the Netherlands, 
consumers did not have had the choice between an insurance product with a limited 
choice of healthcare provider and a higher-priced insurance product with a free choice 
of healthcare provider. Because Dutch consumers have to become used to this choice, 
it may take some time before they are willing to give up (to some extent) their unlimited 
free choice of healthcare provider. As soon as the demand for insurance products with 
a limited choice of healthcare provider increases, insurers can use their most effective 
tool to enhance efficiency in healthcare (i.e. selectively contracting with healthcare 
providers).
30 In April 2015, Dutch insurers announced that they will: 1) improve the information provided on 
their contracted provider network, 2) increase the input from consumers regarding contracting 
in healthcare, 3) reduce consumers’ switching barriers, and 4) improve the risk equalization 
model (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, 2015).
31 Recently, the Dutch minister of Health, Welfare and Sport announced that she aims at improv-
ing the risk equalization model (Schippers, 2015a).
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32 De tekst van dit proefschrift is afgerond op 1 juli 2015.
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De introductie van de Zorgverzekeringswet (Zvw) in 2006 was een belangrijke stap in 
de richting van gereguleerde concurrentie op de Nederlandse zorgverzekeringsmarkt. 
Jarenlang was het de overheid die de capaciteit en tarieven in de gezondheidszorg 
vaststelde. Deze top-down benadering bracht echter onvoldoende prikkels tot doel-
matigheid, kwaliteit en klantgerichtheid met zich mee. Vanaf begin deze eeuw heeft 
de Nederlandse overheid zich geleidelijk teruggetrokken wat betreft de planning en 
tariefstelling in de gezondheidszorg en zijn het de individuele zorgverzekeraars die 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor de zorginkoop. Zorgverzekeraars dienen met zorgaanbieders 
te onderhandelen over de prijs, kwaliteit en kwantiteit van de zorg. Om hun rol als 
kritische zorginkoper waar te kunnen maken, mogen zorgverzekeraars selectief zorg 
inkopen. De overheid bepaalt de spelregels van gereguleerde concurrentie. Gedurende 
de jaarlijkse overstapperiode dienen verzekerden de verzekeraar en het verzekerings-
product te kunnen kiezen die het beste aansluiten op hun preferenties. Verzekerden 
hebben hierbij de keuze tussen verzekeringsproducten met een beperkte keuzevrij-
heid van zorgaanbieder en duurdere verzekeringsproducten met een vrije keuze van 
zorgaanbieder.
De dreiging dat verzekerden overstappen naar een concurrent dient zorgverze-
keraars voortdurend te stimuleren om optimaal in te spelen op de preferenties van 
verzekerden. Doordat in de gezondheidszorg de preferenties van groepen verzekerden 
uiterst heterogeen zijn, kan een beperkte keuzevrijheid van bepaalde groepen verze-
kerden nadelige consequenties hebben. Zorgverzekeraars zullen dan minder prikkels 
hebben om in te spelen op de specifieke preferenties van de groepen verzekerden die 
zich niet vrij voelen om over te stappen dan op de preferenties van andere groepen 
verzekerden. De keuzevrijheid van verzekerden is derhalve een cruciale voorwaarde 
voor het slagen van gereguleerde concurrentie. De acceptatieplicht en het verbod op 
premiedifferentiatie voor de basisverzekering (BV), het door de overheid vastgestelde 
basispakket en het risicovereveningssysteem dienen de keuzevrijheid van verzekerden 
te waarborgen. Het is onduidelijk of alle groepen verzekerden met specifieke preferen-
ties zich ook daadwerkelijk vrij voelen om over te stappen naar een andere zorgver-
zekeraar. Het eerste doel van dit proefschrift is om dit na te gaan en om strategieën te 
formuleren die de keuzevrijheid van verzekerden kunnen vergroten. Deze resultaten 
worden gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 2 tot en met hoofdstuk 5.
Als verzekerden zich vrij voelen om over te stappen, kunnen zij de verzekeraar 
en het verzekeringsproduct kiezen die het beste aansluiten op hun preferenties. Veel 
gezondheidseconomen beschouwen selectieve zorginkoop als het meest effectieve 
instrument dat zorgverzekeraars voorhanden hebben om de doelmatigheid33 in de 
33 In navolging van Van de Ven et al. (2009) is doelmatigheid als volgt gedefinieerd: “zo laag 
mogelijke eenheidskosten bij een gegeven kwaliteit’’.
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gezondheidszorg te bevorderen. De geloofwaardige dreiging niet gecontracteerd te 
worden door een zorgverzekeraar – hetgeen kan leiden tot minder patiënten en een la-
ger inkomen – stimuleert de prijs- en kwaliteitsconcurrentie op de zorgverleningsmarkt. 
Als verzekerden echter niet bereid zijn hun volledige keuzevrijheid van zorgaanbieder34 
(enigszins) op te geven in ruil voor een premievoordeel, zullen zij niet kiezen voor de 
verzekeringsproducten met een beperkte keuze van zorgaanbieder. In dat geval zal 
gereguleerde concurrentie minder in staat zijn om de doelmatigheid in de gezondheids-
zorg te stimuleren. Terwijl Nederland pas recentelijk kennis heeft gemaakt met selec-
tieve zorginkoop, speelt selectieve zorginkoop al jarenlang een belangrijke rol op de 
Amerikaanse zorgverzekeringsmarkt. Ongeveer 20 jaar geleden hebben de Verenigde 
Staten te maken gehad met een flinke weerstand tegen de meest extreme vormen 
van selectieve zorginkoop. Het tweede doel van dit proefschrift is inzicht krijgen in de 
oorzaken die ten grondslag lagen aan deze weerstand en het formuleren van lessen 
voor Nederland. Deze resultaten worden besproken in hoofdstuk 6.
Jongeren stappen tien keer zo vaak over als ouderen
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft inzicht in het overstapgedrag van laagrisicoverzekerden (i.e. jonge of 
gezonde verzekerden) en hoogrisicoverzekerden (i.e. oude of ongezonde verzekerden) 
in de periode 2009-2012. De overstappercentages van beide groepen verzekerden zijn 
bepaald op basis van: 1) gegevensbestanden met objectieve gezondheidsinformatie en 
de verwachte zorgkosten van vrijwel de gehele Nederlandse bevolking (n=15,3 miljoen 
personen) en 2) 3-jarige steekproefgegevens (n=1.152 personen). De resultaten wijzen 
uit dat het overstappercentage substantieel verschilt tussen leeftijdsgroepen. Zo stap-
ten in 2009 verzekerden in de leeftijd 25-44 jaar 10 keer zo vaak over als verzekerden 
van 75 jaar of ouder. Naarmate de verwachte zorgkosten toenemen van een paar 
honderd euro tot 10.000 euro, daalt het overstappercentage van circa 5 procent tot 0,5 
procent. Gezonde verzekerden stapten in 2009 twee keer zo vaak over als ongezonde 
verzekerden, maar dit verschil verdwijnt grotendeels als gecorrigeerd wordt voor de 
leeftijdsverschillen tussen beide groepen.
Hoge overstapkosten voor hoogrisicoverzekerden
De vraag is waarom laagrisicoverzekerden meer geneigd zijn om over te stappen dan 
hoogrisicoverzekerden. Verzekerden zullen overstappen indien de verwachte overstap-
baten per saldo groter zijn dan de verwachte overstapkosten. Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft 
de volgende potentiële overstapbaten op de zorgverzekeringsmarkt: (1) premie, (2) 
34 De mate waarin verzekerden vrij zijn een zorgaanbieder te kiezen wordt bepaald door: 1) het 
aantal gecontracteerde zorgaanbieders door een zorgverzekeraar en 2) de hoogte van de 
vergoeding indien een niet-gecontracteerde zorgaanbieder wordt geraadpleegd.
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service van een verzekeraar, (3) zorginkoopbeleid van een verzekeraar, (4) dekking van 
de aanvullende verzekering (AV) en (5) welkomstacties. Mogelijke overstapkosten zijn 
daarentegen: (1) transactiekosten, (2) leerkosten, (3) het verlies van verworven voorde-
len, (4) onzekerheidskosten, (5) de kosten van het (niet) overstappen naar een andere 
zorgaanbieder en (6) verzonken kosten. Gedurende de onderzochte overstapperioden 
waren de overstapbaten van laagrisico- en hoogrisicoverzekerden min of meer gelijk. 
Hogere overstapkosten voor hoogrisicoverzekerden dan voor laagrisicoverzekerden 
vormen een verklaring voor de bevinding dat hoogrisicoverzekerden minder geneigd 
zijn om over te stappen dan laagrisicoverzekerden. Een vragenlijst onder 1.091 verze-
kerden wijst uit dat ongeveer 43 procent van de niet-overstappers één van de mogelijke 
overstapkosten als de belangrijke reden heeft aangedragen om niet over te stappen 
naar een andere zorgverzekeraar. In totaal benoemde 55 procent van de verzekerden 
met een slechte of matige gezondheid één van de overstapkosten als de belangrijkste 
reden om niet van zorgverzekeraar te veranderen.
De aanvullende verzekering als overstapkost
Voor 16 procent van de niet-overstappende verzekerden vormt het mogelijke verlies van 
de verworven voordelen bij de huidige zorgverzekeraar de belangrijkste reden om niet 
over te stappen. Hoofdstuk 4 en hoofdstuk 5 focussen zich op één van de mogelijke 
verworven voordelen die een verzekerde kan verliezen, indien hij of zij overstapt naar 
een andere zorgverzekeraar: het verlies van de verworven voordelen ten aanzien van 
de aanvullende verzekering (AV). Ongeveer 85 tot 90 procent van alle verzekerden sluit 
vrijwillig een AV af voor zorgvormen die niet gedekt worden door de basisverzekering 
(BV) en meer dan 99 procent van hen heeft de BV en AV bij dezelfde zorgverzekeraar 
afgesloten. De beslissing om al dan niet over te stappen voor de BV wordt daarom mede 
ingegeven door de verwachte overstapbaten en overstapkosten ten aanzien van de AV. 
Voor de AV mogen zorgverzekeraars premiedifferentiatie en risicoselectie toepassen. 
Wel hebben de verzekeraars, zonder dat hiervoor een wettelijke plicht bestaat, in alle 
aanvullende verzekeringen de clausule van stilzwijgende verlenging van de verzekering 
tegen de standaardpremie en standaardvoorwaarden opgenomen.
Op basis van een vragenlijst (n=992 in 2011 en n=881 in 2012) is bepaald in hoe-
verre verzekerden de AV als een overstapkost ervaren voor de BV. Zowel in 2011 als 
in 2012 verwachtte ongeveer 10 procent van de respondenten door een andere zorg-
verzekeraar niet geaccepteerd te worden voor de AV. Daarnaast vermoedde 20 procent 
van de respondenten wel geaccepteerd te worden door een andere zorgverzekeraar, 
maar uitsluitend tegen een hogere premie dan andere verzekerden met dezelfde AV. 
Voornamelijk hoogrisicoverzekerden beschouwen de AV als een overstapkost voor de 
BV: ongeveer een derde van de 55-plussers en meer dan de helft van de verzekerden 
met een slechte of matige gezondheid uitten de verwachting dat hun huidige zorgver-
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zekeraar de AV tegen gunstigere voorwaarden zou afsluiten dan andere verzekeraars 
zullen doen voor dezelfde AV.
Vervolgens zijn we nagegaan of de AV daadwerkelijk een overstapkost vormt voor de 
BV. Zorgverzekeraars kunnen drie instrumenten toepassen om zichzelf te beschermen 
tegen antiselectie op de verzekeringsmarkt: (1) risicoselectie, (2) premiedifferentiatie 
en (3) productdifferentiatie. Deze instrumenten hebben uiteenlopende gevolgen voor 
de AV als overstapkost voor de BV. Vanwege de jaarlijkse stilzwijgende verlenging van 
de AV, vormt de AV een overstapkost voor de BV indien zorgverzekeraars risicoselectie 
toepassen voor nieuwe verzekerden. Hoogrisicoverzekerden lopen het gevaar door een 
andere zorgverzekeraar niet geaccepteerd te worden voor de AV, terwijl hun huidige 
zorgverzekeraar de AV gegarandeerd verlengt. Daarentegen vormt de AV nauwelijks 
een overstapkost, indien zorgverzekeraars premiedifferentiatie of productdifferentiatie 
toepassen en risicoselectie afwezig is op de aanvullende verzekeringsmarkt. Andere 
verzekeraars zullen verzekerden een vergelijkbare premie vragen voor een soortgelijke 
AV als hun huidige verzekeraar doet. Van zes verschillende zorgverzekeraars is een 
medewerker geïnterviewd om na te gaan welke instrumenten zorgverzekeraars hebben 
gebruikt om antiselectie tegen te gaan. Voorts zijn hiertoe de polisvoorwaarden van 
verschillende aanvullende verzekeringsproducten (i.e. 159 producten in 2014 en 145 
producten in 2015) geanalyseerd. Naar voren komt dat verzekeraars terughoudend 
zijn met het toepassen van risicoselectie voor de AV. In 2015 hanteerde bijvoorbeeld 
86 procent van alle zorgverzekeraars een non-selectief acceptatiebeleid voor al hun 
aanvullende verzekeringen. De overige 14 procent hanteerde alleen gezondheidsvra-
genlijsten voor hun meest uitgebreide aanvullende pakketten. Dit zijn wel de pakketten 
waarin voornamelijk hoogrisicoverzekerden geïnteresseerd zijn. De AV vormt daarom 
een overstapbelemmering voor de hoogrisicoverzekerden die voor de BV over willen 
stappen naar één van de verzekeraars die een selectief acceptatiebeleid hanteert voor 
de AV. Aangezien echter het gros van de verzekeraars een non-selectief acceptatie-
beleid hanteert voor al hun aanvullende verzekeringen, kan gesteld worden dat een 
discrepantie bestaat tussen de verwachtingen van verzekerden en de daadwerkelijke 
werkwijze van de meeste verzekeraars. De AV als gepercipieerde overstapkost door 
hoogrisicoverzekerden is desalniettemin een serieus probleem, omdat verzekeraars 
verminderde prikkels zullen hebben om in te spelen op de preferenties van deze groep 
verzekerden.
Ten slotte zijn verschillende oplossingsrichtingen aangedragen om de AV als over-
stapkost voor de BV te verminderen. Een eerste oplossing is een informatiecampagne 
die hoogrisicoverzekerden wijst op hun overstapmogelijkheden. Vanwege de lage 
overstapgeneigdheid van hoogrisicoverzekerden hebben zorgverzekeraars echter de 
afgelopen jaren wellicht geen risicoselectie toe hoeven te passen voor de AV. Het is 
de vraag hoe verzekeraars zich zullen wapenen tegen antiselectie als de overstapge-
Samenvatting 157
neigdheid van hoogrisicoverzekerden toeneemt. Het is daarom van cruciaal belang om 
de werkwijze van verzekeraars in de aanvullende verzekeringsmarkt voortdurend te 
monitoren.
Zorgverzekeraars Nederland (ZN) heeft recentelijk aangegeven de AV als overstap-
kost voor de BV te willen verminderen door het uitgangspunt te hanteren dat een aspi-
rant verzekerde zonder acceptatievoorwaarden toegang heeft tot een AV, indien deze 
verzekerde bij de vorige zorgverzekeraar een vergelijkbare AV had. Verzekerden lopen 
hierdoor niet langer het risico geweigerd te worden door een andere zorgverzekeraar 
voor een soortgelijke AV en de AV is dus niet langer een overstapkost voor de BV. De AV 
vormt verder niet langer een overstapkost voor de BV, indien de BV en AV geïntegreerd 
worden in een basisplus-polis. Na de introductie van de basisplus-polis zullen verzeke-
raars namelijk ook iedereen moeten accepteren voor de aanvullende zorgvormen. Voor 
de basiszorg zal het verbod op premiedifferentiatie blijven bestaan, maar verzekeraars 
zullen wel premiedifferentiatie toe mogen passen voor de aanvullende zorgvormen. 
Onder de veronderstelling dat het risicovereveningsmodel voldoende corrigeert voor de 
verwachte kostenverschillen tussen verzekerden, zullen de prikkels van verzekeraars 
om in te spelen op de preferenties van hoogrisicoverzekerden toenemen als de AV niet 
langer een overstapkost vormt voor de BV.
Weerstand tegen selectieve zorginkoop
Als verzekerden niet bereid zijn hun volledig vrije keuze van zorgaanbieder (enigszins) 
op te geven in ruil voor een premiekorting, zullen verzekeraars het meest effectieve in-
strument dat zij hebben om de doelmatigheid in de gezondheidszorg te bevorderen – na-
melijk selectieve zorginkoop – niet kunnen gebruiken. Hoofdstuk 6 geeft inzicht in de 
oorzaken die ten grondslag lagen aan de weerstand tegen selectieve zorginkoop in de 
Verenigde Staten en formuleert lessen voor Nederland. De analyse van de Amerikaanse 
zorgverzekeringsmarkt wijst uit dat de weerstand tegen de zorgverzekeraar als zorgin-
koper vooral vanuit de zorgaanbieders kwam en niet zozeer vanuit de verzekerden. Zo 
nam gedurende de weerstandsperiode het percentage verzekerden dat bereid was zijn 
volledig vrije keuze van zorgaanbieder op te geven in ruil voor een premiekorting toe. In 
2002 had vrijwel iedere Amerikaan – namelijk 96 procent van alle verzekerden – geko-
zen voor een verzekeringsproduct met een beperkte keuzevrijheid van zorgaanbieder. 
De mate waarin verzekerden hun keuzevrijheid van zorgaanbieder – in termen van 
het aantal gecontracteerde zorgaanbieders en de hoogte van de vergoeding voor niet-
gecontracteerde zorgaanbieders – opgaven in ruil voor een premiekorting nam wel af. 
Verzekeraars boden in eerste instantie voornamelijk verzekeringsproducten aan die de 
vrijheid van verzekerden om een zorgaanbieder te kiezen, vrijwel volledig beperkten (i.e. 
‘Health Maintenance Organizations’ (HMO’s)). Verzekerden die voor deze producten 
kozen, hadden slechts toegang tot een beperkt aantal gecontracteerde zorgaanbieders 
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en ontvingen geen vergoeding indien zij niet-gecontracteerde zorgaanbieders raad-
pleegden.35 Tijdens de weerstandsperiode nam in Amerika de vraag naar HMO’s relatief 
af en nam de populariteit van verzekeringsproducten met een groter gecontracteerd 
zorgaanbod en een hogere vergoeding voor niet-gecontracteerde zorgaanbieders toe. 
De Amerikaanse ervaring leert ons dat verzekerden bereid waren hun keuzevrijheid 
van zorgaanbieder enigszins op te geven in ruil voor een premiekorting. Een beperkte 
mate van selectieve zorginkoop door zorgverzekeraars kan echter al voldoende zijn om 
zorgaanbieders tot doelmatigheid te stimuleren.
De analyse wijst verder uit dat verzekerden meer tevreden met hun zorgverzekeraar 
zijn, indien zij de keuze hebben tussen een verzekeringsproduct met een geringe keuze 
van zorgaanbieder en een duurder verzekeringsproduct met een uitgebreide keuze van 
zorgaanbieder. Een les voor Nederland is dus dat verzekerden de keuze moeten hebben 
tussen verschillende verzekeringsproducten. Daarnaast bleken Amerikaanse verzeker-
den de perceptie te hebben dat verzekeraars bij hun zorginkoop meer geïnteresseerd 
zijn in de prijs dan in de kwaliteit van zorg. Het is daarom belangrijk dat verzekeraars 
inzicht verschaffen in de kwaliteit van de door hen gecontracteerde zorgaanbieders. 
Voorts zal het vertrouwen van verzekerden in hun zorgverzekeraar toenemen, indien 
verzekeraars bij het vaststellen van hun zorginkoopbeleid input van verzekerden ge-
bruiken.36 Drie andere lessen die op basis van de Amerikaanse ervaringen getrokken 
kunnen worden zijn: 1) informeer verzekerden over de kenmerken en de effecten van 
selectieve zorginkoop; 2) zorg voor effectieve klachtenprocedures voor verzekerden; 
en 3) beperk de administratieve lasten.
Conclusie
De conclusie is dat een essentiële voorwaarde voor het slagen van gereguleerde concur-
rentie – de keuzevrijheid van zorgverzekeraar – nog niet vervuld is voor hoogrisicover-
zekerden. Zorgverzekeraars hebben hierdoor verminderde prikkels om in te spelen op 
de specifieke preferenties van hoogrisicoverzekerden. Een effectieve oplossingsrichting 
om de AV als overstapkost te verminderen voor de BV is het initiatief van verzekeraars 
om een aspirant verzekerde zonder acceptatievoorwaarden te accepteren voor de AV, 
indien deze verzekerde bij de vorige verzekeraar een vergelijkbare AV had. Daarnaast 
35 Vanwege de zorgplicht en het hinderpaalcriterium (i.e. de vergoeding voor niet-gecontracteer-
de zorgaanbieders mag geen hinderpaal voor verzekerden vormen om deze zorgaanbieders 
te raadplegen) zullen Nederlandse verzekeraars de keuzevrijheid van zorgaanbieder momen-
teel niet volledig mogen beperken zoals de HMO’s deden.
36 In april 2015 heeft Zorgverzekeraars Nederland (ZN) kenbaar gemaakt dat zorgverzekeraars 
de transparantie omtrent hun zorginkoop en de invloed van verzekerden op hun beleid willen 
vergroten. Daarnaast beogen zorgverzekeraars de overstapbelemmeringen voor verzekerden 
weg te nemen en het risicovereveningsmodel te verbeteren.
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vormt de integratie van de BV en AV in een basisplus-polis een effectieve oplossings-
richting. Het huidige risicovereveningsmodel is imperfect: de financiële compensaties 
voor diverse groepen van hoogrisicoverzekerden schieten substantieel tekort, terwijl 
zorgverzekeraars overgecompenseerd worden voor diverse groepen van laagrisicover-
zekerden. Een hogere overstapgeneigdheid van hoogrisicoverzekerden kan de prikkels 
van zorgverzekeraars om risicoselectie toe te passen voor de BV vergroten. Het niet 
contracteren van de beste zorgaanbieders voor hoogrisicoverzekerden is een vorm 
van risicoselectie die verzekeraars kunnen toepassen. De vermindering van de over-
stapkosten van hoogrisicoverzekerden vormt onder imperfecte risicoverevening een 
serieuze bedreiging voor de kwaliteit van zorg. Een verlaging van de overstapkosten 
van hoogrisicoverzekerden dient daarom hand in hand te gaan met een verbetering van 
het risicovereveningsmodel.37
De toename van de keuzevrijheid van verzekerden op de zorgverzekeringsmarkt 
en de verbetering van het risicovereveningsmodel zullen de prikkels van zorgverze-
keraars om in te spelen op de preferenties van verzekerden vergroten. De ervaring in 
de Verenigde Staten met selectieve zorginkoop laat zien dat verzekerden bereid zijn 
hun keuzevrijheid van zorgaanbieder enigszins op te geven in ruil voor een premie-
korting. Nederlandse verzekerden hebben echter nooit de keuze gehad tussen een 
verzekeringsproduct met een beperkte keuzevrijheid van zorgaanbieder en een duur-
der verzekeringsproduct met een volledig vrije keuze van zorgaanbieder. Aangezien 
verzekerden zullen moeten wennen aan deze verandering, zal het even duren voordat 
zij bereid zullen zijn hun volledig vrije keuze van zorgaanbieder op te geven. Zodra de 
vraag naar verzekeringsproducten met een beperkte keuzevrijheid van zorgaanbieder 
toeneemt, zullen zorgverzekeraars het meest krachtige instrument dat zij voorhanden 
hebben – namelijk selectieve zorginkoop – kunnen toepassen om de doelmatigheid in 
de gezondheidszorg te bevorderen.
37 Minister Schippers heeft onlangs kenbaar gemaakt in te zetten op een verbetering van het 
risicovereveningsmodel (Schippers, 2015a).
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Wat een ontzettend mooi moment om het dankwoord te mogen schrijven. Ook al heb ik 
vaak geroepen dat het schrijven van een proefschrift zo eenzaam en alleen is, zonder 
de steun en hulp van verschillende mensen was dit proefschrift er nooit gekomen. Deze 
mensen wil ik via deze weg dan ook heel graag hartelijk bedanken!
Allereerst Wynand: ontzettend bedankt voor de prettige en informele begeleiding. 
Altijd nam je de tijd om mijn vragen te beantwoorden en mijn stukken grondig te lezen. 
Ik heb ontzettend veel geleerd van de vele brainstormsessies en discussies die we 
in de afgelopen jaren hebben gehad. Ook al zat ik soms vast met mijn onderzoek, je 
gaf me altijd het vertrouwen dat het goed zou komen. Dit steuntje in de rug heeft mij 
geholpen dit proefschrift af te ronden. Ilaria, ook jou wil ik heel erg bedanken voor je 
fijne begeleiding, je altijd kritische blik en de gezellige gesprekken die we de afgelopen 
jaren hebben gehad. Ondanks je drukke baan maakte je toch tijd vrij om mij te blijven 
begeleiden, waarvoor veel dank. Laten we snel weer een keertje gaan lunchen!
Ik wil de leden van de beoordelingscommissie (Prof.dr. P.P. Groenewegen, Prof.dr. 
W.N.J. Groot en Prof.dr. F.T. Schut) en de promotiecommissie (dr. A.H.E. Koolman en 
Prof.dr. J.A.M. Maarse) bedanken voor het beoordelen van mijn proefschrift en voor het 
opponeren tijdens de verdediging.
Een deel van de data is in samenwerking met de Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit (NZa) 
verzameld. Ik wil via deze weg de NZa, en in het bijzonder Katalin Katona, bedanken 
voor de fijne samenwerking.
Ik wil verder graag mijn ZKV-collega’s bedanken: Anne-Fleur, Daniëlle, Edith, Erik, 
Frank, Kayleigh, Marco, René, Richard, Rudy, Stéphanie, Suzanne en Trea. Bedankt 
voor de fijne werkomgeving en de leuke appelkanjer-momenten. Erik, bedankt voor 
je constructieve feedback op de verschillende artikelen. Trea, bedankt voor de fijne 
samenwerking voor Statistiek. Ik ben erg blij met de kansen en ruimte die jij mij gebo-
den hebt om me op onderwijsgebied verder te ontwikkelen. Suzanne, het was fijn om 
kamergenoten te zijn. Ik kijk met veel plezier terug naar de congressen die we samen 
bezocht hebben. Daniëlle, wat vond ik het gezellig dat jij de sectie bent komen verster-
ken. Bedankt voor je interesse en de altijd leuke gesprekken. Laten we contact houden!
Daarnaast wil ik de ‘Norbertusmeiden’ bedanken. Daphne, Lizet, Margot, Marise en 
Mirthe: het was fijn om het wel en wee van mijn proefschrift met jullie te kunnen delen. 
Ik ben blij dat het ondanks de drukke agenda’s lukt om elkaar geregeld te zien!
Mijn proefschriftperiode ben ik samen met jou, Kayleigh, begonnen. En wat vind ik 
het mooi deze periode met jou aan mijn zijde af te mogen sluiten. Al snel ben ik je naast 
een collega ook als een goede vriendin gaan beschouwen. Wat was het fijn om altijd 
mijn hart bij jou te kunnen luchten. Bedankt voor je oprechte interesse! Ons ‘Schiphol-
avontuur’ vergeet ik nooit meer; wat hebben we toen toch gelachen. Dat we nog maar 
veel gezellige etentjes en dagjes weg met elkaar mogen hebben!
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Sabine, mijn lieve zusje, wat vind ik het bijzonder, maar bovenal fijn, dat jij vandaag 
(waarschijnlijk in een prachtige jurk) naast me staat. Eén ding is zeker: met jou is het la-
chen geblazen. De ene keer heb je een grappig verhaal of een goede mop te vertellen, 
de andere keer heb je op het internet een komisch filmpje gespot. Of het kan zomaar 
zijn dat ons allebei iets opvalt waardoor een ontzettende lachbui opkomt. Ik vind het zo 
mooi om te zien dat je helemaal je plek hebt gevonden als docente Nederlands. Ik ben 
trots op je!
Lieve papa en mama, zo ontzettend bedankt voor jullie onvoorwaardelijke liefde, 
vertrouwen, steun en interesse. Altijd was daar een luisterend oor en klonken er op-
beurende woorden. Jullie staan echt altijd voor me klaar. Ik kan me geen betere ouders 
wensen! Een groot deel van het proefschrift heb ik bij jullie thuis geschreven. Jullie 
gezelligheid maakte het schrijven zoveel leuker. Mam, wat is het altijd een feest om met 
jou het weekend in te luiden en op mijn thuiswerkdagen samen te lunchen. Bedankt 
voor je nuttige commentaar op de samenvatting! Pap, ik zie ons nog gezellig ‘proefrij-
den’ naar Rotterdam. Ik had je toen een heerlijke kop koffie beloofd, maar al kletsend 
nam ik de verkeerde afslag. Die koffie heb je nog steeds van me tegoed! Wat is het fijn 
dat ik je altijd voor alles en nog wat kan bellen.
De laatste woorden zijn voor jou lieve Wesley. Jouw liefde, geloof in mij en het fijne 
thuis dat je me biedt zijn echt van onschatbare waarde geweest. Als ik vastzat met mijn 
onderzoek, nam je altijd uitgebreid de tijd om naar me te luisteren en mee te denken. 
En zoals het een adviseur in hart en nieren betaamt, kwam je vervolgens altijd met een 
goed advies. Dit alles maakt dat dit proefschrift ook een beetje van jou is. Bedankt voor 
al die kilometers die je voor mij omgereden bent. Samen de files trotseren is zoveel 
leuker dan alleen. Ik kan niet wachten totdat het 3 juni is: de dag waarop ik volmondig 
‘Ja, ik wil’ tegen je zeggen mag!
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Consumer choice of health insurer is an essential precondition for achiev-
ing efficiency and consumer responsiveness in healthcare. In healthcare, 
consumer preferences are highly heterogeneous. This implies that if groups 
of consumers with specific preferences feel not free to switch insurer, 
insurers have lower incentives to accommodate the specific preferences 
of these consumers than the preferences of other consumers. This thesis 
examines whether all groups of consumers with specific preferences feel 
free to easily switch insurer in the Netherlands and formulates strategies 
to improve consumer choice of insurer. 
If consumers feel free to switch insurer, they will be able to choose the 
insurance product that best satisfies their preferences. Analysts consider 
selective contracting with healthcare providers as the main tool that insur-
ers have to stimulate efficiency in healthcare. If consumers are unwilling 
to give up their unlimited free choice of healthcare provider in return for a 
lower premium, they will not take out the insurance products with a limited 
healthcare provider choice. Because the threat of selective contracting will 
then be substantially reduced for healthcare providers, regulated competi-
tion will be less able to enhance efficiency in healthcare. The United States 
were confronted with a substantial backlash against selective contracting. 
The thesis evaluates the causes of this backlash and seeks lessons for 
Dutch insurers and policymakers. 
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